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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a study of lordship and its expression through the Catholic League 
army’s institutions during the early years of the Thirty Years War.  It draws on letters, 
reports and other chancery documents from the Bavarian State Archive to examine how 
duke Maximilian I of Bavaria (r 1597-1651) and his officers re-negotiated their 
respective command privileges within the army so as to better accommodate each other’s 
practices of lordship through its operations.  In exchange for their continued investment 
in his military power the duke’s officers, that is, his military contractors, bargained to 
preserve, and then expand, customary lordly prerogatives within their commands.  
More broadly the dissertation argues that Maximilian’s negotiations with his 
contractors reflected deeper struggles among the Holy Roman Empire’s nobilities over 
how to incorporate their own lordship within the evolving structures of the imperial state.  
Nobles who fought in Maximilian’s service staked their wealth and landed power on his 
success in securing a preeminent position relative to the monarchy and, with it, their own 
place among the empire’s governing elite.   
 In the process the dissertation probes and questions the role historians have 
usually assigned military contractors within wider processes of state-formation in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe and, in particular, the Holy Roman Empire.  It 
views contractors not as profiteering mercenaries who pursued war for gain at the state’s 
expense, but rather as elites who sought to invest in modes of power-sharing that would 
preserve and strengthen their military role in governance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In early May, 1621, eager recruits began to trudge from afar into Geiselhöring, a small 
north-Bavarian market town nestled in Straubing’s hinterlands along the Danube.  May 
might have fallen late in the spring recruitment season, but duke Maximilian I of Bavaria 
(r 1597-1651) had delayed further musters in the hope that the “winter king,” Frederick V 
of the Palatinate (r 1610-1623) could be persuaded to reconcile with emperor Ferdinand 
II (r 1619-1637) and lay down arms.  Instead Frederick’s general, Ernst von Mansfeld, 
held the Upper Palatinate against Catholic League troops and threatened to engulf the 
entire central highlands in further costly campaigns.  Rather than draw down his forces 
Maximilian now found himself raising new regiments to join the second field army he 
was amassing around Straubing.  Once mustered the new troops would cross the Danube 
into the forested Palatine hills, subdue the rebel towns and castles one by one, block 
Mansfeld’s retreat westward and give Maximilian’s general, Johann Tserclaes von Tilly, 
time to push through the mountains from Bohemia and complete the outlaw’s 
encirclement. 
 In three years’ fighting the Catholic League’s war efforts had become familiar 
stories to Geiselhöring’s people.  Straubing, seat to the duke’s northernmost regional 
administrator [Rentmeister], frequently served as a staging area for Bavarian arms.  Its 
surrounding villages and markets hosted prospective soldiers who awaited muster into the 
new regiment being created under colonel Friedrich von Gaisberg, military contractor and 
captain of the duke’s household guard.  Georg Meisl, a local journeyman tailor, had 
enlisted three years before, during the League’s first recruitment drive.  He helped subdue 
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the rebel estates in Upper Austria, the “land above the Enns,” and in Bohemia, two brutal 
campaigns that left over half the League’s troops dead from vicious partisan tactics and 
the “Hungarian fever,” typhus.  Meisl decided he had seen enough and returned from the 
wars to take up residence with his brother Simon in nearby Engolsbach.  He resumed his 
old craft as a tailor in Geiselhöring. 
 One afternoon Meisl found himself taking refreshment with some fellow 
journeymen at a well-known alehouse.1  Its proprietor, local brewer Christoph 
Reuttlinger, and his wife, Barbara, tried to benefit from periodic musters by serving drink 
to the thirsty soldiery.  Earlier they had welcomed Hans Jacob Mornault, a would-be 
recruit who had traveled to sign up with Hans Adam Wager von Hohenkirchen, 
Gaisberg’s colonel-lieutenant.  Presently two more soldiers arrived to join him, one 
Bernhard Beurl in Wager’s company, and another man named Georg under a different 
captain, Steinbeck.  Both ordered up some beer and conversed with Mornault.  Next, an 
officer from Wager’s company arrived and announced himself as Michael Khugler von 
Falkenfels.  Soon Meisl, too, made himself known as a fellow veteran and joined the 
group with his companions to swap stories from past campaigns.  Wager’s men asked 
where Meisl had fought previously and if he, too, had come to sign on under the Bavarian 
prince. 
                                                                                                              
1 Fatiga, Maximilian’s commissioner assigned to oversee the Straubing muster, describes the incident in his 
letter to Maximilian and attaches further reports from the Gieselhöring councilmen, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 
590-599, May 1, 1621, Fatiga to Maximilian. 
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 Meisl replied that he had already served the Bavarian prince once during the late 
wars in Austria and Bohemia.  He had, in fact, become familiar with Georg’s own 
captain, Steinbeck, in the land above the Enns.  But Meisl judged that Steinbeck had 
earned a poor reputation during the adventure.  Rather than lead his men reputably 
(redlich) like a warrior (Kriegsmann) he instead neglected and swindled them like a 
rogue (Schelm).  He did himself such discredit that Meisl never saw more than two or 
three soldiers willing to follow him in his company, he said.   
Meisl’s insult to the captain seems to have charged the conversation.  Beurl was 
unwilling to go so far as to call Steinbeck a rogue, perhaps a debaucher at most.  But 
Meisl went on to say that the Bavarian prince himself never treated his men reputably, 
either.  Maximilian never came through with what he owed them.  During the duke’s 
campaigns his own soldiers had been reduced to beggars and had to plead with him 
shamefully for their back pay.  Maximilian was no true warrior, Meisl proclaimed, 
merely a cow thief, and no good soldier should ever let himself be seen in the duke’s 
service.  Meisl himself left the army in disgust after the Bohemian war. 
Meisl’s comments shocked Reuttlinger’s guests.  Reports fall silent on subsequent 
events but it seems Meisl fled the brewery and left town while the soldiers reported him 
to Fatiga, the duke’s commissioner assigned to the Straubing muster.  Fatiga arranged his 
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pursuit, apprehended him in a neighboring village, and had local officials arrest and take 
him into custody.2 
Fatiga’s letter calls attention to how lordship shaped the bonds between captains 
and their soldiers in the army.  Lordship, as an historical concept, largely refers to 
practices and institutions associated with landed power, noble privilege, and feudal 
hierarchies in medieval and early modern European societies.  Noble lords, described in 
ideal-typical terms, controlled rural society as warrior elites and derived power from their 
landholdings, legal rights, judicial prerogatives, and networks of clients and dependents 
in the countryside.  Lords held custodianship over their dependents, offered them 
largesse, hospitality and employment in their households, and protected them from 
danger and disaster.  Nobles strove continuously to prove their lordly standing by 
asserting their prerogatives and by mobilizing large retinues and followings to 
demonstrate their mastery, often through violence. 
In their correspondence, Maximilian, his officials and his officers seem to have 
envisioned each company as its captain’s lordly retinue.  Captains recruited soldiers as 
their followers on the promise that they would provide good leadership, generous 
maintenance and lavish loot and booty on campaign.  Soldiers in turn would fight well 
and uphold the captain’s good name.  Meisl’s accusation that Steinbeck treated his 
company poorly, like a rogue rather than a warrior, challenged the captain’s reputation 
                                                                                                              
2 Fatiga discusses in his report to Maximilian, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 590-599, May 1, 1621, Fatiga to 
Maximilian. 
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and implied his men should not follow him.  His soldiers quickly rose to defend him and, 
by extension, their own corporate dignity as his men.   
Meisl’s insult maligned not only Steinbeck and his company but also, to a lesser 
extent, the colonel he followed.  Wager’s men had little stake in Steinbeck’s reputation, 
but Wager, like Steinbeck, followed colonel Gaisberg, trusted courtier to the duke, so 
they, too, jumped to Steinbeck’s defense.  Soldiers could scarcely tolerate such slights 
under normal circumstances, let alone when trying to entertain prospective recruits.  In 
many other instances that spring they refused to let similar insults go without a brawl.  
Far worse, then, for Meisl to claim that Maximilian, lord to every company and regiment 
in the army, forced his troops to beg for their pay.  Fatiga did not exaggerate when he 
claimed that Meisl’s injury to the duke’s reputation put every soldier’s manhood and 
honor to the question.   
Letters like Fatiga’s can yield valuable insight into the attitudes, priorities, 
customs and obligations that shaped how officers, soldiers and their warlord related to 
one another in the Catholic League’s army.  Letters, either dictated to scribes in the field 
or transcribed in council sessions at court, reflect performed narratives that invite 
ethnographic interpretation as acts of collective fiction and self-representation.  
Historians have, in the past, taken Maximilian’s chancery materials largely at face value, 
and have rarely used them except to inform political, diplomatic and operational histories.      
My dissertation instead uses letters, reports and other chancery documents to 
probe the army’s institutional culture and its transformation during the war’s early years.  
Between 1619 and 1626 Maximilian convinced his officers, that is, his military 
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contractors, to become more committed, financially, in his war effort in exchange for 
broader command prerogatives, quasi-proprietary autonomy in their companies and 
regiments, and generous latitude to pursue the hunt for spoils in partisan warfare.  
Officers, in an effort to strengthen their bargaining positions, used letters as occasions to 
prove, that is, to perform through narration, their quality and loyalty, on the one hand, 
and their credit among soldiers, on the other.  During negotiations over disciplinary 
policies and reimbursement they sought to establish their reputations, to advance their 
standing in the duke’s service, and to defend their traditional customs and liberties from 
Maximilian’s efforts to restrict them. 
 Negotiations between Maximilian and his officers, my historical subjects, provide 
an analytical vehicle with which to understand the institutional dynamics that shaped 
their dealings with one another.  My principal aim in tracing the army’s institutional 
history is to question and complicate the role historians have usually assigned military 
contractors within wider processes of state-formation in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Europe and, in particular, the Holy Roman Empire.  I argue that contentions 
between Maximilian and his contractors over how to run the army reflected, in their 
deeper sense, struggles within the empire’s nobility over how to incorporate lordship and 
noble power within the structures of the imperial state.   
 Maximilian, for his part, wielded influence by virtue of his proximity to the 
emperor and his standing within the imperial state.  His leadership in the Bavarian Circle 
and, after 1608, in the Catholic League enabled him to draw on broad political support 
for his initiatives.  In the years after 1619 his position as imperial commissioner, charged 
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to restore the public peace by force of arms, lent sanction to his military actions.  He may 
have owed his stature to the large principality he ruled and the autonomous wealth he 
commanded, and he did, during the war, pursue his own dynastic interests, but he could 
not have lawfully done so without broad constitutional authority.  Maximilian chose to 
incorporate his lordship within the state by using its institutions to mobilize his wealth, 
his influence and his supporters in service to the emperor in exchange for dynastic 
rewards.   
 Contractors readily served Maximilian because his constitutional position made 
him an influential power-broker within the empire.  His commission provided legal 
sanction for their conduct of war, and his access to the emperor enabled him to obtain for 
them lands, titles, and other rewards for their service.  Military contracting provided both 
greater and lesser nobles a chance to enter Maximilian’s and, through him, the emperor’s 
orbits.  In the context of ongoing imperial reform the contractors, by making themselves 
indispensible, might assure themselves an important military role as those who fought on 
the emperor’s behalf.  Maximilian might not have obtained their service or loyalty, and 
certainly not for so many years, had he operated solely as a dynast. 
 Disputes between Maximilian and his contractors arose, I argue, because the 
methods officers employed to exercise lordship within their own commands threatened 
the duke’s broader political legitimacy as imperial commissioner.  While on campaign, 
officers used open-table maintenance, that is, material support for their troops at their 
own expense, on the one hand, alongside the hunt for spoils in partisan warfare, on the 
other, to establish reputations and build credit in the ranks.  Maximilian, on the other 
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hand, sought to restrict their scope for partisan warfare because they often exceeded his 
constitutional authority, inflicted damage on law-abiding neutrals, and thereby 
undermined his political legitimacy and, by extension, his ability to exercise power 
within the imperial state. 
 My dissertation traces how Maximilian and his contractors re-shaped the Catholic 
League army’s institutional structures between 1619 and 1626 so as to better 
accommodate each other’s practices of lordship in its operations.  First, in 1619 and 
1620, officers tried to prevent Maximilian from abrogating their traditional lordly 
prerogatives to open-table maintenance and the hunt for loot and booty.  Second, in 1621 
and 1622, officers won back broad liberties to exercise those prerogatives in exchange for 
their continued investment in the army’s upkeep.  Third, between 1623 and 1624, they 
pushed more radical demands and gained not only explicit permission to take illegal 
plunder, but also quasi-proprietary rights in their commands.  Maximilian, in return for 
his concessions, gained financial support from his contractors, kept the army in being and 
thereby preserved his role as military power-broker among the empire’s nobles.   
During the years after 1626 League commanders began to take imperial 
contributions, albeit illegally, in order to sustain their investment, and thereby obviated 
any need for further intensive negotiations with the duke.  Later, in 1630, the electoral 
congress authorized Maximilian’s commanders to levy contributions as auxiliaries to the 
imperial army.  In so doing they fully incorporated Catholic League forces within the 
imperial state for the foreseeable future, until the League’s dissolution in 1635.  
Maximilian now enjoyed legal pretexts to allow plunder without undermining his 
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constitutional position.  Contractors, for their part, now stood secure in their role as the 
monarchy’s warriors, that is, as those who provided the men, material and expertise to 
pursue war for emperor and empire.  Maximilian and his contractors had, through 
negotiations, worked out symbiotic institutional arrangements that allowed both parties to 
integrate their own lordship into the imperial state through the Catholic League army. 
My dissertation advocates, in its broadest sense, renewed investigation into the 
role historians assign military contractors in the Holy Roman Empire’s historical 
development.  In the past scholars have viewed them as profiteering mercenaries, free 
agents who served foreign powers, particularist dynasts, and their own ambitions at the 
monarchy’s expense, and as lawless brigands whose depredations hindered rulers in their 
search for stability and prosperity.   
I suggest, to the contrary, that contractors did not pursue war primarily for 
financial or economic gain, although many did acquire extensive lands, nor did they 
undermine imperial reform.  Scholars should rather see their heavy investment as an 
effort to secure strong roles for themselves within the evolving imperial state, roles that 
accorded with their warrior identity.  Contractors who fought in Maximilian’s service 
staked their wealth and landed power on his success in securing a preeminent position 
relative to the imperial monarchy and, with it, their own position within the empire’s 
governing structures. 
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Military Contractors, the Thirty Years War and the “Devolution” in Warfare 
By examining how Maximilian and his contractors re-negotiated lordship within the 
army’s institutions my dissertation speaks to an extensive literature on state-formation, 
noble power and military change in early modern Europe.  In recent years many 
historians have argued that nobles, far from suffering a long period of decline after the 
fifteenth century, in fact bargained with rulers to produce new state forms whose 
constitutions guaranteed them stronger positions in governance.  Warfare, in this 
interpretation, did not simply strengthen central authority, but prompted rulers to deepen 
their ties to local elites and empower those who stood to benefit from cooperation.  Some 
scholars have, in addition, begun to re-interpret military contracting, too, as an important 
vehicle for such power-sharing.   
My work probes this line of study by investigating how nobles, that is, the duke 
and his contractors, negotiated power within the Catholic League army and, more 
broadly, the imperial state.  In more peripheral ways my claims concerning partisan 
warfare and military jurisdiction carry implications for ongoing discussions about the 
military revolution, the emergence of the civil-military divide, and the role of violence in 
early modern society and culture. 
 Discussions among historians about the relationship between war and society 
have been largely an outgrowth from observations in the social sciences on the character 
of states, and efforts to explain their development over time.  In this tradition the 
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pressures of warfare powerfully shape the state and its institutions.3  Modern states, so 
defined, employ standing armed forces, staffed with salaried professionals and 
administered by central bureaucracies, that monopolize violence, ensure internal peace, 
and secure or expand their borders.  Scholars believe military pursuits drove rulers to 
create new central administrations and fiscal institutions that could access and extract 
more resources from the societies they ruled.4  From the late fourteenth century onwards 
rulers tightened their control over their own domain lands to raise cameral revenue, 
levied new excise taxes and then, during the seventeenth century, created fiscal states that 
used strong tax bases to secure either public debts or other borrowing.  
 During the last fifty years the notion that Europe underwent a “military 
revolution” in the early modern period has organized an extensive literature on war’s role 
in European modernity.5  The original thesis and its many variations posit not simply that 
warfare itself drove state formation, but that particular changes in technology and tactics 
triggered new demands on military organization and finance that drove rulers to create 
new forms of bureaucracy and taxation.  Historians have since used the thesis to inform 
                                                                                                              
3 See for example Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H.H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills (New York: Routledge, 2007); and Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
4 See for example the influential Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); Richard Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991); and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic 
Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage, 1989). 
5 Geoffrey Parker’s remains the most influential version of the thesis, Geoffrey Parker, The Military 
Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); Michael Roberts’ original essay and articles by other contributors are reprinted in Clifford J. 
Rogers, ed. The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern 
Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1995). 
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discussions on how military pressures influenced how rulers and elites produced different 
republican or absolutist state forms, now termed fiscal-military states.6  Military 
revolution now serves as a shorthand concept to interpret the entire spectrum of military 
change across the early modern period.  
 Beyond state formation the broader literature on war and society has tried to 
locate military change within the period’s general history, in particular those narratives 
that trace the roots of capitalism and bourgeois society in Europe.7  State regulatory 
powers and monopolies on force are often held to have contributed, for example, to 
processes that encouraged discipline in human behavior and diminished violence in daily 
life for most people.  Historians forward theories about how, in the sixteenth century and 
afterward, people gradually internalized patterns of restraint and psychological 
inhibitions that accompanied the growth of monarchical power, urban society, modern 
business relationships, public law, and new philosophies that influenced authorities in 
their search for order.8  Scholars emphasize factors outside military pressures, like the 
                                                                                                              
6 Most begin from Barrington Moore’s classic Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and 
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1993), originally published in 1966, and 
include Brian M. Downing, ed. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and 
Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Theda Skocpol, 
Democracy, Revolution, and History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Thomas Ertman, Birth of 
the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
7 Major representatives include André Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979); Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 
1495-1715 (London: Routledge, 1992); J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620 
(Montreal: McGill Queen’s, 1998); and M.S. Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 
1618-1789 (Montreal: McGill Queen’s, 1998). 
8 Influential theorists include Max Weber, From Max Weber; Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), and his The Court Society, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New 
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concern for religious uniformity, good justice and conflict management, that drove state 
growth. 
 Rulers managed to foster new patterns of order, the argument sometimes goes, by 
developing standing armies and navies, first as objects to be restrained, and then as agents 
for its imposition.  Rulers restricted traditional forage and plunder rights, subjected troops 
to harsh discipline, and redefined soldiers as members in a distinct profession, the 
military, whose institutions stood apart from broader society.  By the turn of the 
eighteenth century many rulers kept permanent peacetime forces who behaved with 
restraint toward their own subjects, in theory, and reinforced the state’s newfound judicial 
and military power.  In the process they helped create the emerging civil-military divide 
and allowed rulers to pursue limited cabinet wars with minimal involvement by the local 
population. 
 Historians once believed rulers used their new military power to pacify the great 
magnates and regional nobilities who opposed their efforts to monopolize public 
authority.  Nobles entered a long period of decline, it was said, as growth in markets and 
trade diminished their power relative to the towns.  Rulers struck bargains to tax 
commercial wealth, drew learned burghers into their councils, created rational modern 
bureaucracies to administer their prerogatives and finances, and marginalized the 
                                                                                                              
  
York: Pantheon, 1983); Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(New York: Vintage, 1995). 
     14  
nobility’s role in government.  Nobles fought back to preserve their judicial and military 
rights, but rulers overcame their resistance, ended their local autonomy and forced them 
to enter state service at court, in the army and in administration alongside burghers.   
In time the nobles were transformed, in this view, from rustic warrior elites into 
urbane courtiers under crown control.  Only once the nobles had been tamed could rulers 
establish peace and prosperity within their realms.  In regions where the towns remained 
weak, on the other hand, as in central and eastern Europe, nobles captured the autocratic 
state for their own purposes and kept their societies backward relative to the west except 
where bourgeois influences touched them.9 
Older narratives like these, which understand transformations among European 
elites as products of broad political, social and cultural embourgeoisement, continue to 
shape how scholars view military change during the period.  Specialists argue that 
fighters re-invented how they approached their vocation as they struggled to figure out 
optimal responses to tactical infantry and master the technical challenges in siegecraft 
and ordinance.10  In this way the bold warrior, committed to the noble’s ideals of chivalry 
and personal prowess, gave way to the professional soldier, committed in his own way to 
the townsman’s technical proficiency and rational calculation.11  Soldiers succeeded to 
                                                                                                              
9 Some classic national studies along these general lines include Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the 
Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965); and Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and 
Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 (Boston: Beacon, 1966). 
10 On technical changes see Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, 
Technology, and Tactics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1997).   
11 See for example D.J.B. Trim, ed. The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism 
(Brill: Boston, 2003). 
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the extent they adopted the bourgeois ethos, and failed to the extent their officer corps 
held on to the old aristocratic ethos, seen as the chief obstacle to military professionalism 
in old regime armies.  
In recent decades, however, historians have dismantled narratives that suppose 
either absolute power on the part of the state or, indeed, any sharp divide between nobles 
in decline and bourgeois on the rise.  Renewed inquiries into Europe’s nobilities have 
demonstrated their continued vitality and adaptability late into the modern period.12  
Scholars describe how nobles pursued strategies to renew and consolidate their grip on 
power and culture, and they understand the state as a product of partnership between and 
among the crown and elites, not the ruler’s monopoly.13  Rather than tell grand narratives 
about the nobility as a whole, or try to split Europe into east and west, they instead 
explore the tremendous variation in noble experience both between societies and within 
them.  
 Scholars like Ronald Asch and Jonathan Dewald, for example, have become more 
inclined to describe wide-ranging processes of aristocratization, not embourgeoisement, 
                                                                                                              
12 See for example Arno Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York: 
Pantheon, 1981); the essential Michael Bush, Noble Privilege (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), and his 
Rich Noble, Poor Noble (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); the essays in Tom Scott, ed. The 
European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Vol. I: Western Europe (New York: 
Longman, 1995), and Tom Scott, ed. The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 
Vol. II: Northern, Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Longman, 1995); Rudolf Endres, ed. Adel in 
der Frühneuzeit: Ein regionaler Vergleich (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1991); H. Rössler, ed. Deutscher Adel 
1430-1555 (Darmstadt, 1953), and H. Rössler, ed. Deutscher Adel 1555-1740 (Darmstadt, 1964). 
13 See Hillay Zmora, Monarchy, Aristocracy and the State in Europe, 1300-1800 (New York: Routledge, 
2001). 
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among Europe’s elites by the late-seventeenth century.14  Nobles redefined themselves, in 
this view, by becoming a more homogenous social stratum with an established lifestyle 
and culture apart from the lower orders.  Families who hoped to establish positions for 
themselves in the halls of power, or to advance their fortunes more generally, tried to 
educate their children to display the cultivation, refinement and manners that would 
identify them as rightful members in urbane good society.  Some historians argue, 
further, that standing state armies, far from taming the nobles, in fact contributed to 
broad-ranged militarization in aristocratic life.15  By the late-seventeenth century 
aristocratic self-fashioning, the ongoing effort to prove that one belonged to the ruling 
elite, played a vital role in the production of modern society and culture.   
 In both older and newer narratives the “seventeenth-century crisis” or, more 
broadly, the period from roughly 1560 to 1660, served as a catalyst in the search for 
public order and new state institutions to manage conflict.16  Climate change, the price 
revolution and political upheavals contributed to widespread famine, poverty and 
lawlessness that prompted magistrates to crack down on social marginals and impose 
                                                                                                              
14 Ronald G. Asch, Nobilities in Transition: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe, 1550-1700 
(London: Arnold, 2003); Jonathan Dewald, Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: 
France, 1570-1715 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), and his The European Nobility, 1400-
1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
15 Christopher Storrs and Hamish M. Scott, “The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c.1600-
1800,” War in History 3:1 (1996): 1-41. 
16 Eric J. Hobsbawm, “The General Crisis of the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century,” Past and 
Present 5:1 (1954): 33-53; Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” Past 
and Present 16 (1959): 31-64; Trevor H. Aston, Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (New York: Basic Books, 
1965); Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford, 1975); 
and Geoffrey Parker, ed. The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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harsher criminal penalties.  Nobles, for their part, saw their landed incomes smashed and 
faced constant struggles over rights, privileges and jurisdictions.  Historians once thought 
this general crisis accelerated the supposed process of noble decline underway since the 
fifteenth century.  Rulers crushed one great rebellion after another and subdued the 
nobles by the late-seventeenth century, in this view.   
More recently, however, scholars have viewed the period’s civil wars as a long 
negotiation process whereby nobles and rulers worked out their respective positions 
within emerging state institutions.  Great magnates and other nobles re-invested their 
resources to become power-brokers at court and in administration.  They placed trusted 
clients in royal offices, law courts and military commands, and spun patronage webs out 
into the same provinces they had once ruled from the countryside.  Nobles and patricians 
mortgaged their lands and took on debts to afford their new offices and positions.  In 
exchange for the legal authority they gave up to the state they gained control over the 
legislative process and ensured that favorable laws protected their land rights and the 
privileges of rank.  In effect they traded rural lordship and autonomy for state power and 
fixed legal hierarchies that secured their position as rulers.     
 Recognition of the continuity in noble power has prompted specialists to re-
evaluate elites’ participation in warfare during the period.  Historians now believe nobles 
and other local power-holders cooperated with rulers to develop new military institutions 
that would both meet the demands of warfare and also preserve their privileged position 
as those who fought.  Many recent studies trace how rulers knitted together court 
patronage, networks of kinship and friendship among clients and allies, and worked out 
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new tax systems and mutual obligations to pull together the necessary resources.17  
Fiscal-military states depended upon empowering those who stood to benefit from 
cooperation, scholars now argue, whether in republican states based on contractual 
representation, or in absolutist states based on administrative power-sharing.   
Historians have recently favored the term “military devolution” to describe the 
process whereby rulers forged interdependent relationships with local power.18  My 
dissertation suggests that negotiations over the Catholic League army’s institutions can 
be understood as a means by which the emperor, Maximilian and the duke’s contractors 
sought to forge such interdependent relationships in the process of reforming the empire’s 
constitutional settlement.   
Devolution, as an historical concept, has prompted renewed interest in military 
contractors and their role in state formation.19  In the past most scholars considered them 
mercenaries, instruments for dynastic particularism and an obstacle to rulers in their 
search for stability and prosperity.  Contractors pursued war for economic gain, scholars 
said, either as impoverished nobles who hoped to make up for lost incomes, or magnates 
                                                                                                              
17 Representative examples include Stephen J. Gunn, Hans Cools and David Grummitt, War, State, and 
Society in England and the Netherlands 1477-1559 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); M.J. 
Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, C. 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); David Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470-1560 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and John Brewer’s classic The Sinews of Power: War, 
Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
18 See in particular the essays by Ronald G. Asch, Jan Glete, Stephen Gunn and David Parrott in European 
Warfare, 1350-1750, ed. Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trimm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
19 See for example the essays in Stig Förster, Christian Jansen and Günther Kronenbitter, eds. Rückkehr der 
Condottieri?  Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: Von der Antike bis zur 
Gegenwart (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010).  
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who saw an opportunity for profiteering.  Most had little interest in cooperation with the 
state except to enhance their own regional power at the ruler’s expense.  War for profit 
reached its peak during the seventeenth-century crisis, when contractors made war feed 
war and inflicted fire and ruin upon the populace until rulers developed strong enough 
fiscal institutions to do away with them later in the century.   
 Recently, however, scholars have begun to investigate military contracting as one 
expression of shared governance between rulers and elites and an expression of noble 
power and identity.20  Contractors used their access to wealth, credit, local power, and 
networks of friends and followers to provide rulers with resources, skills, expertise and 
manpower otherwise beyond their reach.  In return they gained lands, titles, offices and 
influence through the state, and used these to expand their clienteles and power.  Rulers 
did engage contractors most extensively during the early-seventeenth century, but they 
remained important to military efforts under the old regime, as well, particularly in the 
support services and colonial endeavors.  David Parrott goes so far as to argue that 
military contracting in some form, what he calls “public-private partnership,” has always 
been the norm throughout European history.  Only during one brief window, the period 
from roughly 1760 to 1960, have governments wished to establish state-run military 
institutions, and then only to make use of industrial technology and mass mobilization.     
 Other historians suggest, further, that dynasts themselves might be better 
understood as entrepreneurs who built their states in order to gain a competitive 
                                                                                                              
20 Most importantly David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in 
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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advantage in armed force.21  Economic in its outlook, this interpretation holds that 
societies always seek greater security for trade and reduced risk in business transactions.  
Leaders confer wealth and political power upon those parties who can provide the best 
protection at the lowest cost, that is, upon parties who possess the means for violence and 
sell it as a utility service. 
 Military contracting, in this view, differs little from other modes of rule elites 
employ to consolidate political power.  During the middle ages local elites offered the 
cheapest protection, but early modern rulers developed new “complex organizations” to 
marshal the skills, labor, information and capital necessary to produce violence at lower 
overall costs.  Such organizations included Italian-trace artillery fortresses, infantry 
regiments and battlefleet navies, all orchestrated, ultimately, by fiscal-military states.  
During the eighteenth century these states fostered greater prosperity, in this view, 
because they relieved subjects from the heavier costs of relying on local elites for 
protection.  My dissertation eschews any attempt to define “entrepreneurship,” rejects the 
term “enterpriser” in favor of “contractor,” and thereby avoids entanglement in wider 
debates about early modern capitalism. 
 Historians freely acknowledge, on the other hand, that warfare could serve not 
simply to integrate states, as in the decades around 1500, but also to unravel their 
                                                                                                              
21 This line of reasoning is associated with Jan Glete; see for example his War and the State in Early 
Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660 (London: 
Routledge, 2002), and his Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and 
America, 1500-1860 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993).  His work draws extensively on 
economic theorists, in particular Frederic C. Lane, Joseph Schumpeter, Douglas C. North. 
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constitutions and cause them to decline, as in the decades around 1600.  Since the 
nineteenth century historians have tended to measure a given state’s success in the 
seventeenth century by whether it emerged with strong monarchy and state-controlled 
military forces going into the eighteenth.  France, Brandenburg-Prussia and, to a lesser 
extent, Austria and Russia emerged with solid state foundations.  States that saw their 
monarchy weaken, like Spain, or that never established strong monarchy, like the Holy 
Roman Empire, failed the nationhood test and sank into decline, fated to become 
battlegrounds for stronger countries.   
In the empire’s case German nationalists established a long interpretive tradition, 
still influential today, that considered the Thirty Years War to have shattered German 
society, condemned the empire to long decay and delayed German nationhood by two 
centuries.  Imperial institutions ceased to function as a state, the princes became fully 
sovereign at the crown’s expense, and German lands became vulnerable to foreign 
intervention and manipulation.  Post-war scholars, too, have often interpreted the war as 
the foundational disaster in German modernity, responsible for authoritarian traditions 
that contributed to Germany’s militarism and aggressive nationalism in the industrial 
era.22 
 Military contractors tended, in this historiography, to shoulder a large portion of 
the blame for preventing the empire from forming a strong monarchy.  Most fought to 
advance their own fortunes, scholars said, with little interest in the causes they served or 
                                                                                                              
22 See Fritz Dickmann, Der Westfälische Frieden (Münster, 1959).  
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the constitutional questions involved.23  In the process they enabled lords great and small, 
any who could pay them, to pursue their own dynastic ambitions without regard for 
emperor’s authority.  Habsburg dynasts tried to use them to strengthen their clientage 
networks and build support for reforms to the monarchy, but in the end many worked 
against the Habsburgs’ and the empire’s common good.  In particular Albrecht von 
Wallenstein, the Bohemian nobleman who raised entire armies for Ferdinand between 
1625 and 1630, then again between 1631 and 1634, is often thought to have undermined 
the emperor’s policies to further his own interests.24  Others entered service with 
Denmark, Sweden or France, or served princes who made common cause with foreign 
powers, in an effort to carve out new principalities for themselves amid the empire’s 
tatters.  In this view contractors prevented the crown from developing strong enough 
military institutions to back up its statehood. 
In recent decades, however, historians have begun to view the Holy Roman 
Empire as a far more successful state than previously believed.  They describe how its 
constitution evolved through continuous reforms into a mixed or constitutional 
monarchy, both feudal and federal, that could be adapted, through compromise, to 
                                                                                                              
23 See wide-ranging discussions in Reinhard Baumann, “Die deutschen Condottieri. Kriegsunternehmertum 
zwischen eigenständigem Handeln und "staatlicher" Bindung im 16. Jahrhundert,” in Rückkehr der 
Condottieri?, 111-126; as well as Lothar Höbelt, “Götterdämmerung der Condottieri. Der Dreißigjährige 
Krieg,” in ibid., 127-140. 
24 On Wallenstein see Geoff Mortimer, Wallenstein: The Enigma of the Thirty Years War (New York: 
Palgrave, 2010); and Golo Mann, Wallenstein, His Life Narrated (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 
1976). 
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manage conflict within the realm.25  Imperial defense plays an important role in the new 
interpretations, but not the overwhelming importance assigned military institutions in 
other states.  
 Recent work on the Thirty Years War itself emphasizes how the conflict turned 
around contrary interpretations of the empire’s past and present reforms.26  Scholars no 
longer portray the war as a dynastic free-for-all between princes who aspired to 
sovereignty, but rather as a civil war between parties who sought to revise the 
constitution to better guarantee their rights, privileges and position within the polity. 
Legal constraints and considerations shaped their actions at every stage in the war.  In 
continuous assemblies, summits and negotiations, belligerent parties reached a series of 
compromises and military agreements that culminated in the Westphalian settlement.  
Some historians argue that the treaties should be seen not as a watershed in German 
history, but one more in a long line of successful reforms.   
My dissertation suggests that Maximilian’s contractors participated in his war 
effort precisely because they hoped to shape ongoing imperial reform to their advantage 
and ensure themselves strong positions within the monarchy.  Scholars have made similar 
efforts, albeit sporadic ones, to re-interpret the methods and strategies contractors used to 
                                                                                                              
25 See for example Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, Das heilige römische Reich deutscher Nation: vom Ende des 
Mittelalters bis 1806 (Munich: Beck, 2006); Thomas Brady, German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 
1400-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy 
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conduct the war in the field.  In the past most scholars have judged them ineffective 
campaigners, bereft of strategic purpose or vision.  Many have cited the contracting 
system as a reason for the war’s length and brutality, as mercenaries savagely squeezed 
local populations for profit.27  Unwilling to pay or supply the troops effectively their 
operations were determined entirely by the need for forage, supplies and billets rather 
than purposeful objectives.28 
Contractors, seen as capitalists, tried to recruit troops as cheaply as possible, 
historians suppose, and this meant they recruited low-quality “proletarianized” men who 
were as expendable as they were unreliable.  Soldiers held no attachment to their officers, 
in this view, except as laborers who often went on strike to insist on better conditions.29  
Most troops became little more than barbarous locusts, uninterested in their campaigns 
except to brutalize the populace for forage and valuables, and commanders hesitated to 
risk battle with such reluctant fighters.  Princes could seldom achieve their political goals 
with the military means at their disposal, historians have often believed, and this has led 
                                                                                                              
27 See for example Ronald G. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48 
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1997). 
28 See for example Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); and David Parrott, “Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The 
"Military Revolution",” in Military Revolution Debate, 227-251. 
29 See for example the classic Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A 
Study in European Economic and Social History, 2 vols (Wiesbaden: F.Steiner, 1964). 
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scholars to judge the entire Thirty Years War as a wasteful, futile and meaningless 
bloodbath.30 
 Most judgments like these concerning military effectiveness have turned on the 
relative importance of battles, sieges and supply lines, matters that have preoccupied 
military thinkers and historians during much of the industrial age.  In his original military 
revolution thesis Michael Roberts argued that Dutch and Swedish tactical reforms had, by 
the 1630s, more-or-less created the professional officer corps and, with it, the modern 
operational art centered on rapid movement and decisive battle.31  Geoffrey Parker’s 
work, on the other hand, far more influential now, emphasizes a revolution in ordinance 
and siegecraft in the decades around 1500 that dominated warfare until the French 
Revolution.  Colossal sieges made campaigns expensive, static, attrition-based, and 
indecisive for everyone, not just contractors, and battles became nearly irrelevant to 
successful operations.  
 Subsequent debates on whether Europe experienced a military revolution have, 
until recently, done little to revise traditional views about military contractors and their 
shortcomings.  Central to each version of the thesis is that military innovation forced 
rulers to create institutions that could best incorporate the new techniques and their 
associated personnel.  Contractors, operating outside the state, required only finances, 
                                                                                                              
30 For example C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), and Geoffrey 
Parker, ed. The Thirty Years’ War (London: Routledge, 1997). 
31 See Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,” in Military Revolution Debate, 13-35; and 
further discussion in Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from 
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and their techniques therefore play little role in the debate except where they increased 
costs.  Few historians believe any longer, as Roberts did, that commanders came up with 
revolutionary new ways to win battles beyond trying to optimize their use of cavalry, 
infantry and artillery.  Parker even argues that the decades around 1600 saw a sharp 
decline and regression in military methods due, in large part, to rulers’ over-reliance upon 
contractors to fight their wars.   
 Scholars who support the recent notion of a military “devolution,” on the other 
hand, credit contractors with an entirely different innovation, that is, the ability to sustain 
continuous operations in the field over many campaigns.32  In his work on military 
enterprise David Parrott suggests that historians should consider operational arts, not 
battle tactics or particular strategies, the most important innovation in early modern 
warfare.  He emphasizes the variety of approaches contractors used to produce results, 
the adaptability they showed in their approach to campaigns, and their astute use of 
business networks and contacts to keep their troops supported under many challenging 
situations.  Rewards for contractors’ financial commitment, in prestige and land, 
depended upon success, and their efforts allowed belligerents to deploy forces effectively 
for long-term conflicts. 
 Parrott argues, further, that their armies showed tremendous fighting quality and 
motivation during the Thirty Years War.  Contractors recruited the best soldiers they 
could find, not reluctant ruffians, and invested heavily to maintain their effectiveness, 
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cohesion and corporate identity in extended campaigns.  In their units they maintained a 
veteran core willing to march hundreds of miles in each campaign, serve many long years 
under adverse conditions and train raw recruits who, if they did not perish or desert, 
became veterans themselves.  As evidence for their motivation scholars point out the 
many ferocious battles they fought and the high casualty rates they endured, particularly 
among officers and senior commanders themselves, who led from the front.33  
 Scholarship on late medieval warfare, too, has sometimes credited contract-
retained fighters with similar innovation in sustained campaigning.34  Stipendiaries who 
went unpaid by their rulers, for example, found ways to live from the land that served, at 
the same time, to advance their military goals.  Campaigns integrated forage, raids, 
reprisals, sieges, and, when advantageous, pitched battles into an established concept of 
warfare that made little distinction between combat on the battlefield and combat on the 
“war ride.”35  Their methods helped establish a political economy that enabled rulers to 
deploy forces far afield for long periods beyond their near-term means.   
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 Historians have often acknowledged the many long-term continuities between 
fifteenth-century and eighteenth-century warfare.  In particular they emphasize the 
importance of sieges and attrition over battle-oriented offensives, save during the decades 
around 1500 before artillery fortresses became common.  Seldom do they recognize the 
continued, overwhelming predominance of partisan tactics, however.  In early modern 
contexts scholars tend to view forage, plunder and raids as emergency support efforts 
taken when commanders could not provide their troops with adequate supplies.  Frequent 
plunder, as evident during the Thirty Years War, is taken as a symptom of widespread 
supply breakdown, another intrinsic weakness to war by contract, else dismissed with 
truisms about how war always brings pillage.  Parrott, too, ignores small war when he 
describes how contractors sustained their troops.  By relegating partisan actions to the 
category of logistics, outside combat proper, historians see them as evidence not for an 
established method of war, but rather the absence of coherent strategy or deliberate 
military thought.  
 My dissertation posits that partisan warfare, and in particular the hunt for spoils, 
underpinned the Catholic League army’s institutional culture, political economy and 
campaign methods.  Some few scholars have tried to bring partisan warfare into the 
center of discussions about military change across the early modern period.36  Historians 
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of Spain, in particular, assign small war an important operational role during Spain’s 
efforts to hold dominion in Italy and the Netherlands.37  In trying to bring regions under 
secure control during the late-sixteenth century they developed what historians call the 
“Spanish School,” a strategy to suppress local resistance through fortress garrisons, small 
detachments and patrols, and commerce raids on land and sea.  They point out how the 
Spanish armies organized their companies to operate autonomously in detachments down 
to as small as ten men who could occupy, search and perform specialized tasks to combat 
both enemy troops and local fighters.   
 Scholars debate the extent to which German contractors tried, or had the 
resources, to replicate the Spanish strategy at various times during the Thirty Years War.  
Some argue they opted to pursue decisive battle in order to avoid long-term expenses, 
others believe they sought broad regional control in order to secure their power and 
wrong-foot the enemy.38  In few cases, however, do historians include combat between 
rival parties, or between soldiers and locals, within wider strategies to gain local 
superiority and collaboration.  Most historians treat local conflict as incidental violence 
when soldiers stole goods at swordpoint and villagers took revenge on stragglers and 
patrols.  Some, moreover, dispute whether the term “occupation” or the concept of 
                                                                                                              
37 See the classic Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics 
of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); and Fernando González de León, The Road to Rocroi: Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish 
Army of Flanders, 1567-1659 (London: Brill, 2009). 
38 See in particular the essays by Simon Adams and David Parrott in Military Revolution Debate. 
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partisan warfare can be validly applied to societies without nationalist sensibilities.39  
Only battles and sieges, they imply, could constitute warfare proper before the late-
eighteenth century. 
 My dissertation argues, to the contrary, that commanders used partisan methods to 
drive out enemy troops, secure regional control and establish occupation regimes.  I join 
those scholars who have, more recently, drawn attention to widespread involvement by 
local populations throughout the war.40  Many emphasize long traditions of communal 
defense in the German lands that remained strong until well into the late-seventeenth 
century.41  Most people kept household arms to help defend their localities from attack, 
not only in the towns but in villages as well.  Weapons circulated widely on both legal 
and illegal markets, and efforts by authorities to regulate them largely failed.  German 
scholars writing in the late-nineteenth century recognized this and had little hesitation 
incorporating partisan warfare and occupations into their operational histories of the 
war.42 
                                                                                                              
39 See for example the essays in Markus Meumann and Jörg Rogge, eds. Die besetzte Res Publica: zum 
Verhältnis von Ziviler Obrigkeit und militärischer Herrschaft in besetzten Gebieten vom Spätmittelalter bis 
zum 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Lit, 2006). 
40 See for example Michael Kaiser, “Inmitten des Kriegstheaters: Die Bevölkerung als militärischer Faktor 
und Kriegsteilnehmer im Dreißigjährigen Krieg,” in Krieg und Frieden: Militär und Gesellschaft in der 
frühen Neuzeit, ed. Bernhard Kroener and Ralf Pröve (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996), 281-304.  
41 See B. Anne Tlusty, The Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany (New York: Palgrave, 2011). 
42 See for example Johann Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern, Franken, Pfalz, und Schwaben von 
1506-1651, 2 vols (Munich: J.G. Gotta, 1868). 
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 Legal historians, for their part, stress how prevailing customs and laws implicated 
local populations in warfare and feuding until at least the late-seventeenth century.43  In 
the context of rebellion, in particular, anyone considered an outlaw, rebel, or who 
otherwise stood in open defiance to the sovereign’s laws forfeited any claims to 
immunity or protection.  Persons found to have rendered them aid or collaboration, 
meaning in particular their tenants, dependents and subjects, could be rightfully 
dispossessed or killed in reprisal.  Some scholars argue these categories remained 
virtually unchanged between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries until the civil-
military divide became sharp enough for thinkers to elaborate broader non-combatant 
immunities. 
 In the case of the Thirty Years War scholars have largely neglected to understand 
the legal considerations that influenced how contractors and their armies interacted with 
local populations.44  Having for so long considered the war a conflict between more-or-
less sovereign princes many forget that the war proceeded, from the emperor’s 
perspective, as a rebellion in defiance to his authority.  New imperial history, on the other 
hand, situates the war within long-term constitutional reforms intended to strengthen the 
empire’s sovereign rule of law, enforce the public peace, and diminish private warfare 
                                                                                                              
43 See Matthew Bennett, “Legality and Legitimacy in War and its Conduct, 1350-1650,” in European 
Warfare, 1350-1750, 264-277; Geoffrey Parker, “Early Modern Europe,” in The Laws of War: Constraints 
on Warfare in the Western World, ed. Michael E. Howard et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 
40-58. 
44 One notable exception is Kersten Krüger, “Kriegsfinanzen und Reichsrecht im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,” 
in Krieg und Frieden, 47-58. 
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within the realm.45  This line of work seems to suggest that any effort to interpret how 
contractors fought should consider their position within the imperial state. 
In regulating the treatment of local populations in war, for example, imperial 
legislation continued to draw on practices common to the late-medieval feud.  Feuds 
proper are held to have died out in the German lands by the mid-sixteenth century as 
parties began to entrust their claims to the imperial courts.  Early modernists have found, 
however, that in many places the customs associated with the feud survived even when 
higher legal institutions like royal courts seemed to de-legitimize them.46  They stress 
how feuds, other forms of group violence, and even one-on-one duels continued to feed 
into the exercise of power at all social levels well into the seventeenth century and 
beyond.47  My dissertation suggests that partisan methods drew heavily on lordly 
violence and rural modes of power, including the feud, to establish local supremacy and 
rule. 
                                                                                                              
45 See for example Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire; and Thomas Brady, German 
Histories in the Age of Reformations. 
46 Early modern feud studies build upon work by medievalists, themselves inspired by post-colonial 
anthropologists seeking to understand dispute resolution in tribal societies; influential anthropology 
includes Max Gluckman, “The Peace in the Feud,” Past and Present 8 (1955): 1-14; J. Black-Michaud, 
Feuding Societies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); C. Boehm, Blood Revenge: The Anthropology of Feuding in 
Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); medieval work 
follows from J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, “The Bloodfeud of the Franks,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 
41 (1959): 459-487; and includes William Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in 
Saga Iceland (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990); and Howard Kaminsky, “The Noble Feud in the 
Later Middle Ages,” Past and Present 177 (2002): 55-83. 
47 See the classic Edward Muir, Mad Blood Stirring: Vendetta in Renaissance Italy (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1998); as well as Stuart Carroll, Blood and Violence in Early Modern France (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Keith Brown, Bloodfeud in Scotland, 1573-1625: Violence, Justice, and Politics in 
an Early Modern Society (Edinburgh: J.Donald, 1986); and Jeppe Büchert Netterstrøm, ed. Feud in 
Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2007). 
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German studies, for their part, have tended to emphasize how noble feuding or 
public enmity (Fehde) connected lordship (Herrschaft) to wider processes of state 
formation in the empire.48  During the middle ages feuds helped establish clear processes 
for legal action, including violence, whereby lords could secure and protect their rights 
and, on the whole, foster peace.49  Subsequent debates have turned on whether feuding 
practices extended the legal order down to dependent villagers as well.  Some historians 
believe lords fought not only to defend their own rights, but those of their villagers as 
well.  Others, however, see the feud in functional terms as system that helped lords 
subjugate and extract surplus resources from their peasants.50  Still others have shown 
that villagers themselves pursued feuds as a means for dispute resolution just as avidly as 
did their lords.51  
My dissertation tries, in a similar vein, to situate violent disputes between League 
commanders and local authorities within the context of state-formation.  Many scholars 
have treated the contentious civil-military relations that characterized the Thirty Years 
War as one symptom within a wider general crisis of authority in the early-seventeenth 
century.  Research on these lines has remained limited to what historians call the soldier’s 
                                                                                                              
48 See for example Hillay Zmora, State and Nobility in Early Modern Germany: The Knightly Feud in 
Franconia, 1440-1567 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
49 In this view most follow the classic Otto Brunner, Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in 
Medieval Austria, trans. H. Kaminsky and J. Van Horn Melton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1992). 
50 Gadi Algazi, Herrengewalt und Gewalt der Herren im Späten Mittelalter: Herrschaft, Gegenseitigkeit 
und Sprachgebrauch (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1996). 
51 Christine Reinle, Bauernfehden: Studien zur Fehdeführung Nichtadliger im spätmittelalterlichen 
römisch-deutschen Reich, besonders in den bayerischen Herzogtümern (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2003). 
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“libertine lifestyle” and to links between army camp communities and organized crime.52  
My work, on the other hand, investigates whether military contractors, by using lordly 
violence to assert jurisdiction in matters that involved their soldiers, might have extended 
the imperial monarchy’s juridical prerogatives, as exercised by commanders, to the local 
level. 
In my study of the Catholic League army’s institutional culture I find the concept 
of lordship pivotal to understanding Maximilian’s negotiations with his contractors.  Both 
parties sought, in their own ways, to establish particular lordly prerogatives through the 
army’s practices and operations in an effort, I argue, to make their own lordship an 
essential vehicle for the emperor’s military and judicial strength.  Maximilian wielded 
constitutional authority and his contractors, through him, positioned themselves as agents 
who extended state power to the ground level by means of lordship. 
  
  
Sources & Institutions: Maximilian, Military Contractors, Lordship and the State 
My dissertation relies, for its evidence, upon Maximilian’s correspondence with his 
military contractors, commissioners and other officials during the war’s early years.  In 
this section I discuss, first, my approach to the sources, and second I offer some essential 
background on Maximilian’s military institutions and their deployment through the 
Catholic League.  In the process I situate Maximilian, his contractors, and the Catholic 
                                                                                                              
52 See for example Brage Bei der Weiden, “Niederdeutsche Söldner vor dem Dreißigjärigen Krieg: Geistige 
und mentale Grenzen eines sozialen Raums,” in Krieg und Frieden, 85-108; and John Lynn, Women, 
Armies and Warfare in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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League itself within the empire’s broader constitutional framework.  In addition I make 
use of contracts and articles of war in the pages that follow to illustrate the structures and 
mechanisms whereby Maximilian and his commanders practiced lordship through the 
army’s operations. 
In many ways this dissertation reflects my ongoing search for an overarching, 
chronological context within which to tease apart the shifting web of language and idiom 
Maximilian and his officers used during their negotiations.  Each letter, usually 
performed and transcribed before an audience, contains rich terminologies that 
correspondents marshaled in order to represent themselves, establish their claims to 
reputation and standing and, in the process, strengthen their bargaining positions vis-à-vis 
the duke.  Maximilian and his administration changed the terms of this discourse, 
however, during the course of negotiations, and thereby created new contexts wherein 
important concepts like “valor,” (valor) “devotion” (devotion) or “good regiment” (gutes 
Regiment) took on new meanings and inflections.   
My dissertation eschews deeper probing into this social imaginary, however, in 
order to sharpen its focus on the specific institutional practices under contention, namely 
open-table maintenance and the hunt for spoils through partisan warfare.  In future 
projects I hope to use the negotiation process I have traced in order to unpack their 
terminologies more analytically.  In the meantime, however, I render Maximilian’s and 
his officers’ language uncritically, and focus instead on their efforts to claim prerogatives 
and concessions from one another.   
     36  
My work also tends, in discussing complex negotiations taking place over 
prolonged periods, to present discursive claims as though they offered transparent 
windows onto events.  I do this largely for the sake of clarity and economy, because my 
dissertation deals not primarily with events themselves, but rather with Maximilian’s and 
his officers’ claims about what events mean for themselves and the army more broadly.  
Most letters treat multiple conversation threads in tandem, reference prior missives 
otherwise lost from the archival record, and discuss interactions taking place entirely off 
the page.  Their fragmentary character demands a degree of juxtaposition and inference 
that entails a certain repetitiveness in my references. 
 Maximilian’s and the Catholic League’s army, in its structure and practices, 
expressed traditions deeply shaped, like the Holy Roman Empire more broadly, by both 
lordship and corporate constitutionalism.  Historians have seldom tried to situate the 
armies that fought the Thirty Years War within the empire’s long-term political 
development.  Most have tended to depict the war as a chaotic free-for-all wherein 
predatory dynasts used lawless mercenaries to advance their own particular ambitions 
without regard for the empire’s broader integrity.  Recent scholarship has shown, to the 
contrary, that participants did not trample the imperial constitution, but remained the 
emperor’s vassals and estates, deeply committed to upholding their common laws.53  
Maximilian and the Catholic League, in particular, made war under the emperor’s 
commission, charged to restore the public peace and bring its violators to justice. 
                                                                                                              
53 See for example Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire; Thomas Brady, German 
Histories in the Age of Reformations, 1400-1650; and Peter H. Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy. 
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 Maximilian and the other members envisioned the League, first, as an ad hoc 
imperial circle designed, like the regional circles, to safeguard their rights and liberties 
under the rule of law.54  Original founders, the leading bishops and abbots in Franconia, 
Swabia and the Rhineland, hoped to defend Catholic lands against further secularization 
by Protestant princes until future legislation could settle the practice’s illegality.  
Maximilian stood as their natural champion.  He was the strongest prince in southern 
Germany and the only secular Catholic prince left in the empire besides the archdukes of 
Austria and the duke of Lorraine.  He held legal authority, moreover, as the Bavarian 
circle’s military director (Kreisoberst or kreisausschreibender Fürst), to uphold the peace 
by force within his district, per the emperor’s approval. 
 In the League’s founding charters, first in July, 1609, then again in May, 1619, 
members designed their organization to mirror the imperial circle’s institutions.  League 
estates met regularly in an assembly (Ligatag) to vote contributions for their mutual army 
in proportions based on the imperial register (Reichsmatrikel).  Maximilian served as 
military director, as he did for the Bavarian circle, and ran the League’s finances, armies 
and diplomacy through his administration in Munich.   
By the Treaty of Munich in October, 1619, emperor Ferdinand formally 
recognized the League and commissioned Maximilian to help restore the public peace 
(Landfrieden) by force of arms.  Maximilian now held constitutional authority to make 
war on peace-breakers and could draw on broad political legitimacy through the League 
                                                                                                              
54 On the Catholic League see Franziska Neuer-Landfried, Die Katholische Liga. Gründung, Neugründung 
und Organisation eines Sonderbundes, 1608-1620 (Kallmünz, 1968). 
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and the Bavarian circle.  Soon the League included not only bishoprics and abbeys, but 
many Catholic counts, lords and imperial cities within its orbit, including the 
Hohenzollern and the Fugger.  Maximilian, through the emperor’s commission and 
leadership in the League, gained control over the monarchy’s reach in the empire and 
positioned himself as a power-broker within the imperial state.     
Maximilian steered a cautious diplomacy, on the one hand, to avoid entangling 
the League’s estates in wider Habsburg-Catholic dynastic struggles that little concerned 
them.55  On the other hand, however, he hoped to advance his own position within the 
empire in reward for his aid and council to the crown.  He sought, first, to retain the 
formerly free imperial city of Donauwörth, recently annexed to Bavaria, and, if possible, 
to reclaim the Palatine lands and electoral title from his family’s senior branch, now in 
open rebellion. 
 Maximilian worked to maintain exclusive control over the League’s policies and 
operations throughout the war.56  He summoned frequent assemblies to ask for new 
contributions, but otherwise kept the League estates at arms length, and managed the 
                                                                                                              
55 See Michael Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung.  Maximilian von Bayern, Tilly und die Katholische Liga 
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League’s affairs through his own court councils.  Bavarian coffers provided the lion’s 
share of contributions to the League’s war chest (Bundeskasse) and, in addition, drew on 
the Bavarian circle treasury (Kreiskasse), as well as the duke’s own territorial militia fund 
(Landesdefensionskasse), to supplement them.  His leadership helped ensure that League 
forces, despite their corporate constitution, operated, in essence, as a Bavarian army. 
In the war’s first few years Maximilian favored his own close courtiers for 
regiment and company contracts and thereby extended his own lordship through the 
army.  Bavaria’s duke, like other princes in the empire, counted several military 
contractors among the councilors, household officers and other clients he kept at court.  
Most held the title chamberlain (Kämmerer) and many served as Captain of the Guard 
(Guardi-Hauptmann), Master of the Hunt (Jägermeister), Lords Marshal (Hofmarschall) 
and, when several marshals stood present, as Lord High Marshal (Obersthofmarschall).  
In military affairs the duke prevailed upon them as advisors and consultants, deputized 
them to carry out special missions and, in wartime, called upon them to raise troops for 
service in the field.  On more extended assignments the duke patented them as war 
councilors (Kriegsräthe), defense councilors (Defensionsräthe) or commissioners 
(Kommissäre).  During emergencies he might form them into an ad hoc state council to 
administer his war effort for the duration. 
Courtiers who agreed to raise troops as military contractors carried the further title 
of stipendiary commander (bestellter Obrister von Haus aus), the principal instrument for 
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their own lordship within the army.57  They drew upon their households, clienteles and 
other friends and followers to assemble a pool of men who could serve as mounted 
retainers (reisige Knechte) and, when needed, recruit their own fighters as well.  Once at 
court the commander’s service contract (Bestallung) entitled him to salaries, expense 
allowances, and open table, not only for himself, but also for his men, their valets and 
households.  In addition the duke often gifted contractors with bonuses, pensions and 
endowments to show them favor and boost their prestige.  Rulers and corporate bodies 
entitled to engage contractors, in this case the duke, assumed the legal designation “lord 
of war” or “warlord” (Kriegsherr).  
Once the duke decided to raise troops he tapped the contractor to assemble several 
infantry banners (Fähnlein) and/or cavalry squadrons (Kornett), that is, companies, under 
his command.  Before further recruitment the contractor formed his present retainers into 
his own company, the first or body company (Leibkompanie).  He then picked several 
among them to lead their own companies as captains, either of infantry (as Hauptmann) 
or cavalry (as Rittmeister), and thereby expanded his personal retinue into a larger 
warband.   
                                                                                                              
57 Representative contracts issued by Maximilian include those to Friedrich von Gaisberg, KuBay ÄA 2224 
fol. 11-15, May 3, 1596, and KuBay ÄA 2224 fol. 91-94, June 8, 1601; to Engelbert von Bönninghausen, 
KuBay ÄA 2224 fol. 159-169, June 25, 1606; to Egon von Fürstenberg, KuBay ÄA 2258 fol. 6-10, July 19, 
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In the past the captains, when engaged separately by their warlord, had elected 
one from among their number to lead them in the field as “foremost” or “principal” 
captain (obrister Hauptmann), subsequently shortened to commander (Obrist or Öberist), 
translated as “colonel,” the title now assumed by the contractor.  Institutional colonelcy, 
as it emerged over the sixteenth century, harnessed the lords of companies more closely 
to the feudal hierarchy through their colonel on up to Maximilian and, through him, the 
emperor. 
 In addition to his original contract the colonel now received from the duke a 
regalian charter (Kapitulation) that conferred the rights, prerogatives and duties entailed 
in his governance (Regiment) over the companies under his command.  Charters adhered, 
in principle, to the regulations set out by imperial legislation at Augsburg in 1555 and 
Speyer in 1570.  They specified troop numbers, equipment, organization, standards for 
service and pay, the colonel’s judicial authority, and the articles of war expected to 
govern discipline in the regiment.  In practice regiments included any number or mixture 
of companies, although charters typically specified full regiments with ten companies and 
demi-regiments with five companies, either all-cavalry or all-infantry.  By conferring 
regalian prerogatives through the warlord, charters transformed the colonel into an agent 
of the imperial state, albeit layered, again, through successive intermediary lords.   
 Once the colonel received his charter he assigned each captain an office in his 
staff or “state” (Obristenstaat or Hofstaat) to assume specific responsibilities in the 
regiment.  Senior among them stood the colonel-lieutenant (Oberstleutnant), who served 
as the colonel’s administrator in the latter’s absence, followed by the colonel-major 
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(Oberstwachtmeister), quartermaster, provost, auditor (Schultheiss), wagon-master, 
provisions-master and sometimes, from outside, the chaplain.  In addition certain men 
who already held the captain’s title, but no company of their own, might join as 
“entertained” officers (Intretenierte, from the Spanish entretenidos).  They stood eligible 
for staff posts, should the regiment contain too few captains to fill all nine, and sought to 
distinguish themselves by performing tasks for the colonel.   
 In this way the contractor drew his regiment’s entire officer cadre, that is, his 
captains, from his own lordly retinue.  His appointees and their households, together with 
entertained officers, formed his regiment’s headquarters.  Fighters who aspired to careers 
at arms hoped, one day, to be selected as captains, either by their lord colonel directly, or 
by their own captains as replacements.  Captaincy meant membership in the colonel’s 
following, standing as stake-holders in the regiment, and eligibility for advancement to 
higher posts.  Every colonel, general and senior commander in the army remained, first 
and foremost, captain in his original company, even when administered in his absence by 
a designated captain-lieutenant (Hauptmann-Leutnant). 
 My dissertation refers to the colonels and captains collectively as “officers,” and 
includes in that category each captain’s lieutenant (Leutnant) and ensign (Fähnrich, or 
Kornett in the cavalry).  Picked from among the captain’s circle, often companions from 
the contractor’s original pool, lieutenants and ensigns stood alongside him on the 
muster’s “first sheet” (Prima Plana) and became candidates for future captaincy.  Many 
commanders began their careers on the first sheet and were said to have served “from the 
pike on up” (von der Pike auf).  In letters common terms used to describe officers include 
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warrior (Kriegsmann), cavalier (Kavalier or caballero), head (Haupt or capo), troop-
leader (Truppenführer), commander (Bevelchshaber), war-officer (Kriegsoffizier) and, 
very rarely, soldier (Soldat). 
 In addition to their expertise and networks contractors provided the material 
resources warlords required to wage campaigns.58  By their contract terms the colonels 
agreed to cover their own men’s recruitment, expenses, supplies and equipment in the 
short-term until the duke could reimburse them.  Contractors raised loans against their 
incomes and estates, both from noble lending networks and from reluctant bankers, and 
pawned valuables to come up with cash.  Captains, too, and sometimes lieutenants and 
ensigns who hoped for advancement, became financially involved in their company’s 
upkeep.  In recompense (recompens) for their service and financing contractors received 
reimbursements, further gifts and endowments, honors and state offices, particularly as 
local constables (Pfleger), and sometimes, from the emperor, lands and titles confiscated 
from defeated outlaws. 
 Officers invoked the qualities, practices and military potentials associated with 
lordship when they asked for recompense or advancement in their letters.  Each 
commander typically drew attention his martial prowess and experience, his faithfulness, 
his good name, his lordship and clientele network, the prestige of his bloodline, and his 
material wealth, not only in estates and holdings, but also in his body, his physical health 
and fitness.  Most importantly officers considered their valor a finite and expendable 
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resource.  During service they could lose military potential through wounds, injuries to 
reputation and honor, and financial ruin, either through heavy borrowing or destruction to 
their lands by enemy parties.  In letters they described their merit for recompense in 
variations on the phrase “I risk my body, blood, estate, reputation and honor” (mit 
darseztung Leib, Bluet, Guet, Reputation, und Ehr) in service. 
In contracts and letters Maximilian used further language that invoked officers’ 
self-image as lords of war in his service.  Military contractors had originated, in the 
empire, as hired knights and men-at-arms (Soldritter), often gathered in adventuring 
bands (Soldgesellschaften), who helped lords and cities wage feuds during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries.59  Their leaders often entered a lord’s household by contract as 
“knight and servant” (Ritter und Knecht) and became stipendiary retainers (Diener von 
Haus aus) charged to make their followers available to fight.  By the early-seventeenth 
century their lordly identity still shaped the imagery used in their documentation.  
Maximilian often reminded officers to render him the service a “faithful retainer owes his 
lord” (so ain getreue Diener sinem Herrn schuldig ist).  He referred to each favored 
officer as his “reputable” or “honest” man and “faithful retainer and cavalier” (redlicher 
Mann und getreuer Diener und Reiter) and often, in addition, as his companion 
(Mitritter). 
Officers, in turn, discussed the fighters under their command as members in their 
personal retinues, regardless of their origins.  In letters they most commonly used the 
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     45  
term “servants” (Knechte) to describe foot troops and “riders” (Reiter) to describe 
cavalry.  Further terms included “warriors” (Kriegsvolck or Kriegsleuthe) and, by the 
1630s, “warband” (Soldateska), but never “soldier” (Soldat).  Here, I use the words 
“troops” and “soldiers” to describe fighters collectively.  Many soldiers, too, brought 
along their own servants, that is, their families or consorts, to help them on campaign in 
much the same way valets or squires helped their officers.  Camp followers, as historians 
call them, provided for soldiers’ daily care and helped haul the gear and loot.  Support 
services like artillery, pioneers, craftsmen, merchants, and sutlers followed in the formal 
baggage train (Troß). 
Most contracts called upon colonels to organize their foot soldiers in the “high-
German” manner, that is, as tactical heavy infantry (hochdeutsches Kriegsvolck).  Since 
the fourteenth century most men-at-arms had grown accustomed to fighting dismounted 
in mixed teams with marksmen.  By the fifteenth century contractors had begun to 
include footmen from the towns in their own warbands.  In the 1480s, when future 
emperor Maximilian I first formed his infantry as Landsknechte, he encouraged them to 
consider themselves members in his own following, and presented himself to them pike 
in hand.60  By the early-seventeenth century the heavy infantry seldom called themselves 
Landsknechte, simply Knechte, but their customs and traditions still reflected a strong 
sense of corporate identity and bond to their leaders and, by extension, the emperor.   
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Officers, for their part, seemed to regard their companies and regiments not as 
fixed formations, primarily, but as personal followings.  Once chosen, captains received 
from their colonel the duke’s patent (Werbepatent) to assemble volunteers by open 
recruitment in his name (freie Werbung).  In principle they should recruit only in 
specified regions where the duke had negotiated permission from friendly rulers.  In 
practice, however, they often traveled back to their homelands to gather men from their 
captain’s or their own local clients and dependents.  Once the recruit had taken the 
captain’s coin or “conduct money” (Liefergeld, Laufgeld) he would be accorded a seat at 
“open table” (freie Tafel) and live at the captain’s “maintenance” (unterhaltung), or 
“open-table maintenance,” as I call it, until mustered.61  
During the muster process itself captains led induction rituals that suggested their 
recruits had, in following them, joined a privileged band of warriors.  Once present at the 
muster area (Musterplatz) recruits displayed their martial skills, per the captain’s 
preference, and thereby gained their place in the ranks.  On the appointed muster date the 
captains presented their men before the colonel and, upon his inspection, had them swear 
to abide by the articles of war specified in the colonel’s charter.  Their oath instantiated 
the regiment as a legally constituted corporate body, bound them to observe its statutes, 
and joined them in loyalty to their captain, colonel, warlord and, in principle, the 
emperor.  On campaign the troops should in theory receive their pay from the duke, but in 
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practice they continued to live at the captain’s open-table maintenance until the duke 
found cash to reimburse him.  In short recruits signed on, first and foremost, to serve their 
captain and, through him, great lords, not to enter a company, regiment or unit.62 
Once they swore into the regiment soldiers and officers entered a contractual 
relationship wherein each party assumed certain privileges and obligations.  In statutory 
terms the articles of war seemed to replicate seigneurial lordship.  They empowered the 
colonel with sole jurisdiction over his men (as Gerichtsherr) and charged him with 
responsibility for their care and short-term upkeep.  In addition to the articles, however, 
the colonel’s charter obliged officers to observe unwritten customs and practices of war 
(Kriegsgerechtigkeit, Kriegsgebrauch), established through consensus and tradition, that 
framed the regiment’s corporate constitution and limited their authority.  Most important 
among their institutions stood the commune (Gemein, or Ring) where soldiers gathered to 
voice their concerns and claim their ancient customs and traditions (alter Brauch, altes 
Recht). 
 More than any other practice soldiers guarded their right to legal spoils 
(Beuterecht), rooted in the traditional right of feud (Fehderecht) and sanctioned by the 
empire’s 1555 and 1570 regulations.63  By law any forces that marched to restore the 
public peace under constitutional authority could exercise sovereign prerogatives to 
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punish peace-breakers for their wrongdoing.  In the outlaw lords’ lands they could loot 
and burn villages, sack towns, take booty from defeated fighters, capture leaders for 
ransom, and levy protection money (Brandschatzung), all to assert the emperor’s and 
empire’s sole jurisdiction to resolve disputes in the courts.  Legitimate armies included 
imperial circle commanders who mobilized troops on their district estates’ behalf and 
those who, like Maximilian, held the emperor’s direct commission.  Similar practices in 
neutral lands, or done by rebel armies, were considered illegitimate robbery, extortion 
and plunder. 
 Maximilian’s imperial commission and his regalian charters, therefore, conferred 
upon his contractors military jurisdiction and, with it, the right to project the monarchy’s 
legal powers through traditional lordly prerogatives to open-table maintenance and the 
right to spoils through feud on the state’s behalf.  Soldiers held their captains responsible 
for leading them to spoils and ranked loot and booty, alongside upkeep and maintenance, 
among their officers’ chief obligations.  In letters officers described how well they had 
succeeded, or failed, to meet their men’s expectations by reference to their “credit” 
(credit) among the troops.  On campaign most opportunities for spoils came during 
patrols, forage and scouting expeditions, ambushes on enemy parties, raids on villages 
that collaborated with the enemy, and other partisan activities.   
Cavalry enjoyed the best and most frequent opportunities for spoils, but 
commanders often sent single infantry companies, too, to garrison and hold large areas or 
regions on their own through partisan tactics.  In order to fight autonomously each 
company contained three-hundred men armed with hand weapons, roughly half to 
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specialize as marksmen with muskets or carbines, the other half to carry armor and pikes 
to deal with cavalry.  Captains might further spread the company out into small squads 
(Rotten) led by a veteran corporal (Korporal) or senior corporal (Gefreiter-Korporal) to 
hold bridges, passes and the like.  Correspondents reserved the term “irregular” 
(irreguliert, or unregulated) for light troops who specialized in border raids, like Croats 
and Hussars, probably because they observed no rule, that is, no articles of war or tactical 
drill discipline. 
Maximilian’s commission did not always allow for commanders to practice 
partisan warfare as they liked, however, because soldiers never limited their depredations 
to the emperor’s ostensible enemies.  Field armies often left detachments behind to secure 
important areas in neutral lands, and their tendency to claim lavish privileges from their 
hosts occasioned frequent grievances.  Local authorities similarly complained about the 
disruptions caused by large camp communities among their people.  Partisan methods 
became a political liability for Maximilian when his troops exceeded his legitimate 
constitutional authority.   
 Before and during the war rulers often considered contractors, their troops and 
their methods a threat to good policy and public order.  Local authorities tended to 
associate soldiers with organized crime and mistrusted them when present.64  During the 
time between campaigns (the Gartezeit) soldiers disbanded from their companies to wait 
out the winter until their captain recalled them for service in the spring.  Once the wars 
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had concluded, however, they seem to have seldom re-integrated into their old lives.  
Some tried to find work as watchmen or guards, but many instead formed small or large 
bands (Vergaderungen) that mirrored the camp communities they had left behind.  Bands 
made their way as outlaws and bandits, often sheltered by local hosts who fenced their 
loot, and sometimes hired in secret by princes to sow disorder in their rivals’ lands as 
saboteurs and troublemakers (Mordbrenner).  Rulers reacted to “lordless soldiers” 
(herrlose Knechte, gartende Knechte) with suspicion and tried to crack down on them 
with harsh penalties as they did other itinerants and wanderers in those decades.65 
 Scholars have often taken at face value the many aggrieved observers and satirical 
authors who portrayed the soldiers of the Thirty Years’ War as brutish, poorly treated 
criminals and abusers.  Standard histories present them as social outcasts and the 
desperate poor who sought refuge in the mercenary life.  Contractors treated them as 
proletarian workforces, easily hired, dismissed and discarded at whim, with little 
connection to one another or their leaders.  Profiteering officers skimmed for themselves 
what little pay the warlord sent and left their defrauded soldiers to desperately squeeze 
their basic needs from the populace through unchecked theft and violence.   
 I argue, to the contrary, that Maximilian’s commanders related to their troops as 
lords to retainers and exercised the imperial state’s juridical powers through their lordly 
prerogatives to open-table maintenance and legitimate spoils.  Maximilian forced his 
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contractors into negotiations during the war’s early years when he tried to restrict their 
traditional prerogatives so as to protect his authority and legitimacy.  My dissertation 
traces the process whereby contractors sought to recover and expand their lordship in the 
army and, in exchange, financed the duke’s military effort, thereby sustaining his own 
exercise of lordship within the imperial state. 
 
Chapters & Summary: Maximilian, Officers and Negotiations, 1619-1626 
My dissertation follows the negotiations Maximilian and his contractors undertook 
between 1619, when the duke first mobilized the Catholic League’s army, and 1626, 
when the army first began to take imperial contributions, that is, formal war taxes levied 
on particular regions to support the troops.  It periodizes them into four subsequent stages 
over five chapters, namely 1619-1620, 1621, 1622, and 1623-1626, each corresponding 
to a major shift in the army’s institutional structure that resulted from the successive 
compromises they reached. 
Chapter 1 examines how officers resisted the duke’s early attempts to implement 
reforms during the 1619 and 1620 campaigns in Upper Austria and Bohemia.  
Maximilian tried, first, to usurp traditional open-table maintenance through his own 
administration and, second, insisted that officers enforce “good regiment” in their 
commands, that is, restraint toward local populations.  He outlined specific procedures 
that called upon officers to identify individual culprits, force them to make restitution to 
their victims, then render exemplary punishment to discourage further infractions.  In this 
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way he sought to reinforce his own lordship within the army and prevent political 
criticisms that might impeach his conduct as imperial commissioner. 
In response officers invoked military necessity to defend their customary lordly 
prerogatives.  Commanders relied on open-table maintenance to support their men, they 
insisted, and without it would suffer loss to their reputations and credit.  Some allowed 
their soldiers to take spoils at will, even in friendly lands, in order to convince the duke 
that their men would remain unsatisfied until he restored their maintenance privileges.  In 
the field they largely ignored the duke’s disciplinary mandates and continued to rely on 
partisan methods to drive out enemy troops, suppress local resistance and establish 
control in the face of opposition from collaborators.  Officers shielded their men from 
legal consequences and defended their own exclusive jurisdiction over soldiers under 
their command. 
Maximilian further expanded his administration during the 1621 campaign in the 
Upper Palatinate in an effort to redouble the same policies he had implemented the 
previous year.  He soon found, however, that he could no longer afford to provide 
officers with regular reimbursement.  Rather than abrogate open-table maintenance, as he 
had tried the previous year, he did the opposite, and began to encourage longer-term 
investment from his contractors to support the army.   
Chapter 2 shows how officers leveraged Maximilian’s weaker position in 1621 to 
more firmly establish their prerogative to maintenance and spoils and thereby 
strengthened lordship in their commands.  Commanders soon redoubled the hunt for loot 
and booty, not only to satisfy their soldiers and recoup costs, but also to pressure the duke 
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into making good on reimbursement.  Officers ignored the duke’s disciplinary mandates, 
as before, and resisted any attempt by outside authorities to interfere in their companies 
and regiments. 
By year’s end Maximilian’s officers had forced the duke to meet them halfway 
and offer concessions that would make both long-term investment and good regiment 
more palatable to them.  Maximilian would agree, first, to refrain from reforming, 
disbanding, or otherwise dismantling their regimental and company commands, so as to 
preserve their investment and the followings they had built during their service.  Officers, 
in turn, would forego reimbursement for the foreseeable future and, at the duke’s 
insistence, exercise more restraint toward local populations.  In reward for their ongoing 
commitment Maximilian would either enlarge their commands, or award them multiple 
regiments, so they could grow their followings and expand their prestige and influence in 
the army.  In principle the new arrangement might have provided acceptable institutional 
means for both Maximilian and contractors to express lordship to their satisfaction. 
In 1622, however, few officers seemed willing to settle with this compromise, and 
instead pressed Maximilian for further concessions.  Commanders orchestrated near-
mutinies in each of the League’s main field armies, continued to flout the duke’s policies, 
and used illicit plunder and extortion, as before, to advance their reputations and recoup 
their expenses.  Chapter 3 follows how Maximilian’s contractors forced him, in exchange 
for their investment, to concede still further command prerogatives that strengthened their 
lordship in the army.   
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Maximilian tried, throughout his 1622 campaigns in the Lower Palatinate, Hessen 
and Westphalia, to establish investment as his new standard for quality, loyalty and good 
service from his officers.  He promised investors gifts and future rewards from the 
emperor; he favored for new appointments those officers willing to cover their own 
upkeep costs; and, he forced serving officers to invest their wealth outright, that is, 
beyond the sums they might otherwise expect in reimbursement, during their efforts to 
compete for fresh recruits and refit their commands.  In order to appease them, however, 
Maximilian had to grant them enlarged commands as well as give up, for the most part, 
on enforcing the disciplinary policies he had introduced in years past.  He continued to 
admonish officers for their soldiers’ conduct, but he no longer made serious efforts to 
enforce their compliance. 
By the end of 1622 Maximilian and his contractors had, together, modified the 
army’s institutions so as to allow both parties to continue exercising lordship through its 
operations.  In agreeing to invest, Maximilian’s officers enabled him to keep the army in 
being and, thereby, maintain his power within the imperial state as commissioner.  
Maximilian in turn had, for the most part, conceded his officers each of the two lordly 
prerogatives they originally sought to defend, namely open-table maintenance and the 
hunt for spoils.  His investment policy, in addition, further strengthened contractors’ 
lordship in the army because it conferred clearer advantages upon those who commanded 
wealth, large clienteles, and strong local influence.  In abandoning his efforts to enforce 
good regiment, however, Maximilian opened himself to repeated criticism from neutral 
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parties whose lands his armies ravaged, precisely the situation he had hoped to avoid 
since 1619.   
Chapter 4 traces how Maximilian tried, in response, to avoid legal culpability for 
the damages his troops inflicted.  By the end of 1622 the duke and his commissioners had 
developed several standard, evasive replies to the countless grievances and petitions 
lodged by local authorities that deferred their complaints and dodged their claims to 
restitution.  Most often Maximilian claimed the culprits had not yet been found or that no 
wrongdoing had occurred in the first place.  Soon he began to ignore complaints 
altogether and thereby, in effect, turned a blind eye to illicit pillage. 
 Chapter 4 illustrates, in addition, how officers used the hunt for loot and booty to 
demonstrate lordship in their commands, on the one hand, and as an operational method 
to secure local control and suppress resistance, on the other.  Captains often found 
villagers and townspeople more formidable in their opposition than historians usually 
allow.  Magistrates and officials organized their people for local defense, claimed 
jurisdiction over soldiers who committed crimes in their districts, and tried to capture and 
execute the culprits despite protests from officers.   
Captains brooked no interference in their companies from outsiders, however, and 
took up the sword on their men’s behalf to shield them from retaliation and 
imprisonment.  Their disputes with magistrates often followed patterns of escalation that 
resembled minor feuds.  Insults, threats, tit-for-tat retaliation and skirmishes afforded 
captains comparatively low-risk occasions to advance their reputations and build credit 
with the men under their lordship.  Officers, by claiming exclusive jurisdiction in matters 
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that involved the soldiers under their command, translated the judicial dimensions of 
lordship into the imperial state, as expressed through Maximilian’s army under the 
emperor’s commission. 
In the years before 1623, then, Maximilian and his contractors had reached what 
might seem a reasonably conventional détente.  Officers would support Maximilian’s 
army through long-term investment in exchange for the freedom to exercise traditional 
lordly prerogatives in their commands.  In effect, though, Maximilian’s contractors had 
won the ability to graft their lordship into an institution, Maximilian’s and the League’s 
army, that might one day, through future constitutional reforms, provide a pillar for the 
monarchy’s ongoing military power.  Contractors had made themselves indispensible to 
Maximilian’s and the emperor’s efforts to reach a new settlement with the imperial 
estates and shape the empire’s future political framework.  
Between 1623 and 1626, however, as the war dragged on and Maximilian became 
more deeply indebted to their investment, contractors pressed for more radical 
institutional prerogatives in the army.  Officers claimed their expenses had become too 
ruinous to sustain much longer, expressed concern that their commands had begun to fall 
apart, and resorted to lavish pillage to keep their men together.  Chapter 5 discusses how 
Maximilian granted his contractors nearly unchecked control over the army’s operations 
in the field and officers, in exchange, assumed from him nearly full responsibility for the 
army’s upkeep. 
During 1623 and 1624 Maximilian confirmed the privileges he had already 
granted, either implicitly or explicitly, and ceded officers quasi-proprietary rights over 
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their commands.  First, Maximilian guaranteed his officers their commands would remain 
standing for the war’s duration to protect their investment.  Second, he would hold no 
further musters, inspections, or recruitment drives, but simply entrust each unit’s welfare 
and maintenance to the captains and colonels.  Third, he would accept no resignations 
until the commander in question had found a successor to assume financial responsibility 
for his company or regiment.  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, he gave officers 
explicit permission to take illegal spoils in lieu of reimbursement from his treasury.  He 
would allow them to plunder at will, often under the guise of contributions, without 
restriction or oversight from his administration. 
Contractors continued to negotiate and press Maximilian for concessions until 
they began to collect imperial contribution revenues between 1625 and 1627.  Late in 
1624, when League troops brought Hessen under occupation, Maximilian and his 
commanders decided to levy emergency contributions in kind throughout region to help 
support them.  Later, in 1625 and 1626, Albrecht von Wallenstein introduced and 
implemented imperial contribution taxes in order to finance the new army he raised on 
the emperor’s behalf.   
Maximilian’s service as imperial commissioner placed League contractors in a 
position to claim that they, too, served the emperor under constitutional authority and 
were entitled to contributions just like imperial troops.  In late 1626 and 1627 they began 
to collect contributions alongside other forces who fought on the emperor’s behalf, albeit 
illegally, until 1630.  In that year the electoral congress formalized contributions as a 
regular tax levied on the estates to finance both the Imperial and Catholic League armies 
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for the war’s duration.  Maximilian’s commanders, now considered auxiliaries to the 
imperials, held legal authority to exact revenues from lands who refused to pay their 
quotas. 
In the years after 1626 imperial contributions resolved the original tensions 
between Maximilian and his contractors and obviated any further need for intensive 
negotiations between them.  Contributions helped officers negotiate the burdens of 
investment, on the one hand, by providing new sources for finance and support.  On the 
other hand they offered contractors a legal pretext to take spoils and plunder, one that 
allowed them to practice lordship through partisan warfare without undercutting 
Maximilian’s political legitimacy.  Soon thereafter the 1630 laws fully incorporated the 
Catholic League army within the imperial state and thereby solidified Maximilian’s 
constitutional authority and political standing. 
Maximilian and his officers had, between 1619 and 1626, renegotiated the army’s 
institutional structures so as to better incorporate their own practices of lordship within 
the imperial state.  By 1626, and even more so by 1630, Maximilian stood secure in his 
role as a military power-broker, and his contractors stood secure in their role as the 
monarchy’s warriors, that is, as those who provided the men, material and expertise to 
pursue war for emperor and empire.   
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CHAPTER 1: MAINTENANCE AND SPOILS, 1619-1620 
In early winter, 1618, as the year drew to its close, the Upper Austrian estates joined the 
Bohemians in open rebellion against their Habsburg overlords.  During the previous year 
the Bohemians had nearly driven the Habsburg armies from their kingdom and, in the 
process, curried wide support among the dynasty’s many enemies in the Austrias, 
Hungary and the Carpathian basin.  In Upper Austria the estates mobilized their militia 
and hired troops, and began to block Habsburg reinforcements from reaching their 
beleaguered counterparts in the Bohemian borderlands.1  They refused, upon the death of 
emperor Matthias in March, to recognize his brother Ferdinand of Styria as archduke, and 
thereby reopened the Habsburgs’ decades-long struggle to re-establish secure rule in their 
Austrian hereditary lands.2 
 Later that winter in February, 1619, Maximilian called up his stipendiary 
commanders, drew up fresh charters for regiments of infantry and cavalry, and ordered 
them to assemble their men along the Danube by year’s end.  He saw in Ferdinand’s hour 
of need an opportunity to make himself and the League indispensible to the Habsburgs’ 
war effort.  During the previous decade Maximilian had wrangled for influence in 
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imperial politics until emperor Matthias finally forced him to dissolve the League in 
1617.  He now summoned former members to Munich to negotiate the League’s renewal, 
signed four months later, in May.3   
By summer’s end Ferdinand’s situation had grown more desperate still.  In 
Bohemia the rebels elected Frederick V of the Palatinate (r 1610-1623) for their new 
king.  Bohemian forces laid siege to Vienna, the Lower Austrian estates threatened to join 
their ranks, and Gabriel Bethlen, prince of Transylvania, invaded Austria with help from 
his Hungarian supporters, who elected him Protector of Hungary in an effort to oust the 
Habsburgs and their clients.  In the west, meanwhile, the Protestant Union began to 
mobilize its own forces, poised to maintain armed neutrality, or perhaps intervene, as the 
situation unfolded.4   
By fall Ferdinand saw little choice but to call upon Maximilian for council and 
military aid.  In October, 1619, by the Treaty of Munich, he commissioned Maximilian to 
help him deal with the Protestant Union, the Upper Austrians and the Bohemians while 
he focused on the Lower Austrians and Hungarians.5  In recompense for the duke’s costs 
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Ferdinand would grant him full administrative rights in Upper Austria until he had 
collected enough revenues to discharge the emperor’s debt. 
Maximilian assembled his troops in northern Bavaria throughout 1619 and into 
spring, 1620, then took the field in June, when Ferdinand placed Frederick V under the 
imperial ban.  Maximilian would travel with the army in person throughout his first 
campaigns that year, first against the Protestant Union in Swabia, then against the rebels 
in Upper Austria and Bohemia.   
In taking personal command Maximilian sought not only to demonstrate his 
lordship in the army, and thereby advance his reputation, but also to establish careful 
control over how his officers carried out his imperial commission.6  During their hunt for 
loot and booty most companies tended to overlook the strict legal distinction between 
law-abiding lords, on the one hand, and outlaws on the other.  Should they overstep legal 
bounds and exceed Maximilian’s constitutional authority they would not only invite 
criticism, but also give the duke’s opponents grounds to impeach his legitimacy.7   
Maximilian took steps throughout 1619 and 1620 to restrict his officers’ leeway to 
provide for their own men through spoils.  He tried, first, to usurp their prerogative to 
open-table maintenance for himself, and thereby strengthen his own lordship in the army 
and, with it, his control over its operations.  Second, he insisted that officers enforce 
                                                                                                              
6 Insights on Maximilian’s decision to lead the army in person, his self-image as a warrior and his efforts to 
present this image to contemporaries and posterity can be found in Albrecht, Maximilian I, 523-525. 
7 On Maximilian’s concerns for discipline and legal precision see Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 71-78, 
103-104, 236-249.  
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“good regiment,” that is, restraint toward local populations, and he developed disciplinary 
procedures for them to follow that might, when implemented, assuage local authorities 
and allay further grievances against his troops. 
In the process of reinforcing his own lordship, however, Maximilian inadvertently 
abrogated the privileges and methods commanders relied upon to exercise theirs.  
Colonels and captains resisted the duke’s new policies, called for their recension, and 
claimed the policies frustrated not only their ability to wage campaigns, but also the very 
basis for traditional command authority in the ranks.  Commanders relied on open-table 
maintenance to support their men, they insisted, and without it would suffer loss to their 
reputations and credit.  Some allowed their soldiers to take spoils at will, even in friendly 
lands, in order to convince the duke their men would remain unsatisfied until he restored 
their maintenance privileges.   
In the field officers largely ignored the duke’s disciplinary mandates and relied on 
partisan methods, as before, to drive out enemy troops, suppress local resistance and 
establish control in the face of opposition from collaborators.  Commanders shielded their 
men from local authorities, sheltered them from legal consequences, and defended their 
own exclusive jurisdiction over soldiers under their command.  In so doing they guarded 
their right to exercise lordship as they saw fit within their commands, and they claimed 
the charter-granted privilege to share state power with Maximilian.   
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Maximilian’s Lordship: War Council and Commissioners   
In 1619 Maximilian undertook the first in a series of reforms whereby he intended to 
fund and supply the army through his own administration rather than rely on open-table 
maintenance from his contractors.8  Maximilian’s support would, in effect, constitute an 
assertion of lordship over the army, would oblige both officers and troops to respect his 
disciplinary wishes, and would deny his officers credible pretexts for trying to provide for 
their own men through the customary hunt for spoils.  He hoped, as a result, to use the 
League army to achieve precise, controlled objectives without recourse to undue plunder 
or pillage that might threaten his position as imperial commissioner. 
 During the League’s mobilization in 1619 and early 1620 Maximilian informed 
his officers that soldiers should, henceforth, receive coin at muster straight from his 
commissioners rather than from their captains.  Perhaps the richest single prince in the 
German lands, Maximilian might have felt confident he could cover the costs with as 
little help as possible from his contractors.9  He called the new policy “lord payment” 
(Herrnbezahlung), sometimes “payment from us” (von uns Bezahlung) or, most 
frequently, “bench payment” (Bankbezahlung), probably in reference to the muster bench 
where the captain, colonel and commissioner stood to enroll each company’s new 
candidates. 
                                                                                                              
8 On Maximilian’s early relationship with his contractors see Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 63-71. 
9 On claims regarding Maximilian’s relative wealth see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 172. 
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 In its scale the League’s mobilization far exceeded any military effort Maximilian 
had undertaken previously.10  His commissioners faced new challenges trying to 
administer his interests and prerogatives across so many companies and regiments.  He 
appointed them from among his commanders at court on a case-by-case basis, as before, 
but now began to use more specific titles to indicate their particular assignments.  They 
included Kriegs-, Regiments-, Begleitungs-, Quartier-, and Musterungskommissäre who 
oversaw matters that involved, respectively, miscellaneous tasks related to the war, 
specific regiments, march conduct, billets and musters.11  In 1619 the duke appointed 
Theodor Viechpeckh von Haimhausen as General Commissioner (Generalkommissar) to 
coordinate their collected efforts. 
 Maximilian’s finance ministers, too, found themselves overwhelmed trying to 
manage funds for the entire army alongside the state’s other accounts.  They suggested 
that the duke set up a new, separate council within the Hofkammer that could handle war 
finance and remove the burden from their own Hofkammerrat.  In February, 1620, 
Maximilian heeded their advice and established the War Council (Kriegsrat) to govern 
those fiscal affairs that touched upon the army.  On its board sat the president of the 
Hofkammerrat, as Director, alongside other finance ministers delegated from the council. 
                                                                                                              
10 His largest previous expeditions had been undertaken during the Donauwörth Incident in 1607 and 
against Salzburg in 1611, see Johann Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern, Franken, Pfalz, und 
Schwaben von 1506-1651, vol.1 (Munich: J.G. Gotta, 1868), 3-12; and Albrecht, Maximilian I, 391-450. 
11 Discussions concerning the commissioners can be found in Cordula Kapser, Die bayerische 
Kriegsorganisation in der zweiten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, 1635-1648/49 (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1997), 101-108; and Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 15-61. 
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 In several mandates issued from February through May, 1620, Maximilian 
outlined the War Council’s scope and authority.12  First, the war pay office 
(Kriegszahlamt) would fall under its exclusive control.  Paymasters (Zahlmeister) from 
the League war chest (Bundeskasse), the Bavarian Circle war chest (Kreiskasse), and the 
duke’s state war chest (Landesdefensionskasse) had to get all cash disbursements 
assigned and approved by the war councilors.  Relevant expenses included, for example, 
pay, enlistment bounties, conduct money, equipment, munitions, provisions, transport,  
artillery, fortifications, and field hospitals.  Second, the War Council would review each 
regiment’s books, submitted in copy by the commissioners, to verify their accuracy.  
Third, the War Council would assume the Hofrat’s role as high military court (oberste 
Militärgerichtshof) in legal matters that touched upon officers in the army.  
 Councilors on the Kriegsrat performed, in principle, no executive role.  Like their 
counterparts on the Hofkammerrat, they served as comptrollers, in this case for the 
duke’s war chests.  Maximilian’s commissioners, once his paymasters had turned over 
the authorized monies, took sole responsibility for implementing his decisions in the 
field.  They needed the War Council’s approval only in matters that entailed new expense 
allocations, such as personnel, recruitment, reformation, and muster.  Maximilian had 
until now relied on his old Defense Council (Defensionsrat), the circle of military 
                                                                                                              
12 On Maximilian’s reforms see Friedrich Münich, Geschichte der Entwicklung der Bayerischen Armee seit 
zwei Jahrhunderten (Munich, 1864), 3; Reinhard Heydenreuter, Der landesherrliche Hofrat unter Herzog 
und Kurfürst Maximilian I. von Bayern (1598-1651)(Munich: Beck, 1981), 178; August Damboer, Die 
Krise des Söldner-Kapitalismus in Bayern unter Kurfürst Maximilian I. insbesondere in der Zeit des 
dreißigjährigen Krieges.  Eine soziologiesche Studie (Munich, 1921), and Albrecht, Maximilian I, 611-640. 
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advisors who often served as commissioners, to oversee them.13  But once he created the 
War Council he decided to dissolve the Defense Council and left supervision in general 
commissioner Haimhausen’s hands. 
 Maximilian nonetheless did make allowance for a new chief Master of Provisions 
(Oberstproviantmeister), Georg Pfliegl, who would report directly to the War Council 
rather than the commissioners.  Pfliegl and his staff, together called the provisions service 
(Proviantamt), would oversee the duke’s small but growing magazine network.  Ducal 
magazines stockpiled salt, candles, wood, fodder, wine, beer, meat, flour and other 
supplies to keep them available on short notice.  Each magazine had a collector and 
scribe to track shipping and receiving, and a baker with ovens to prepare the flour into 
bread that could be quickly sent to the troops.  In time Maximilian established magazines 
along the Danube at Straubing, Ingolstadt, and Rain am Lech, on the Inn at Braunau and 
Schärding, and in the interior at Landshut and Burghausen.14 
 Maximilian intended his provisions office to help keep the army well-supplied 
beyond Bavaria’s borders.  Pfliegl would, he hoped, keep the magazines well-stocked and 
maintain secure routes to ship the goods over distances.  He sometimes assigned the War 
Council dedicated officials to arrange wagons and boats for transport (Fuhramt), or to 
watch over arsenals, munitions and other war materials (Zeugamt).  In cases when his 
administration came up short Maximilian expected commissioners to make the usual on-
                                                                                                              
13 See Albrecht, Maximilian I, 611-640. 
14 On the provisions service and magazine system see Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte, 996-997, and Damboer, 
Krise des Söldner-Kapitalismus, 127-130. 
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the-spot arrangements officers normally handled in the field.  They would liaise with 
local authorities, contract with sutlers, merchant suppliers, and transport providers and, 
when practical, set up market staples along important routes.15  In addition he wanted 
commissioners to offer soldiers Remontierung, that is, the option to turn in their own or 
captured weapons in exchange for cash.16  He could then stockpile these in arsenals and 
bestow them upon new recruits, as captains often did, to help establish their lord-retainer 
relationship. 
 Through his War Council and provisions office, his commissioners and bench 
payment, Maximilian strove to fund and supply the entire campaign under his sole 
auspices.  Steady coin from his treasury would oblige commanders to respect 
Maximilian’s wishes, while good pay and supply would belie any rationales for violence 
soldiers might visit upon subjects under his protection.  He expected commissioners to 
report officers who neglected good regiment and help them avoid illegal actions that 
might tarnish Maximilian’s reputation.  In this way Maximilian would assert his own 
lordship over the army’s conduct and his soldiers’ material well-being. 
 
                                                                                                              
15 See discussion in Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte, 996-997, and Damboer, Krise des Söldner-Kapitalismus, 
127-130. 
16 In its strict meaning the term refers to remounts offered to cavalrymen to replace horses lost in action, but 
correspondents use it more broadly to indicate compensation for equipment offered or lost in the duke’s 
service. 
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Officers Resist: Petitions, Mischief and Open-Table Maintenance 
Commanders, for their part, lodged repeated protests against the duke’s new policies, 
often in joint petitions, wherein they claimed their reputations depended upon open-table 
maintenance and the hunt for spoils.  Left without the means to provide for their own 
men, they claimed, or to reward hard fighting, they could neither establish leadership and 
authority in the ranks, nor could they cultivate loyalty and credit among their followers.  
Their negotiation strategies reveal, first, their wish to be perceived as lords and, second, 
the means they used to exercise putative lordship in their companies and regiments. 
 Johann Viermund von der Neersen, for example, gathered several endorsements 
for a joint petition that expressed common views.17  They feared curtailed access to 
Maximilian’s coin would reflect disfavor upon them and deny them the reimbursement 
they needed to provide maintenance for their troops in the field.  Leaders who could not 
support their own men, on their own terms, would inspire little respect or loyalty, they 
said, and their good word would cease to carry any credit among soldiers.  Neersen later 
added that he knew Maximilian intended no disfavor toward his warriors, but he would 
nonetheless rather resign his company than lose his good name, his honor, and his 
reputation.18 
                                                                                                              
17 Neersen’s letter and joint petition, KuBay ÄA 2254 fol. 165-166, July 20, 1619, Neersen to Maximilian; 
Maximilian further discusses their claims in KuBay ÄA 2254 fol. 163-164, July 26, 1619, Maximilian to 
Neersen.   
18 KuBay ÄA 2259 fol. 3-4, August 12, 1619, Neersen to Maximilian. 
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 Colonel Engelbert von Bönninghausen, too, collected endorsements for a joint 
petition.19  Bench payment breached their contract terms, they insisted, and ran contrary 
to both the articles and time-honored customs of war (alter Kriegsgebrauch).  
Bönninghausen asked that Maximilian cancel the policy in order to protect his and his 
captains’ honor, good names and reputations.  Maximilian assured Bönninghausen that he 
had intended no disfavor or discredit to his warriors when he introduced the policy.20  He 
nonetheless appreciated their concerns and agreed to suspend bench payment for three 
months.  He would insist upon it at future musters, however, and expected both officers 
and commissioners to abide by his instructions. 
 Maximilian’s commanders tried, in response, to convince the duke that they could 
neither support nor control their men unless he allowed them to resume traditional open-
table maintenance.  Colonel Wartenberg’s cavalry captains, for instance, warned 
commissioner Schwabach that Maximilian had not provided their men with enough 
support to fulfill the obligations soldiers otherwise expected from their own officers.21 
Once they reached Bavarian lands their troops simply took from Maximilian’s subjects 
what they felt the duke owed them.  
Local lodgers around Mühldorf and Ötting, for example, where Wartenberg’s 
captains had gathered their recruits, met with Schwabach during his billet visitations to 
                                                                                                              
19 Bönninghausen’s letter and joint petition, KuBay ÄA 2261 fol. 203, 1619, Bönninghausen to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2261 fol. 210-211, August 7, 1619, Bönninghausen to Maximilian. 
20 KuBay ÄA 2261 fol. 201-202, August 3, 1619, Maximilian to Bönninghausen. 
21 Discussed in exchanges between Schwabach and Maximilian, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 1-2, February 10, 
1620, Maximilian to Schwabach; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 5-7, February 22, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian. 
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complain that the horsemen refused to pay for the goods and services they had 
consumed.22  Officers explained, when Schwabach confronted them, that their men had 
paid in good faith, but the lodgers refused to include hay and fodder in the original stall 
rents for their mounts.  Now they were trying to gouge the riders for more coin, costs the 
soldiers could not afford.  Maximilian should provide his cavaliers with more conduct 
money, they insisted, enough to meet all the charges they incurred in his service.  Several 
months later Wartenberg’s captains threatened to leave Maximilian’s service altogether 
unless he either changed his policies or provided better maintenance.23  Maximilian 
would need to show better lordship through his commissioners, in other words, should he 
continue to deny captains the privilege. 
In the meantime Wartenberg’s captains found themselves suddenly unable to keep 
“good regiment” in their commands, or so they claimed.24  Their recruits had begun to 
take free license to engage in games, competitions, brawls, sometimes duels, heavy 
drinking and lavish banquets.  Correspondents usually described these activites as 
“mischief” (Mütwillen), and sometimes “immodesty” (Unbeschaidenhait) or 
                                                                                                              
22 Schwabach describes his visitation, his discussion with the lodgers, and his interaction with Wartenberg’s 
captains, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 5-7, February 22, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 3-
4, February 27, 1620, Maximilian to Schwabach. 
23 KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 19-20, April 11, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian. 
24 Schwabach describes his many interactions with Wartenberg’s captains throughout the spring, KuBay 
ÄA 2275 fol. 5-7, February 22, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 23-24, April 7, 
1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 19-20, April 11, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 19-20, April 11, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 27-29, April 
30, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 30-31, May 5, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 32, May 5, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 f 47, May 27, 1620, 
Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 49-51, May 28, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay 
ÄA 2275 fol. 60-62, June 14, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian, among others. 
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“impertinence” (Frechheit) or, when taken in prolonged, open defiance, “insolences” 
(Insolenzien).  Phrases like these reflected Maximilian’s perspective and recur throughout 
the documents as the duke and his administration shaped the terms of negotiation. 
Leaders tended to allow and even encourage “mischief” in an effort to build credit 
among their followers.  Soldiers, as officers and commissioners portray them in their 
letters, seem to have craved the chance to perform their manliness, their skill at arms, and 
the bold lifestyle associated with warrior identity and companionship in arms.  In taking 
up the sword, holding banquets, and trying to live at subjects’ expense they might have 
sought to act out a version of noble privilege they imagined they had earned through 
service as retainers.  Officers claimed that when they failed to meet their men’s 
expectations the soldiers used “insolence,” that is, greater liberties than leaders 
themselves had authorized, in order to pressure them into making good on their 
maintenance obligations. 
In other cases, however, commanders gave free rein to “mischief,” and allowed 
their soldiers to take spoils at will, even in friendly lands, to convince the duke to redress 
their own grievances.  Seldom did they admit complicity outright, but claimed instead 
that the troops, unhappy with the maintenance they had received, had become 
ungovernable despite their best efforts to keep “good regiment.”  Wartenberg’s captains, 
for example, pursued this very strategy in their dealings with commissioner Schwabach at 
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Mühldorf and Ötting during the spring.25  Schwabach reported how the officers told him, 
in meetings, that their credit among the troops had waned so badly they feared their 
recruits might desert before the muster commenced.  Officers sought to demonstrate, 
through example, that they could not maintain authority among their men unless free to 
practice lordship within their commands. 
Schwabach urged Maximilian to heed their warnings and grant their requests for 
more cash.26  He noted one captain in particular, Hans Friedrich Langenauer, a famous 
cavalier who he said commanded great respect and seemed to have led the others in their 
effort to regain their customary privileges.27  Langenauer led a renowned company, the 
commissioner said, and offered highly experienced soldiers who brought with them good 
warhorses, always a scarce and valuable commodity.  He felt the duke should satisfy 
Langenauer, above all, so the other captains would follow his example and reach an 
accommodation.  In describing Langenauer’s stature Schwabach emphasized his martial 
                                                                                                              
25 Schwabach details his meetings and negotiations with Wartenberg’s captains in his many reports and 
letters to Maximilian, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 5-7, February 22, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 
2275 fol. 23-24, April 7, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 19-20, April 11, 1620, 
Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 19-20, April 11, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay 
ÄA 2275 fol. 27-29, April 30, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 30-31, May 5, 1620, 
Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 32, May 5, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 
2275 f 47, May 27, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 49-51, May 28, 1620, 
Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 60-62, June 14, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian, among 
others. 
26 He repeated his counsel throughout April and May, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 19-20, April 11, 1620, 
Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 27-29, April 30, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay 
ÄA 2275 fol. 30-31, May 5, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 32, May 5, 1620, 
Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 47, May 27, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 
2275 fol. 49-51, May 28, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian. 
27 Schwabach discusses Langenauer, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 60-62, June 14, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian. 
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reputation, his large following and ability to provide for his men, that is, those qualities 
associated with lordship. 
In time Maximilian agreed to Schwabach’s recommendations and promised he 
would send more coin shortly.28  His reply might indeed have addressed the captains’ 
earlier ultimatum, but it represented neither a concession to their protests nor a move to 
restore their customary prerogatives.  Cash convoys instead showed Maximilian’s 
renewed commitment to provide for the troops through his own maintenance and ensure 
that his new policies succeeded in proving his lordship.  Officers therefore remained 
unsatisfied and continued their efforts to convince him that only their own maintenance 
could restore “good regiment” and “devotion” among their men. 
Later that summer, for instance, Schwabach got further reports that Wartenberg’s 
cavalry had continued to engage in “mischief” throughout the spring.29  Leaders in 
Johann Perrin’s company, in particular, claimed their men had become so dissatisfied 
with the duke’s poor maintenance that they felt inclined to leave his service altogether.30  
Perrin’s men told Schwabach that only their “devotion” to Perrin himself had prevented 
them from deserting.  Perrin’s leadership and maintenance had earned him credit as an 
“honorable cavalier” (ehrlicher Cavalier), they said, and they gladly served him with 
“body, blood and estate” (Leib, Bluet und Guet), the same phrase colonels and captains 
                                                                                                              
28 KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 21-22, April 15, 1620, Maximilian to Schwabach; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 25-26, 
April 19, 1620, Maximilian to Schwabach. 
29 Schwabach discusses the reports, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 60-62, June 14, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian. 
30 Schwabach discusses Perrin’s company, ibid. 
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used to describe their service to Maximilian.  Recruits still wished to serve the House of 
Bavaria, they said, but only if they fought under Perrin, and with his maintenance.  
Claims like these, whether in their words or in Schwabach’s, implied to the duke that 
soldiers would not accept his lordship in substitute for that from their own commanders. 
In the meantime colonel Wartenberg took matters into his own hands and decided 
to provide maintenance for his troops without permission from Maximilian or his 
commissioners.  He had his household Hofmeister, Alexander Rolus, draw up his own 
victual ordinance for the troops billeted around Mühldorf and Ötting during the spring.31  
Its articles required local lodgers to provision the cavalry as their captains saw fit, the 
very demand they had earlier made on the duke.  Schwabach, at first uncertain how to 
proceed, tried to counter the ordinance with other arrangements through Maximilian’s 
local Pfleger, rather than allow the colonel to usurp the duke’s prerogatives.32   
Soon thereafter, to Schwabach’s relief, Maximilian’s promised cash consignment 
arrived for Wartenberg’s captains.33  Rather than content them as the commissioner had 
hoped, however, the officers and soldiers refused to accept the coin altogether.  Leaders 
claimed their men felt insulted by the paltry sum and threatened, once again, to leave 
their lodgings for service elsewhere.34  Schwabach urged the captains to remain patient 
                                                                                                              
31 Schwabach describes Wartenberg’s ordinance, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 23-24, April 7, 1620, Schwabach to 
Maximilian. 
32 KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 27-29, April 30, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian. 
33 Kubay ÄA 2275 fol. 25-26, April 19, 1620, Maximilian to Schwabach. 
34 Schwabach describes his negotiations with them during April and May, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 19-20, 
April 11, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 27-29, April 30, 1620, Schwabach to 
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and remember their affection for the House of Bavaria, to no avail, he said.  Before long 
Wartenberg himself stepped in and provided his own maintenance, and his captains 
followed suit.  Like Neersen, Bönninghausen, Langenauer, Perrin and others, Wartenberg 
sought to prove that only traditional open-table maintenance could satisfy the troops. 
In petitions, through “mischief” and by their own initiative officers tried to 
persuade Maximilian that their soldiers would not accept his lordship in substitute for 
their own.  Commanders like Langenauer, Perrin and Wartenberg asserted their 
customary right to support their own men through open-table maintenance.  Maximilian 
nonetheless remained committed to his policies and tried to send enough cash to 
demonstrate his lordship despite their grievances.  Officers, on the other hand, never 
relented in their efforts to prove his maintenance insufficient and continued to pressure 
him throughout their first campaigns. 
 
“Good Regiment”: Discipline, Jurisdiction and Punishment 
Wartenberg’s victual ordinance illustrates not only how officers took maintenance back 
into their own hands, but also their willingness to wrest legal prerogatives from local 
authorities in matters that touched upon their men’s welfare.  Commanders frequently 
compelled local magistrates to heed their authority, provide their men with food, shelter 
                                                                                                              
  
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 30-31, May 5, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 32, 
May 5, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 47, May 27, 1620, Schwabach to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 49-51, May 28, 1620, Schwabach to Maximilian. 
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and supply on an otherwise illegal basis, and ignore crimes committed by soldiers 
engaged in mischief and violence.  During clashes between soldiers and local subjects 
officers fought to claim sole jurisdiction over their men in an effort to shield them from 
civil law.  In so doing they not only defended their own lordship within their commands, 
but used lordship to claim the right to exercise state power granted them by charter. 
 During that same summer, for example, several men from Langenauer’s company 
left their muster billets at Mühldorf and took a short ride along the Inn to attend an annual 
fair being held a few miles upriver at Altötting.35  Not long after they arrived they got 
involved in a heated dispute with several fairgoers that quickly went awry and escalated 
to swordplay.  In the ensuing brawl the horsemen shot and fatally wounded several 
townspeople.  They made their escape during the commotion, but the authorities knew 
their regiment.  Magistrates quickly confronted Wartenberg, his staff, and Langenauer to 
demand that their soldiers be turned over to face justice.36  Langenauer describes to 
Maximilian how the officers refused outright, denied any knowledge about the incident 
and claimed that their men, in the unlikely event they could be found or identified, would 
face military justice in the customary manner, under their auspices.  By freely 
acknowledging the incident, on the one hand, but also showing how his colonel and 
fellow captains had denied legal culpability for it, on the other, Langenauer 
                                                                                                              
35 Langenauer recounts the incident in his letter, KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 397, July 26, 1620, Langenauer to 
Maximilian. 
36 Langenauer describes their demands, ibid. 
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communicated to Maximilian that officers would tolerate no interference in their 
commands from local authorities, regardless of their men’s conduct.   
Officers normally had more trouble trying to protect troops who, like 
Langenauer’s men, went beyond simple “mischief” and committed capital crimes.  
Soldiers took theft, rape and murder as legitimate spoils in lands whose rulers stood in 
open enmity with the emperor and empire, that is, rulers who had broken the public 
peace.37  But the articles of war strictly protected subjects in lands under law-abiding 
rulers.  Correspondents referred to soldiers’ capital offenses as “highly punishable” 
(hochsträflich), possibly in reference to high jurisdiction (Hochgerichtsbarkeit).  Illegal 
loot and booty taken under improper circumstances, often alongside both mischief and 
capital crimes, fell under the term “exorbitances” (Exhorbitanzien). 
In practice many warlords only bothered to enforce the articles of war within their 
own and their allies’ lands.38  Maximilian would, in this case, have spared only Bavaria, 
those principalities he administered under occupation, and lands that belonged to other 
League members.  Unlike other warlords, however, the duke seems to have tried in 
earnest, at least early in the war, to curb wanton violence against all neutral parties.  In 
his role as imperial commissioner he showed serious concern that his army’s behavior 
                                                                                                              
37 See Fritz Redlich, De Praeda Militari. Looting and Booty, 1500-1815 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1956), and 
Matthew Bennett, “Legality and Legitimacy in War and its Conduct, 1350-1650,” in European Warfare, 
1350-1750, ed. Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 264-277. 
38 See the discussion in Kersen Krüger, “Kriegsfinanzen und Reichsrecht im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,” in 
Krieg und Frieden: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Bernhard Kroener and Ralf Pröve, 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996), 47-58. 
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appear legitimate and sanctioned under the law.39  He issued repeated orders to insist that 
his officers enforce “good regiment” (gutes Regiment) in their commands and prevent 
wanton violence against local populations. 
Maximilian recognized that his ability to exercise lordship in the army would 
depend upon how thoroughly he convinced officers to cooperate with his policies.  
Colonels and captains held exclusive authority over discipline and punishment under the 
customs of war and military justice (Kriegsrecht).40  Rather than simply abrogate their 
privileges Maximilian tried, instead, to prevent them from exercising those privileges.  
He developed new disciplinary procedures he hoped would make them more accountable 
for their men’s conduct, on the one hand, and ease relations with local authorities on the 
other.  He instructed his commissioners to supervise their initial enforcement and then, 
once his expectations had been established, broadened his orders to include officers as 
well. 
 Maximilian first implemented his new procedures in summer 1619, when his 
officials in the Vohburg Landgericht, near Ingolstadt, informed him that prospective 
troops had begun to commit serious offenses while they awaited muster.41  Shenanigans 
                                                                                                              
39 See Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 236-249. 
40 See Peter Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Sozialgeschichtliche 
Studien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 129-145; Reinhard Baumann, Landsknechte: Ihre 
Geschichte und Kultur vom Späten Mittelalter bis zum Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Munich: Beck, 1994), 92-
108; and Fritz Redlich, De Praeda Militari. Looting and Booty, 1500-1815 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1956), 
5-53. 
41 Maximilian describes the reports in his orders to Haimhausen, KuBay ÄA 2246 fol. 10-11, July 17, 1619, 
Maximilian to Haimhausen. 
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that had begun as simple “mischief” escalated into widespread property crime.  Recruits 
broke into homes, ransacked churches and chapels, stole livestock and, even worse, 
uprooted fruit trees, a cruelty forbidden entirely under the articles of war because of the 
long-term hardship it inflicted on villagers.  Maximilian instructed general commissioner 
Haimhausen to conduct an inquiry, find the individuals responsible, and render 
exemplary punishment to show that such behavior would not be tolerated.42  Haimhausen 
should also remind the colonels and captains that the duke expected them to keep better 
“regiment” to protect his subjects from harm.   
 Maximilian ordered similar measures when his own troops began to inflict 
damage on neutral parties beyond his own lands.43  In early winter, 1620, League recruits 
had to fight their way across Swabia to reach the army’s assembly points in Bavaria.  
Union troops tried to contest them for bridges and for narrow routes that ran through 
forests and mountains, or past fortified points.  Both sides tried to force local authorities 
to collaborate with their efforts.44  Skirmishes alongside illegal raids, counter-raids and 
reprisals against subjects caused widespread outcry and quickly exhausted the duke’s 
tolerance.  Maximilian deputized a trusted colonel, Levin von Mortaigne, to serve as his 
commissioner and monitor how the companies behaved.45  Mortaigne should prosecute 
                                                                                                              
42 KuBay ÄA 2246 fol. 10-11, July 17, 1619, Maximilian to Haimhausen. 
43 KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 273-274, February 16, 1620, Maximilian to Mortaigne, copied to Bönninghausen, 
Pappenheim, Haslang, and others.     
44 In his instructions Maximilian discusses prior reports and letters he had received, ibid. 
45 Ibid.     
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illegal violence, the duke ordered, and make sure the individuals responsible suffered 
exemplary punishment.  Maximilian copied several other colonels on his order and 
admonished them to cooperate with Mortaigne and keep “good regiment” to protect the 
emperor’s subjects.  
 Further complaints prompted Maximilian to issue the same instructions not only 
to commissioners, but also to officers.46  He told Neersen, for example, to investigate 
some horsemen in his company who had allegedly killed several villagers near their 
billets.47  Neersen should find the cuprits, render exemplary punishment and make a full 
report.  Maximilian went on to emphasize that incidents like these besmirched his 
princely reputation, particularly when he led the army in person, witnessed them with his 
own eyes and seemed to tolerate them in his very presence.  He meant, in other words, 
that his own lordship came into question when he could not seem to master his own 
soldiers or compel them to carry out his commission in the way he desired. 
 In time, the duke introduced a further requirement that officers force those 
soldiers responsible to make full restitution to their victims.  He told colonel Nicola 
Rouville to implement this policy when he got reports that Rouville’s horsemen had 
driven people from their homes and from inns, struck and injured them, and stole cattle 
and valuables.48  He expected the colonel to conduct inquiries, try the culprits under 
                                                                                                              
46 KuBay ÄA 2254 fol. 169-170, August 3, 1620, Maximilian to Neersen; KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 391-392, 
July, 1620, Maximilian to Rouville. 
47 KuBay ÄA 2254 fol. 169-170, August 3, 1620, Maximilian to Neersen. 
48 KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 391-392, July, 1620, Maximilian to Rouville. 
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military justice, force them to make restitution and then render exemplary punishment.  
In this way, officers might quash grievances before local authorities could claim 
restitution from the duke himself. 
 But Rouville, like other officers, proved unwilling to proceed against his own 
troops.  Maximilian scolded Rouville in his instructions for not having followed the same 
orders in previous cases.49  Commissioners reported that Rouville stood by and watched 
while his men practiced their “exorbitancies.”  Those who tried to conduct further 
investigation complained that Rouville had simply laughed in their faces and turned them 
away from his headquarters.50  Maximilian pressed the colonel to cooperate with 
commissioner Eisenreich, whom he sent to help with the inquiries, but seemingly to little 
result.  Rouville’s actions, as described, seemed to suggest that he found the duke’s 
attempt to interfere in his judicial prerogatives ridiculous and would resist any similar 
attempts in the future. 
 By summer, 1620, when Langenauer’s men came under scrutiny for the shooting 
in Altötting, Maximilian’s new expectations had become firmly established, at least on 
paper, as the duke continued to shape the terms of negotiation.  Langenauer felt 
compelled to hastily excuse himself from any involvement in their misconduct.  He had 
traveled on the duke’s invitation to attend court in Munich with colonel Wartenberg, he 
                                                                                                              
49 Ibid. 
50 Maximilian describes the reports in his reprimand to Rouville, ibid. 
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explained.51  In his absence he left his lieutenant in command at Mühldorf.  He promised 
to ensure better “regiment” in the future and expressed his hope that Maximilian would 
not hold him in disfavor over the incident.   
In practice, however, Langenauer continued to avoid cooperating with the duke’s 
mandates.  He claimed to have returned to Mühldorf shortly thereafter and pursued the 
incident per Maximilian’s guidelines.52  His investigation failed to turn up anyone he 
could punish, he said, because the culprits had long since deserted and fled the region.  
True or not, the captain’s evasion illustrates an important loophole in Maximilian’s 
disciplinary procedure.  Officers in their letters deemed collective punishment “bad 
justice” (schlechte Justitia) and insisted, per military tradition, that only those directly 
responsible be punished for their crimes.  Officers easily shielded their men by claiming 
the individuals could not be identified, had gone into hiding or had left the army.  
Soldiers moreover inflicted far more damage than they could hope to make good on their 
own through restitution.  In the future Maximilian and his commanders would use the 
loophole as a convenient way to address complaints against their troops without having to 
take meaningful action to remedy them. 
Officers continued throughout the League’s campaigns to reject interference from 
outside their commands, shield their followers from legal repercussions, and safeguard 
their men’s welfare vis-à-vis local authorities.  Rather than heed Maximilian’s repeated 
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mandates to enforce his disciplinary policies they largely ignored the new procedures and 
evaded inquiry by claiming the culprits could not be found, or had fled.  Their resistance 
reflected an effort to prevent Maximilian from claiming lordship over their men through 
“good regiment.”  They preferred to practice their own lordship by leading their men in 
partisan warfare and the hunt for loot and booty. 
 
“Public Enemies”: Partisans, Plunder and Constitutional Authority 
In asking his officers to keep “good regiment” Maximilian intended them to refrain not 
only from illegal violence and plunder but also, increasingly, from legitimate partisan 
tactics and the hunt for spoils they entailed.  He had designed his financial and 
disciplinary policies in the hope that his army could vanquish the rebels in one swift 
campaign with minimal bloodshed.53  He soon found, however, that his advance would 
prove far more difficult, brutal and costly than he had anticipated.  Commanders relied 
more than ever upon partisan methods to drive out enemy troops, suppress local 
resistance and establish control in the face of opposition from collaborators.  Officers 
consistently ignored Maximilian’s restrictions and claimed they hampered their efforts to 
conduct the war, uphold their reputations and maintain their men.  Their message implied 
that only through their own lordship could Maximilian’s army conduct successful 
campaigns.    
                                                                                                              
53 On Maximilian’s considerations see Albrecht, Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573-1651 (Munich: R. 
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 By as early as late 1619 and early 1620, before Maximilian had even assigned the 
army its assembly points, League officers found themselves forced to contend with 
enemy partisans trying to interdict their travel.54  During the winter the Protestant Union 
spread parties out to control the routes through Swabia and western Franconia toward 
Bavaria.  Leaguists who had recruited in the west and north now had to fight or slip their 
way past the Unionists to reach muster.  Nearly half the prospective army had yet to 
arrive by March, 1620.  League and Union troops continued to grapple in eastern Swabia 
throughout the spring and into the summer. 
 In June, 1620, Maximilian ordered League troops to converge on Ulm and 
established his headquarters near Dillingen.  League and Union leaders, unable to break 
their stalemate during several weeks’ further fighting, reached an eventual truce.  By the 
Treaty of Ulm, signed in July, both parties agreed not to attack lands that belonged to 
each other’s members.55  Union commanders turned their defenses to face Spanish troops 
in the Rhineland and left Frederick V, his Bohemian supporters and their allies in Austria 
to fend for themselves. 
Later that month Ferdinand authorized Maximilian to cross into Upper Austria 
and bring his rebellious nobles to terms.56  League troops had first to cross the Inn and 
fight their way through the mountains against bitter resistance in the passes and villages.  
                                                                                                              
54 On the 1619 and early 1620 campaign see Johann Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte, 12-51. 
55 On the Treaty of Ulm see Asch Thirty Years War, 63-64. 
56 On the 1620 campaign in Upper Austria see Johann Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte, 51-61. 
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Their vanguard under general-major Anholt, several thousand men, contended with 
nearly 20,000 fighters, half regional militia, the other half veterans the estates hired to 
bolster their locals.  Defenders forced the Leaguists to fight them piecemeal and 
organized partisan counterattacks from the mountainsides.  Once Anholt pushed his way 
through he had next to subdue the towns.  Local villagers joined the urban militia and 
helped delay his men for several weeks. 
By the time Anholt’s men had dealt with the towns most felt their ordeals had 
entitled them to claim traditional rewards for their service.  League troops stood legally 
entitled under the articles of war to treat anyone who waged war against them, and by 
extension against the emperor, as what correspondents called an “open” or “public” 
enemy (öffentlicher Feind).  Soldiers could claim loot, booty and, under the right 
conditions, reprisals and blood vengeance as legitimate spoils.57   
Commanders under Maximilian’s charter, and by extension the emperor’s, stood 
legally entitled to use the state’s powers to subdue the emperor’s public enemies.  
Officers chose to deploy the duke’s constitutional authority through the practices of 
lordship and, in the case of partisan warfare, those of the feud.  Once they resumed their 
advance toward Linz they put those towns and villages that opposed them to the sword, 
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then burned the settlements behind them.  Refugees collected into even more determined 
bands and continued their efforts to attack and harass the soldiers. 
 Maximilian, for his part, regarded the army’s conduct with increasing dismay.58  
He had no wish to hold the Upper Austrian estates or subjects in open enmity.  Ferdinand 
had entrusted the region to the duke’s governance for at least several further years 
following the expedition.  Its subjects fell, in principle, under Maximilian’s princely care, 
and he bore responsibility for their well-being.   
Rather than allow his troops to despoil them he instead took steps to assert his 
own lordship and restrain the violence through policy.  He ordered his officers to have the 
Rumormeister and provosts regard capital crimes, particularly arson, as illegitimate, and 
to summarily hang any soldiers caught participating in them.59  He also told commanders 
to treat peasant partisans not as enemy fighters, but as rabble engaged in rural revolt.  
Ringleaders would be condemned as agitators and hanged to discourage further 
insurrection, but villagers would not be subject to reprisal.   
 Maximilian’s restrictions seem to have fallen on unreceptive officers and troops.  
Soldiers, as portrayed by correspondents, expected spoils in reward for hard fighting.  On 
most campaigns they found that regular patrols, raids, forage rides, ambushes, small 
skirmishes and, above all, convoy interdictions, offered the best occasions to take good 
prizes.  But commanders, in Upper Austria and elsewhere throughout the war, often 
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Albrecht, Maximilian I, 611-640; as well as Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 295-298.  
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worked with local collaborators to help their parties control regions, sustain their troops 
and make life difficult for their foes.  Soldiers nearly always found themselves 
contending with some villagers and townspeople alongside the enemy’s hired troops.60 
Commanders treated hostile locals as open enemies, under law, in order to 
exercise the imperial state’s power through their own lordship and to maintain their men 
through legitimate plunder.  Maximilian tied their hands, however, when he took those 
subjects under his protection and criminalized action against them.  Some soldiers likely 
felt that he had gone back on his good word and denied them the due recompense he 
owed.  Meisl, a participant in these campaigns, may have given voice to their outrage 
when he insulted the duke in Reuttlinger’s tavern in 1621 for failing to reward them for 
their efforts.61 
In trying to restrain how officers used fire and sword Maximilian also, 
inadvertently, threatened their ability to advance their reputations in the army.  Routine 
forays offered ambitious leaders many opportunities to show courage and skill, and the 
wherewithal to win their followers plentiful spoils.  They could participate in daily 
adventures that carried relatively little risk compared to the colossal sieges and climactic 
battles that overshadow most narratives.  In the hunt for loot and booty they made sport 
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out of small-scale fights, performed their self-image as warriors, and proved their lordly 
qualities repeatedly before peers and dependents. 
Later that August Maximilian’s troops captured Linz.  Soon the duke’s emissaries 
convinced the Upper Austrian estates to capitulate and declare their renewed loyalty to 
the Habsburgs.62  Maximilian left Herberstorff in charge as Statthalter to establish an 
occupation government and sent troops around to confiscate all weapons, equipment and 
munitions from the town armories.  He then marched east through Lower Austria, helped 
the imperial troops reduce the remaining Bohemian garrisons and, in early September, 
swept across the mountains northwest toward Budweis. 
In Bohemia the army’s partisan struggles proved even more arduous than they had 
in Austria.  Thurn and Anhalt, the Protestant leaders, believed their army too depleted to 
risk a confrontation during the fall.  They opted to avoid open battle, wear down the 
League and imperial forces, then use the winter to regroup and gather allies for the 
spring.  Throughout September, October and early November they sent parties to defend 
important places and forced the Catholics to slog their way forward village by village, 
town by town.63  Cities with old fifteenth-century walls, both in Bohemia and indeed 
elsewhere throughout the entire war, had to be taken by storm and escalade because the 
artillery proved too cumbersome to send, and too scarce to risk.  Meanwhile the rebels 
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used Mansfeld’s raiders, plus some Hungarian light cavalry on loan from their allies, to 
lay waste to Maximilian’s supply convoys.  League troops fought on without any support 
beyond what their officers could provide or squeeze from the countryside. 
 Maximilian expressed concern to Ferdinand that the campaign had, over time, 
made his troops ever more unwilling to treat even loyal subjects with restraint.  Under the 
present circumstances the duke felt that that neither army would “win any reputation” 
unless they could achieve victory soon.64  Later he would chastise the emperor’s general, 
Bucquoy, for having allowed his troops to mistreat the emperor’s loyal subjects.65  
Bucquoy should have instead limited reprisals, theft, arson and murder to lands that 
belonged to Protestant rebels and their supporters, he insisted.  Lands that belonged to 
loyal Catholics who had submitted in due devotion to Ferdinand should have been spared.  
Bucquoy’s indiscriminate violence discredited Ferdinand’s good word to spare loyalists, 
the duke said, and drove many into the rebel camp.  It also brought dishonor to 
Maximilian, the League, and the Catholic cause more broadly.  He closed his reprimand 
with a suggestion that perhaps Bucquoy’s physical infirmity (Leibesschwachheit) 
rendered him unable to control his men, a veiled insult to the general’s lordship and 
quality as a warrior. 
 In late October the Catholics managed to catch the Bohemians in several running 
battles near Prague and, in early November, defeated them on the White Mountain, the 
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final, exhausted clash Thurn and Anhalt had dreaded.  League and imperial troops 
ransacked the city for two days and hunted down the loot and booty the Bohemian 
soldiers had stashed there for safekeeping.  Prague secured, Ferdinand deputized prince 
Carl von Liechtenstein as his Landpfleger to re-establish firm rule throughout his 
troubled kingdom.66  Ferdinand also granted Maximilian and the League shared 
responsibility to restore the peace in the Bohemian lands.  He let the duke appoint Tilly 
as Kommandant in Prague with full command authority over League troops in the region. 
 In late November Maximilian held a week-long muster at Prague to assess his 
army’s condition.67  He appointed colonel Hannibal von Herliberg, a cavalry leader, as 
his muster commissioner, and had Tilly gather the regiments together for roll calls, absent 
those away in garrisons.68  Their returns revealed staggering casualties.  Over half the 
army had fallen during the League’s expedition.  White Mountain claimed roughly 1,000 
soldiers, but the rest had been lost during the previous four months.  Some had died from 
disease, or had deserted, but it seems likely that most had perished in the partisan 
fighting.  In Maximilian’s own household, for example, a group usually remote from the 
greatest danger, those killed included eight state councilors, five chancery scribes, and 
many bodyguards. 
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 Maximilian had sought, throughout the 1620 campaign, to exert his lordship over 
the army and limit the damage his troops inflicted on local populations.  He insisted that 
officers should observe his new disciplinary policies and ordered them to prevent their 
men from plundering hostile subjects, putting them to the sword in reprisal, or otherwise 
treating them as open enemies.  Officers largely ignored Maximilian’s instructions, 
however.  “Good Regiment” interfered with partisan tactics, prevented them from 
deploying the imperial state’s power through their own lordship, and hampered their 
ability to build credit among their troops. 
 
Conclusion 
Maximilian might, back in June, have expected the Prague muster would conclude his 
imperial commission in complete success, and thereby demonstrate how he had, through 
his own lordship, enabled the emperor to exercise the monarchy’s authority.  He would 
have led his army in person, kept his troops well-maintained, and extended his princely 
protection to the emperor’s loyal subjects.  
 Maximilian had tried to strengthen his lordship in the army by usurping from his 
officers their traditional prerogatives to open-table maintenance and the hunt for spoils.  
His war council, commissioners, provisions service and bench payment system would 
have assumed their responsibility for maintenance, while his disciplinary policies would, 
through “good regiment,” have superseded their command authority and prevented them 
from leading their men in the hunt for spoils.  
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Once the war got underway, however, Maximilian’s officers vigorously resisted 
his attempts to abrogate their privileges.  Commanders re-asserted their right to open-
table maintenance, conducted partisan warfare as they saw fit, allowed their soldiers to 
participate in “mischief” and plunder, and shielded their men from interference and 
punishment by insisting on sole military jurisdiction.  Maximilian persisted in trying to 
enforce his policies, but in the end they proved more than his administration could 
handle.  He had too few commissioners to uniformly carry out his instructions, let alone 
force officers to comply, and they lacked the resources to fulfill his ambition to control 
the flow of maintenance.   
In the meantime it became apparent to Maximilian that the war was far from over.  
During Prague’s fall Frederick V managed, in the confusion, to escape to Silesia, then 
Saxony and eventually to the Hague.69  In exile he still retained his champion, Mansfeld, 
fortified at Pilsen, his ally Gabriel Bethlen, and gathered further support around him from 
across Europe.  Several rebel leaders, including Anhalt, Thurn, Hohenlohe and 
Jägerndorf, escaped to fight on and rally clandestine troops in the Empire.  In Bohemia 
stalwart nobles and subjects harassed the occupiers and tried to prepare the ground for 
their leaders’ awaited return. 
Maximilian feared that now, with Mansfeld still on the march and Bohemia still 
unstable, he would need to keep the League army on its feet for at least another year.  
                                                                                                              
69See Peter H. Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 314-325. 
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Tilly’s force had been reduced to a fraction of its former strength.70  Many veterans had 
stayed on with the regiments, but others, like Meisl, had seen enough and mustered out at 
Prague to head home.  Old regiments would need fresh recruits and new regiments might 
need to be raised.  By the time Tilly conducted his muster at Prague, moreover, the duke 
had yet to deliver a fraction of the monies he had promised. 
Commissioner Herliberg meanwhile encountered difficulty trying to help Tilly 
square the regimental books during the muster.71  He found that officers had seldom kept 
careful track of their incomes and expenses.  He pleaded with Maximilian to send more 
commissioners so they could keep records for payments issued, coin delivered, loans 
extended, and the other transactions that accumulated over time.72  Maximilian sent 
several new appointees to help Herliberg in the short-term.  They included two finance 
ministers and Hans Ulrich Burhus, a Regensburg city councilman who served as one of 
Maximilian’s toll administrators.  Maximilian hoped they could keep better track of the 
army’s finances and thereby help him prolong his arrears into the coming year. 
Ferdinand tried to solve similar problems in his own army by setting up the 
Confiscations Court to absorb former rebels’ estates into the crown domains.73  In order 
to settle debts and recoup the war’s costs he turned around and sold the properties to 
                                                                                                              
70 Maximilian and Herliberg discuss, KuBay ÄA 2265 fol. 150-152, December 29, 1620, Herliberg to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2265 fol. 158-162, January 21, 1621, Maximilian to Herliberg. 
71 KuBay ÄA 2265 fol. 150-152, December 29, 1620, Herliberg to Maximilian. 
72 KuBay ÄA 2265 fol. 158-162, January 21, 1621, Maximilian to Herliberg. 
73See Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, 163-180; and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 349-361. 
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loyalists at cut-rate prices.  Imperial officers received estates as gifts in recompense for 
their service and expenses.  In the future League officers, too, would ask Maximilian to 
intercede with the court on their behalf so they could receive Bohemian lands.  He could 
deduct their prices from the recompense Ferdinand owed him for his own efforts as 
imperial commissioner. 
Maximilian returned promptly to Munich that December for the winter.  He 
remained determined to better enforce his policies the following year and decided he 
would use his commissioners, in particular, to strengthen his lordship in the army. 
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CHAPTER 2: RECOMPENSE AND COMMANDS, 1621 
In the winter of 1620-1621 the exiled Frederick V, his kingdom overrun, his allies 
scattered, opened peace talks with emperor Ferdinand.  He began to entertain terms 
whereby he might bend the knee and surrender the crown in exchange for amnesty and 
religious liberty for the Bohemian nobles.  Soon, however, he learned that many rebel 
leaders had escaped the Catholic snare and might yet rally enough support to retake their 
lands and place him back on the throne.  He learned, too, that Ferdinand’s troops 
remained tied up in the east, either with Gabriel Bethlen’s attacks, else with the 
remaining holdouts in Bohemia.  Frederick hardened his terms and, in the end, demanded 
more than the Habsburgs thought reasonable.1  In January, 1621, Ferdinand re-issued his 
ban on Frederick and, this time, included many Bohemians who had not yet reconciled 
with the crown.  He would rely once again on support from the Catholic League to bring 
the outlaws to terms.  
 Ferdinand’s renewed ban dashed any hope Maximilian still held that he might be 
able to disband his armies.2  He began instead to prepare another invasion force during 
the winter and spring.  His best option for the coming year, he decided, would be to carry 
the war into Frederick’s own Palatine lands.  He would first secure the Upper Palatinate, 
                                                                                                              
1 On Frederick’s political situation and considerations see Ronald G. Asch The Thirty Years War: The Holy 
Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 68-72; and Peter H. Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War, (London: Penguin, 2009), 314-316. 
2 On Maximilian’s considerations see Michael Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung. Maximilian von Bayern, 
Tilly und die Katholische Liga im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Münster: Aschendorff, 1999), 236-249; and 
Dieter Albrecht, Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573-1651 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1998), 539-580. 
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just across the Danube from Bavaria, then pursue the war west into the elector’s 
Rhineland territories. 
 Maximilian continued, in the Upper Palatinate, to demand that his officers respect 
his new administrative and disciplinary policies.  He remained determined to assert his 
lordship within the army, retain close control over its operations, and thereby avoid the 
unlawful conduct he felt had tarnished his reputation during the previous year’s 
campaigns.  He led his forces in person, as he had done before in Austria and Bohemia, 
and he expanded his administration to strengthen his oversight in the army’s maintenance 
and support.   
Maximilian soon found, however, that he lacked the resources and personnel to 
make good on his ambitions.  He could scarcely gather sufficient monies to reimburse his 
officers for their expenses, let alone fund the army solely through his own treasury.  
Rather than abrogate open-table maintenance, as he had tried before, he now called upon 
his commanders to support their own men in the long-term until he could summon 
finances to repay them in the future. 
Officers, as they became more deeply invested in their commands, defended their 
lordly prerogatives all the more trenchantly against Maximilian’s interference.  Most 
enjoyed stronger bargaining positions now that the duke had come to rely upon them to 
fund his troops.  Commanders resisted any orders that might threaten bonds with their 
followers, and they redoubled the hunt for loot and booty, not only to satisfy their 
soldiers and recoup costs, but also to pressure the duke into making good on 
reimbursement.  Maximilian tried to compel them to exercise more restraint in their 
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commands through supervision by his commissioners, local authorities, and occupation 
governments, but officers ignored his mandates, as before, and resisted any attempt by 
outside authorities to interfere in their companies and regiments. 
By year’s end Maximilian began to strike new bargains with his commanders and 
offered them concessions he hoped would make long-term investment and “good 
regiment” more palatable.  Maximilian would agree, first, to refrain from reforming, 
disbanding, or otherwise reducing their commands, so as to preserve their investments 
and followings.  Officers, in turn, would forego reimbursement for the foreseeable future 
and, at the duke’s insistence, exercise more restraint toward local populations.  In reward 
for their ongoing commitment Maximilian would either enlarge their commands, or 
award them multiple regiments, so they could grow their followings and expand their 
prestige and influence in the army.  Only a few officers had reached the new, informal 
arrangement by early 1622, but their compromise would form the basis for future 
negotiations throughout the army over the next several years. 
 
February Reforms: War Council and the General War Commissariat 
Maximilian began his new year with extensive institutional reforms intended to 
strengthen his control over the army’s maintenance and conduct.  In February, 1621, he 
granted the War Council broad executive powers to coordinate his commissioners and 
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other representatives in the field.3  He instructed them to appoint new commissioners, one 
for every regiment, each with orders to manage the duke’s prerogatives in all matters that 
pertained to his assigned regiment.  Councilors would supervise the commissioners 
through several General Commissioners (Generalkommissäre) deputized from among 
their number to represent his interests through Tilly’s headquarters.  In this way 
Maximilian hoped to supervise his officers in every aspect of their commands and 
compel them to better respect his instructions.  
 Maximilian conferred upon regimental commissioners more robust authority to 
govern on his behalf than he had granted previous appointees.  He entrusted them with 
sole custody over his coin and its expenditure, as before, but in addition he now granted 
them exclusive authority over each regiment’s personnel and administration.4   Officers 
could take no decisions related to payment, recruitment, appointment, reformation, 
provisions or equipment without their oversight and his approval.  Support arrangements 
with local authorities, merchant vendors and transport providers, too, fell within their 
exclusive purview.  Maximilian became more insistent, too, that commissioners should 
                                                                                                              
3 On the February reforms see August Damboer, Die Krise des Söldner-Kapitalismus in Bayern unter 
Kurfürst Maximilian I. insbesondere in der Zeit des dreißigjährigen Krieges.  Eine soziologiesche Studie 
(Munich, 1921), 14-51; Michael Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 15-61; Reinhard Heydenreuter, Der 
landesherrliche Hofrat unter Herzog und Kurfürst Maximilian I. von Bayern (1598-1651)(Munich: Beck, 
1981), 178-179; and Albrecht, Maximilian I, 630-635. 
4 More on the commissioners can be found in Damboer, Krise des Söldner-Kapitalismus, 14-51; Kaiser, 
Politik und Kriegführung, 15-61; Heydenreuter, Hofrat, 178-179; Albrecht, Maximilian I, 630-635; and 
Cordula Kapser, Die bayerische Kriegsorganisation in der zweiten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, 
1635-1648/49 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1997), 101-108. 
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take full custody over salvage and captured war materials, and require soldiers to take 
Remontierung for weapons, rather than leave related decisions to the officers. 
 In addition the duke charged commissioners to keep close watch over colonels 
and captains and make sure they obeyed his instructions.  He forbade commissioners 
from partaking in common table with commanders and required them to submit regular 
reports on the army’s conduct.  Reports should include any infractions they witnessed, 
alongside routine financial transactions, expenses incurred, the troops’ mood and 
readiness, and officers’ quality and performance.  He also became more concerned that 
commissioners make sure officers held to the Catholic religion.  Regimental 
commissioners could, the duke hoped, serve as his eyes, ears and hands on a permanent, 
daily basis. 
 General Commissioners each enjoyed seats on Tilly’s war council and held 
equivalent rank to a general-major (Generalwachtmeister).  In council they would read 
the duke’s orders aloud, represent his will, advise commanders on the logistical and 
financial considerations involved in their plans, and handle all correspondence between 
Maximilian’s councils and Tilly’s headquarters.  In addition the war chest paymasters 
(Kriegszahlamt), as well as the provisions service (Proviantamt), materials service 
(Zeugamt), and transport service (Fuhramt) would fall under their supervision.5  
                                                                                                              
5 On the war chests see Eduard Rosenthal, Geschichte des Gerichtswesens und der 
Verwaltungsorganisation Baierns, Vol 2: Vom Ende des 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (1598-1745) 
(Würzburg: A. Stuber, 1902), 418-419; and Albrecht, Maximilian I, 611-640; and on the logistical services 
see Damboer, Krise des Söldner-Kapitalismus, 125-144. 
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 Maximilian created a new chamber attached to Tilly’s headquarters, the General 
Chancery (Generalkanzlei), whose staff would handle the War Council’s documents and 
correspondence in the field.  On its board sat the director, General Commissioner 
Haimhausen, alongside the other General Commissioners when present.  Historians tend 
to describe the general commissioners, plus the officials within their sphere, collectively, 
as the General War Commissariat (Generalkriegskommissariat).6 
 Ducal officials tried to bring the February mandate into effect as best they could 
during the spring and summer months leading up to the invasion.  Most new appointees 
were not warriors, as before, but rather court councilors from the Hofrat and Hofkammer, 
largely townsmen with experience in matters of state and finance.  Lawyers and 
bookkeepers, these new commissioners stood well-suited to verify the muster rolls, 
record financial transactions and conduct paperwork, skills warriors typically deferred to 
their household and staff.  Their expertise became more essential over time as the army’s 
financial and administrative structures grew more intricate.7 
 Once the 1621 campaign got underway, however, Maximilian’s commissariat 
proved no more effective than it had in Austria and Bohemia.8  Officers continued to 
resist any effort to to interfere in their commands or wrest control over the material 
                                                                                                              
6 On the General War Commissariat see Damboer, Krise  des  Söldner-­‐‑Kapitalismus, 14-51; Kaiser, Politik 
und Kriegführung, 15-61; Heydenreuter, Hofrat, 178-179; Albrecht, Maximilian I, 630-635; and Kapser, 
Kriegsorganisation, 101-108. 
7 On their origins and importance see Kapser, Kriegsorganisation, 101-108; Kaiser, Politik und 
Kriegführung, 15-61; and Albrecht, Maximilian I, 611-640. 
8 On Maximilian’s difficulties with the commissariat see Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 103-104. 
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resources they employed to reward their followers.  Maximilian managed to employ, at 
most, some twenty commissioners for the whole army at any given time, not nearly 
enough to supervise every regiment, let alone those troops distributed across the 
landscape in smaller parties.  He then committed himself to even further burdens in 
March, 1621, when the Catholic League diet convened in Augsburg and voted to 
authorize his new recruitment.  Maximilian would, once again, find his finances and 
administration too overwhelmed to meet the tasks he set before them. 
 
Shortage in Coin: Maintenance, Arrears and Deferred Reimbursement 
By summer, 1621, when Maximilian launched his invasion into the Upper Palatinate, he 
had yet to make good on his arrears from the previous year.  Officers continued to 
support their men, but most had gone without reimbursement since 1619, and they found 
their resources strained.  Many began to request more commissioners from Maximilian 
on their own initiative, not only to witness their contributions to his war effort, but to 
provide access to the duke’s coin so they could recoup their short-term expenses through 
customary recompense.  Officers highlighted how well they had performed lordship in 
their commands, and how readily they could attract more troops, to bolster their case that 
they deserved reimbursement.  Maximilian’s ambition to fund the army on his own had 
outstripped his government’s capacity, however, and he had little choice but to deny their 
requests. 
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 Most requests came, first, from those officers who had been continuously fighting 
in the Upper Palatinate since the previous year.9  In June, 1620, when he had first taken 
the field, Maximilian left several regiments along the Danube to guard his northern 
borderlands against incursions during his march abroad.10  He entrusted the region’s 
defense to colonel Timon von Lindlo, an old, trusted commander who had helped train 
the duke’s militia since around 1600.  Lindlo used his companies to cross, illegally, into 
the Upper Palatinate, and tasked them to hunt down and stop Mansfeld’s parties from 
their periodic attempts to strike into Bavaria.11 
Frederick’s spies had kept him well-informed about Maximilian’s invasion plans 
over the winter.  In January, 1621, the same month he came under the ban, he ordered 
Mansfeld to rush across the mountains to the Palatinate’s defense.  Mansfeld retired his 
army from western Bohemia with caution, left small rearguard garrisons in the towns to 
hinder pursuit, then hurried to reach the hills before Tilly could slog his way through 
                                                                                                              
9 Lindlo discusses their situation, KuBay ÄA 2276 fol. 116-117, January 27, 1621, Lindlo to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2276 fol. 222, July 5, 1621, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
10 See Johann Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern, Franken, Pfalz, und Schwaben von 1506-1651, 
vol.1 (Munich: J.G. Gotta, 1868), 54, 71, 95. 
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49, March 12, 1621, Maximilian to Lindlo. 
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from Prague and catch him.12  In reply Lindlo sent more companies across the Danube to 
keep Mansfeld contained and prevent him from gaining a solid foothold in the Upper 
Palatinate. 
Lindlo’s and Mansfeld’s parties contended for control in the region throughout 
the spring.13  Local authorities loyal to the elector collaborated with Mansfeld, sheltered 
his men and allowed his recruiters to drum up young volunteers, while town militia and 
villagers joined his soldiers to oppose the Leaguist incursions.14  Mansfeld managed to 
intercept Maximilian’s convoys, captured their coin, weapons and equipment, and, in 
time, gained the upper hand.  Cut off from support, Lindlo began to confine suspected 
pro-Mansfeld nobles to house arrest and charged ransom for their release.  He unleashed 
his men upon the countryside, as his counterparts had done the year before, and fell back 
on help from captains and other colonels to sustain the troops. 
Commanders in the Upper Palatinate found open-table maintenance and the hunt 
for spoils not only helpful for their reputations, but also militarily necessary to sustain 
their men during long tours afield from garrisons and bases.  By early 1621, however, the 
bitter partisan struggle had taken its toll on their resources despite the ready access to loot 
and booty it entailed.  Before long Lindlo began asking Maximilian to assign more 
                                                                                                              
12 See Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte, 91-121. 
13 Lindlo and Maximilian discuss their efforts, KuBay ÄA-2276 fol. 184-185, March 9, 1621, Lindlo to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 41-43, March 9, 1621, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 45-
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commissioners to his headquarters.15  Commissioners would record the expenses officers 
undertook on the duke’s behalf and thereby witness the good service they had rendered. 
In their requests for reimbursement officers took every opportunity to remind 
Maximilian how he relied upon their lordship and maintenance to keep the army fighting.  
Officers in colonel Gaisberg’s new regiment, for example, emphasized how they had 
spent heavily to bring together good candidates for their companies.16  Gaisberg’s 
colonel-lieutenant, Hans Adam Wager von Hohenkirchen, for one, prevailed upon 
Maximilian to recognize his service with further cash through the commissioners.  
Gaisberg interceded with Maximilian on Wager’s behalf and asked the duke to order his 
regiment’s commissioner, Fatiga, to issue Wager more conduct money from his war 
chests.17 
Wager sought the duke’s recompense not only to refill his coffers, but to confirm 
his reputation and help him grow his following.  Gaisberg explained that several ensigns 
and lieutenants had recently presented themselves to seek posts in Wager’s company.18  
He judged them experienced warriors, noblemen with good names who could bring their 
own followers into service.  They might prove reluctant to sign on with Wager, however, 
                                                                                                              
15 KuBay ÄA 2276 fol. 116-117, January 27, 1621, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2276 fol. 222, July 5, 
1621, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
16 Gaisberg and Maximilian discuss their claims, KuBay ÄA 2230 fol. 433-435, May 8, 1621, Gaisberg to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2230 fol. 431-432, May 10, 1621, Maximilian to Gaisberg; KuBay ÄA 2230 fol. 
439-440, May 30, 1621, Gaisberg to Maximilian. 
17 KuBay ÄA 2230 fol. 433-435, May 8, 1621, Gaisberg to Maximilian. 
18 Ibid. 
     105  
unless they saw that Maximilian would show Wager favor and reward his contributions.  
Should they decline to join the captain then Gaisberg himself would gladly take them on 
as Intretenierte, he said, until he could find posts for them in the regiment.  Maximilian 
nonetheless refused Wager’s and Gaisberg’s requests.19  He similarly disappointed Lindlo 
and other officers who waited for commissioners who never seemed to arrive when 
needed.20  
 In the meantime two other captains in Gaisberg’s regiment, Hans Heinrich 
Reinach and his brother Melchior, asked Maximilian for reimbursement through 
commissioner Fatiga.21  Each had supported their own men during the 1620 campaign, 
they said, and had thereby earned themselves good reputations.  During the winter both 
brothers continued to provide open-table maintenance and gathered fresh prospectives to 
recruit their companies back up to strength.  Reinach’s efforts had earned him Hans 
Adam Wager’s recommendation for the Major’s post at Gaisberg’s headquarters, he said, 
as well as earlier reimbursement from commissioner Albrecht.  Reinach expected the 
duke would grant their requests again as before. 
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 Maximilian did not refuse Reinach outright, like the others, but told him instead 
that he must await further reports from his commissioners before he could allocate 
recompense.22  He adopted the same tactic in his responses to further requests for 
recompense.  Maximilian would henceforth defer them into the unspecified future and 
remind them that their service and contributions had proven their quality, and their 
loyalty to his house. 
 
Opportunity to Command: Resistance to Disbandment and Reformation 
Maximilian continued throughout the year to deny his officers their requests for 
reimbursement.  In time he began to insist that their service would require them to bear 
expenses without objection until he could offer them due recompense, presumably once 
they had secured the Palatinate.  Officers, for their part, defended their prerogatives all 
the more vigorously the more they invested in their companies and regiments.  
Commanders guarded against his interference, bitterly resisted his efforts to transfer or 
disband their men, and took every opportunity to prove their quality and lordship.  Many 
looked to their own higher patrons to intercede on their behalf and guarantee them 
continued opportunities to command.  Maximilian found the more he relied on officers to 
provide maintenance without reimbursement the less leverage he commanded to exert his 
control in the army. 
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  Many officers did receive at least some money from Maximilian to help defray 
their expenses.  Gaisberg, Wager and the Reinach brothers had to wait longer than they 
would have liked and received less than they expected.  Others, however, like colonel 
Sulz, found their finances stretched to the limit.23  Sulz had helped fund his captains and 
their companies since 1619 without any reimbursement.  He feared his finances would 
come to ruin, he said, unless Maximilian made good on his obligation to recoup the 
expenses, as specified in the colonel’s contract terms.24  His captains, too, needed fresh 
coin to help maintain their men.  Like Lindlo, Gaisberg and others, he asked that 
Maximilian send a commissioner to help figure out the regiment’s books, which had 
come into disarray.25    
 Sulz and his captains likely knew Maximilian might disband their regiment 
should they fail to come up with enough recruits to bring their companies back up to 
strength during the spring.  He sought to prove that despite his regiment’s hardships he 
and his men could still deliver the troops and support the duke expected from them.  In 
his letters he stressed, however, that Maximilian’s poor recompense had depleted their 
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Sulz; KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 343, August 13, 1621, Maximilian to Sulz. 
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reputations and cost them credit among their men.26  Sulz’s regiment’s condition had so 
deteriorated, he feared, that his service might bring discredit upon his family’s reputation 
and the honor of his line. 
 In the end, though, Sulz failed to come up with enough prospective soldiers to 
rebuild his regiment to full strength.27  Maximilian deferred his reimbursement to future 
reports from his commissioners, as he had done with Reinach, and left Sulz and his men 
without sufficient means to offer bounties, conduct money, or other material maintenance 
to candidate recruits.  In May, 1621, he issued the instructions Sulz dreaded, and ordered 
the colonel to disband his regiment as soon as possible rather than incur further 
expense.28  
Maximilian’s decision cost Sulz and his captains their active commands, placed 
their reputations in jeopardy and damaged their prospects for future service elsewhere.  
Sulz asked, in consideration, that Maximilian bestow upon him a gift or token that would 
affirm his valor and show that he still stood in the duke’s good graces.29  Maximilian did 
send a small cash consignment to help Sulz issue partial back pay to the discharged 
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soldiers, but Sulz would have to wait for due recompense until funds became available in 
the future.30  
In the meantime Sulz, desperate to preserve his loyal following, spent the summer 
putting his name forward for a new regiment in the duke’s service.31  He would fill the 
regiment with his present men, he said, and would exercise his skill and courage to 
advance Maximilian’s reputation and fame.  He asked only that the duke grant him 
another chance to demonstrate his quality, he continued, and send him his due 
recompense, so he could once again lead his troops effectively. 
Commanders like Sulz and his captains had fought, bled, and invested years and 
huge sums to earn credit among soldiers and accrue followers during their service.  In his 
letters Sulz recommended to Maximilian that the duke should avoid disbanding his more 
experienced, long-serving regiments in the future.32  Officers and soldiers who had 
persevered and continued to invest in the army had shown their loyalty and deserved the 
duke’s continued support, he said.  Such warriors would render more good service in 
campaigns to come and would contribute to Maximilian’s glory in the ongoing war effort.  
He added that disbandments would prove more costly to Maximilian, in any 
event, because he would need to make good on his outstanding arrears and pay the men 
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their discharge bonus.33   Maximilian had already proven himself willing to defer such 
payments, but Sulz insisted that those veterans who remained in service would become 
outraged that their warlord rendered better recompense to less devoted soldiers who left 
the army.  Maximilian responded that he held Sulz in good favor and would gladly grant 
him a new regiment.34  He planned to raise no further regiments at present, but he would 
keep Sulz in mind on future occasions.   
Colonels and captains resisted not only disbandment orders, but efforts to reform 
their companies or place their men under another leader’s command, even on a temporary 
basis.  Gaisberg, for example, objected to an order from Maximilian to reform one 
company in his regiment and divide its soldiers among other captains.35  He explained 
that his own captains had undertaken great effort and expense to keep their men together.  
Each captain, he said, staked his honor and good name on his promise to lead his men on 
campaign in person and make sure they saw glory and spoils.  Should the duke reform 
away the company in question he would force the captain to break his word and lose his 
credit among the troops.  Gaisberg himself likely worried that his own reputation would 
suffer for having allowed such a fate to befall his followers. 
Gaisberg responded in a similar manner when Maximilian instructed him to send 
his own first company to Kätzling to aid the local Pfleger, Matthias Rosenheimer, in the 
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region’s defense.36  Rosenheimer had never served under his command, he said, and he 
hesitated to entrust his men to him.  Gaisberg’s officers and troops did now know 
Rosenheimer, would regard him as a “stranger” (frembter) and would scarcely follow his 
leadership.  He preferred to keep his own company as well as his Intretenierte under his 
direct command.   
In his effort to persuade Maximilian Gaisberg decided, as many officers did, to 
call upon a higher patron to look out for his interests.  He wrote to court and asked 
Johann von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to intercede with Maximilian on his behalf.37  
Hohenzollern, an imperial count from the family’s senior branch, had been named High 
Chamberlain (Oberstkämmerer) and High Court Master (Obersthofmeister) three years 
before and, by virtue of the latter office, chaired the duke’s Privy Council.38  In the end 
Maximilian was persuaded to leave both matters to Gaisberg’s discretion.39  He asked 
only that Gaisberg make sure to garrison important locations in the region and see to the 
subjects’ protection. 
Other colonels and captains, too, looked to their own higher patrons to find them 
posts and prevent Maximilian from sundering their clienteles.  Archduke Leopold, for 
example, interceded with the duke to make sure he granted one or more new regiments to 
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Egon von Fürstenberg.40  Egon hailed from the family Fürstenberg-Heiligenberg, 
Swabian imperial counts who had long served the Habsburgs.41  Egon himself already 
held several church offices at Leopold’s dispensation.  Maximilian obliged Leopold and 
granted Fürstenberg two regiments, one infantry, the other cavalry.42   
In return Fürstenberg reserved one company in his regiment for Leopold’s other 
client, captain Rudolf Kempfen von Angreth, an experienced warrior in Habsburg service 
who, like Sulz, sought an active command for himself and his men.43  Leopold offered in 
addition to send Fürstenberg up to five further captains who also sought companies, 
should he need them.  In the meantime he made the Habsburg lands around Konstanz 
available for Fürstenberg’s muster.44 
It seems Leopold, Fürstenberg and Kempfen had reached their own arrangement 
whereby Kempfen and his men would not provide maintenance from their own coffers, 
but rather with support from Fürstenberg, and perhaps Leopold.45  Fürstenberg told 
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Kempfen to assemble his company at once and hasten to the Fürstenberg seat at 
Heiligenberg to pick up some cash the colonel would make available for him.  
Fürstenberg’s appointment had fallen late in the season and he needed to muster his 
troops right away.   
Kempfen and his men took on fresh recruits to bring their company up to strength 
and made for the colonel’s castle.46  Once they arrived, however, they found the count’s 
officials had not had enough time to gather the promised funds.  Kempfen would have to 
miss the muster date.  Rather than wait at Heiligenberg he requested a muster extension 
from the colonel and set off to marshal his own resources to support his men.  Despite 
their initial reluctance to invest their own wealth Kempfen and his men nonetheless 
proved willing so as not to miss their opportunity to serve. 
Fürstenberg meanwhile had completed his regiment in Konstanz and marched to 
join the other League troops gathering with Leopold’s field army in Alsace.  He 
instructed Kempfen to bring his company directly to Alsace to join the regiment and 
muster there.47  In August the captain arrived only to find that Fürstenberg had neglected 
to set aside billets, provisions or further coin for his men.  Rather than give Kempfen time 
to find his own solution Fürstenberg decided to reform his company entirely.  He left 
Kempfen with only sixty men and tried to divide the rest up among his other captains.  
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Perhaps Fürstenberg had intended all along, first in Heiligenberg and then in Alsace, to 
impede Kempfen’s inclusion in his regiment. 
Kempfen resisted disbandment just as fiercely as had colonel Sulz.  He expressed 
his outrage that he and his men had undertaken such great effort and expense to collect 
their company only to have them reformed and divided up among strangers.48  He asked 
for suitable recompense from Leopold to show him favor, that he might salvage his good 
name and his inclination to remain in Leopold’s service in the future.  Leopold decided to 
show Kempfen favor rather than allow his client’s reputation to suffer.  He recruited an 
entire new company on his own, with his own men, and invited Kempfen to present 
himself so he might bestow the command upon him in person, should the captain accept 
his offer.49  Leopold and, later, Kempfen explained the entire situation to Maximilian in 
order to request permission for the new company to enter League service.50  Kempfen 
expressed his desire to remain with the House of Austria and Leopold explained his wish 
to reconcile with the captain in light of his long, proven loyalty.    
Maximilian often found that strong bonds between officers, soldiers and higher 
patrons not only ensured their continued opportunity to serve, but restricted his own 
leeway to decide on appointments at his pleasure.  In mid-1621, for example, Maximilian 
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needed to replace colonel Bauer, who fell casualty in action against Mansfeld’s troops.51  
Bauer had raised his regiment under contract from Johann Gottfried Truchseß, one of the 
League’s most prominent leaders.  Truchseß held two imperial bishoprics, Bamberg and 
Würzburg, the League’s only member states besides Bavaria to have contributed troops 
directly to the army.52  He wished Maximilian to grant the regiment to Bauer’s own 
colonel-lieutenant, Wolf Dietrich Truchseß von Wetzhausen, his natural successor to the 
command.53  Truchseß had served since the war’s beginning and Tilly judged him to have 
earned high esteem and credit among the soldiers.54   
 Several rival candidates put their names forward to command the regiment, 
however, including colonel Sulz.  Anholt recommended his own colonel-lieutenant 
Zollern for the colonelcy and interceded with Tilly to get his client appointed.  
Maximilian agreed to name Zollern, perhaps to satisfy Hohenzollern at court.55  Bishop 
Truchseß objected in strong terms, however, and Tilly, too, worried that officers and 
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soldiers in the Bamberg-Würzburg regiment would become outraged that a stranger and 
outsider had been appointed above their own colonel-lieutenant, Truchseß.56   
Maximilian soon agreed to reverse his decision and appointed Truchseß colonel 
instead.57  Truchseß planned to travel to Munich to present himself in person and asked 
Maximilian to have Tilly introduce him formally to the troops as their new colonel.  
Zollern meanwhile resigned from Anholt’s regiment in indignation and Anholt made 
another captain, Matthias Gallas, his new colonel-lieutenant  In the end Truchseß had, 
owing to his bonds with his men and with his higher patron, the bishop, won out over 
Maximilian’s inclination to satisfy Anholt and his client, Zollern. 
 In time, the longer they served without reimbursement, the more frequently 
officers objected to orders that might disrupt their commands and followings.  
Commanders stressed their proven loyalty, heavy investment and experienced soldiers to 
convince Maximilian he should keep their companies and regiments in service.  By 
claiming strong lordship in their commands they tried to prove to Maximilian that they 
had shown their quality and built credit with their men, and that in dismissing them he 
would jeopardize his war effort. 
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Mischief and Infractions: Reputation, Violence and the Pressure for Support  
Officers kept credit with their men not only by holding their commands intact, but by 
allowing mischief and leading the hunt for loot and booty, precisely as they had done 
during the previous year.  Leaders used violent performances to defend their reputations, 
secure local control and show their men how well they could support them through 
spoils.  In addition many permitted their men to engage in exorbitances and insolence 
against local subjects in an effort to pressure Maximilian into making good on their 
reimbursement.  Commissioners reported their infractions, and the duke continued to 
insist they should enforce better regiment, but his efforts only provoked further 
resistance.  Officers defended their command autonomy and relied on partisan methods to 
conduct the war without reimbursement from Maximilian’s treasury. 
 Once Maximilian began to defer their reimbursement during the spring musters 
many officers started giving free rein to mischief in an effort to convince him to send 
more cash.  Commanders insisted that Maximilian’s commissariat had failed to provide 
for them or their men and they claimed they could not enforce good regiment until they 
received better support.  They shielded their men from Maximilian’s oversight and 
pressured commissioners into asking Maximilian, on their behalf, to grant their requests. 
 Gaisberg’s captains, for example, claimed their recruits around Geiselhöring had 
gotten into mischief because commissioner Fatiga could not adequately satisfy them 
during the muster.58  Fatiga had, in April, made arrangements with the duke’s local 
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Pfleger to provision the entire regiment through the region’s service industries.59  He first 
issued special monopoly patents to those butchers, inkeeps and others who put their 
names forward as potential vendors.  Patents would grant them preferred access to mills 
and breweries like Reuttlinger’s so they could sell goods to recruits.  Maximilian soon 
decided to change his approach and instead had Fatiga issue a blanket victual ordinance 
to fix prices and food rations for the entire area to establish a well-regulated market.60 
 Captains soon complained, however, that Fatiga had not issued them enough 
conduct money from the war chests, and their men, unable to pay for goods, had become 
unruly.61  Fatiga made billet visitations and found the recruits engaged in what he called 
“sportive” behavior, namely marksmanship competitions, bouts in arms, and brawls 
between men from rival companies over provocations like Meisl’s.62  Mischief, in other 
words, intended to establish their quality as candidates, their standing as warriors and, 
between rivals, their captain’s reputation.   
Soldiers could expect similar sport at most musters no matter how well, or poorly, 
the duke supported them.  Maximilian, on the other hand, considered their mischief 
unacceptable because it seemed to disrespect his new policies and the authority he 
exercised through his commissioners.  Fatiga, for one, told Maximilian what he wanted to 
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hear, and judged their conduct insolent toward the duke, damaging to good policy and 
dangerous to life and limb for soldiers and subjects alike.63  Now that Maximilian 
expressed such concern over misbehavior officers found they could use their men’s 
ordinary sport as leverage to press their demands.  Fatiga could not persuade them to 
impose order and asked Maximilian for further instructions on how he might curb their 
mischief without help from commanders.64 
In reply Maximilian told Fatiga to bring the soldiers under his own territorial 
jurisdiction rather than leave discipline to the officers.65  Fatiga should coordinate with 
the local Landgericht to set up a summary criminal court supervised by the Pfleger to 
punish soldiers’ capital crimes.  Maximilian’s decision to encroach upon his officers’ 
command autonomy and use territorial authorities to administer justice upon their men 
reflected a sharp, if brief, departure from military traditions.  He emphasized that he 
expected Fatiga, like all his commissioners, to ensure that officers kept good regiment 
and prevented soldiers from harming the subjects. 
Fatiga’s measures, to the extent he may have implemented them, seem to have 
accomplished little to affect mischief around Geiselhöring, however.  He noted that the 
recruits only observed good order once Hans Adam Wager treated with their captains and 
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asked them to remain patient for money on the duke’s behalf.66  Fatiga concluded that 
Maximilian’s best remedy for misconduct should involve satisfying the officers’ demands 
for more conduct money and reimbursement.  In the meantime the Geiselhöring 
authorities asked Fatiga to billet the recruits in another town, Maximilian agreed and 
Fatiga, with palpable relief, transferred them to Behaim, with a reminder to Maximilian 
that he should send the officers more coin.67 
Officers continued to ignore commissioners and allowed similar mischief at other 
musters throughout the summer.  Krazer, for example, denounced shooting competitions 
that consumed more than seven-hundred charges per day in the muster area under his 
supervision.68  Heedless recruits caused many injuries, he reported, not only to one 
another, but also to bystanding subjects and expensive war horses and draft animals.  
Neither the colonels, nor the captains or any other officers showed the slightest 
inclination to restrain their behavior, and all ignored his requests that they enforce good 
regiment, he said. 
Garzweiler, too, garnered no more cooperation from the officers under his 
supervision than had Krazer or Fatiga.  In September he conducted his own visitations in 
response to complaints that the troops had engaged in robbery, cattle thievery and arson, 
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but to no avail.69  He explained to Maximilian that the duke employed too few 
commissioners to oversee so many companies.  Those who tried in earnest to enforce 
compliance with Maximilian’s policies put their lives in danger before the warriors’ 
wrath.  He recounted an incident that occurred the previous day when the Rumormeister, 
on his patrol, had himself gotten robbed at swordpoint by some musketeers who took his 
weapons and coin.70 
Most officers denied any direct involvment in lawless behavior and claimed they 
had done their best to keep good discipline.  Colonel Herzelles, on the other hand, came 
closer to sending Maximilian a direct message.71  He told the duke’s commissioners that 
he could not vouch for his men’s behavior either at muster or on campaign unless 
Maximilian delivered better support and reimbursement than he had so far.  Maximilian 
replied that he expected Herzelles to perform his duty as a colonel and keep good 
regiment.72  He and his riders had no reason to cause trouble, the duke continued, and he 
should under no circumstances allow his troops free license to do as they pleased.  
Maximilian nonetheless agreed to send a small consignment to help Herzelles with his 
expenses. 
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Officers themselves took liberty to engage in violent displays in order to defend 
their reputations from rivals and, perhaps, to attract new followers.  Commissioner 
Krazer reported on duels, for instance, both with swords and with pistols, between rival 
officers, and between their clients, during the muster.73  Few seem to have resulted in 
deaths and, according to Krazer, no incidents even got investigated, let alone punished.  
Those officers who did come under scrutiny usually answered only a few cursory 
questions before being released to resume their duties. 
 In more dangerous cases commissioners sometimes wondered whether they 
should do more to prevent violence among officers.  Krazer, for example, reported on a 
pistol duel between two officers that took place near a munitions tent stacked with 
powder casks.74  Each missed his mark, but one shot entered the tent, struck a full 
bandolier rack and, in Krazer’s judgment, could have easily ignited the entire depot.  
Krazer expressed his dismay that Alexander Grotta, the General of the Artillery, made no 
effort to investigate or pursue the incident.  He believed Grotta and other commanders 
intended to allow officers as much leeway as they liked in their confrontations.  He asked 
Maximilian whether he should make sure crimes like these got punished more earnestly. 
 Officers sometimes escalated their disputes beyond simple duels and accused their 
rivals of dereliction.  One sergeant, for example, leveled charges against captain Niclas 
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Becker and said that he had neglected his duties during the past months.75  Becker in 
reply cited his own reputation, built over twenty-nine years’ experience in war, and 
denounced the sergeant for insolence and falsehood.  Becker’s colonel brought the matter 
before the captain’s peers on the regimental court, who found him innocent and 
confirmed him in his post.76 
 Becker’s accuser, not content to let the matter pass with an unfavorable result, 
pursued it further through violent means.  Becker later claimed the sergeant broke into his 
billets and, according to the captain, broke open his trunks and chests, beat his wife and 
seven children nearly to death, and stole his belongings.77  He felt the sergeant’s actions 
had brought disgrace and ridicule upon his good name in the army.  He asked Maximilian 
to show him favor, and grant him recompense to help offset the damage to his reputation 
and credit with his men. 
Once the campaign got underway officers performed violent acts to show their 
men they could extract treasure and provisions for them from locals.  In early May 
Mansfeld managed to escape Tilly’s vanguard in Bohemia and pushed through the 
mountains into the Upper Palatinate.78  He entrenched throughout the regions his parties 
had secured and blocked the approaches from Bohemia and Bavaria.  Tilly established his 
headquarters just across the passes and began a prolonged, four-month effort to break 
                                                                                                              
75 KuBay ÄA 2261 fol. 674-676, November 22, 1621, Becker to Maximilian. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 On the campaign see Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte, 91-107. 
     124  
through Mansfeld’s positions all along the mountain range.  Mansfeld hoped he might get 
reinforcements from Frederick’s erstwhile supporters in the Protestant Union to help 
repel League attacks. 
 Union leaders, on the other hand, sought only to defend what they called their 
traditional liberties, and declined to participate in Frederick’s wider war effort to recover 
Bohemia from the Habsburgs.  In May they brokered a peace agreement, the Treaty of 
Mainz, with Spain.79  Union troops disbanded and, in exchange, Spinola promised that 
Spanish troops would leave Union members’ lands alone.  Left with no allies and little 
support, Mansfeld held periodic peace negotiations under false pretenses to ease the 
pressure.  He struggled to hold Tilly back and keep his men provisioned as long as he 
could.  If he could hold the Upper Palatinate until winter he might be able to strengthen 
his position for the coming year. 
 Ferdinand waited long into the summer for negotiations to run their course before 
he authorized Maximilian, in July, to wrest the Upper Palatinate from Mansfeld’s grasp.80  
Maximilian left Munich for Straubing to join Gaisberg’s and other regiments along the 
border.  Not everyone had finished their musters, but the completed regiments would join 
Lindlo’s to overrun the region, surround Mansfeld from the west and trap him against the 
mountains and Tilly’s army. 
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Mansfeld weighed his options and decided he would need to escape to fight on 
elsewhere, either east into Bohemia or west into Frederick’s principal lands along the 
Rhine.  He issued Maximilian a threat that he would move west and lay waste to 
Bamberg, Würzburg, and other League member bishoprics and abbeys in Franconia 
unless the duke withdrew Tilly’s troops from Bohemia.  Maximilian ignored him and 
instructed Bamberg to arm its local people to block Mansfeld’s passage.  He then crossed 
the Danube to begin the Upper Palatinate’s reduction.  His troops spent July, August and 
September fighting the same bitter town-by-town struggle they had faced in Austria and 
Bohemia while Mansfeld, meanwhile, looked for a way to extricate himself. 
 League commanders used fire and sword, once again, to overcome resistance 
once the invasion got underway.81  Their methods pushed back Mansfeld’s troops, 
subdued his supporters and, perhaps most importantly, gave officers renewed occasion to 
lead their men in the hunt for loot and booty.  Maximilian had hoped to restrain their 
behavior in the Upper Palatinate, but his efforts met with familiar disregard.  Leaders 
craved further spoils not only to satisfy the soldiers, but to replenish their own coffers, as 
well, in substitute for the duke’s elusive reimbursement.  Regimental commissioners, 
largely court clerks, had proven valuable for bookkeeping and managing monies, but they 
otherwise lacked the standing to force seasoned warriors to forego their customary 
rewards. 
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 Officers used persuasion, house arrest, kidnapping, ransom, and torture, among 
other tactics, to secure cooperation from local authorities, gain regional control and 
provide their men with treasure and supplies.  Captain Hans Goldt, for instance, set an 
example for his men in the villages near Regensburg where his company had been 
stationed to keep the roads secure.  He arrived one morning at a local parsonage with his 
lieutenant, his ensign and several other officers to establish his headquarters.  He hoped 
the resident preacher, Melchior Mayer, could help him establish his company’s firm 
control in the local community.82  Goldt placed Mayer under house arrest in his home and 
kept the headquarters under close guard.  That way Goldt could just as easily hold Mayer 
hostage for leverage and ransom should the villagers prove uncooperative. 
 Mayer protested that he, a simple preacher, and the people under his care were too 
poor to provision Goldt’s company for long.83  Goldt nonetheless forced what supplies he 
could from them and then, once they began to run short, threatened more severe action 
unless they could come up with more.  Mayer offered to speak to the villagers on Goldt’s 
behalf, but evidently to no result. 
 In time Goldt decided to put Mayer to torture in order to compel the villagers to 
come forward with goods in ransom.84  Goldt had the preacher beaten, whipped him with 
his own pistol, kicked him, and cut him with his spurs and sword.  His officers fashioned 
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a makeshift tourniquet, common during the war, from a rope wrapped around a barrel and 
fastened to a length of wood that, when twisted, tightened the rope around Mayer’s neck.  
Before long the rope snapped, however, a miracle that Mayer later attributed to God’s 
intervention.  Goldt’s men interpreted events in a more sinister light and saw sorcery at 
work.  His ensign suggested they should tie a stone around Mayer’s neck and throw him 
in the river. 
 In the end Goldt decided to keep Mayer hostage a while longer.85  He shifted his 
company to a new position some time later and took the preacher with him, naked and in 
chains, so Mayer claimed.  Some weeks later Mayer made contact with acquaintances in 
Regensburg who lent him money to ransom himself from his captors.  Upon his recovery 
Mayer asked Maximilian that he and the villagers be compensated for the damages Goldt 
and his men had inflicted.86 
Maximilian expressed his regret at how his soldiers had treated Mayer.87  He 
promised to have his commissioners investigate and make sure officers identified those 
individuals responsible, forced them to make appropriate restitution, then rendered 
exemplary punishment to deter future misconduct.  In the meantime he asked Mayer to 
prepare a document for his commissioners that named his captors and described as much 
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about them as he could recall to aid in the investigation.  Mayer penned a detailed letter 
that recounted the entire episode for the duke’s officials.88 
Despite their reports and initiatives, however, Maximilian’s commissioners seem 
to have seldom managed to prevent officers from using illegal violence to conduct their 
campaigns.  By year’s end they had driven Mansfeld from nearly all his positions in the 
Upper Palatinate and thereby proved, once again, how effective their partisan methods 
could be.  In late October Mansfeld managed to break through the League’s encirclement, 
then evacuated his remaining troops from the Upper Palatinate.  He struck west for 
Frederick’s principal lands on the Rhine, burned his way through League members in 
Franconia along his retreat, and arrived near Alsace by month’s end to prepare the 
Palatinate’s defense.  In the Upper Palatinate Maximilian would try, one last time, to 
develop new methods whereby his commissioners and administration might ensure better 
regiment in the army. 
 
Amberg Regime: Occupation, Good Policy and the Search for Discipline 
In October, once he had secured control in the Upper Palatinate, Maximilian established a 
new occupation government in Amberg to handle grievances like Mayer’s.89  On its 
board he installed commissioners Herliberg, Haimhausen, Preysing and Rosenbusch to 
govern his name.  He charged them to administer good policy, ensure peaceful rule, and 
                                                                                                              
88 KuBay ÄA 2302 fol. 37-40, October 20, 1621, Amberg Government to Maximilian. 
89 On Maximilian’s occupation government see Albrecht, Maximilian I, 581-610. 
     129  
enforce better regiment among those troops he left to garrison the principality.  In an 
effort to reduce violence between soldiers and subjects he tried to hold officers personally 
accountable for infractions, he tried to disarm towns and nobles to minimize their 
resistance, and he tried to supply his garrisons through the provisions service to reduce 
their need for forage.  His efforts met with no more success than before, however, and he 
soon abandoned them for lack of resources. 
Maximilian sought at first to have his occupation government enforce the same 
disciplinary policies he had established in 1619 and 1620.  In Mayer’s case he instructed 
them to find captain Goldt, have him identify the men responsible, then force those men 
to make restitution to Mayer.90  Goldt evaded responsibility in the same way other 
officers had, however, even though Mayer implicated him explicitly in criminal acts.  
Maximilian’s commissioners themselves proved reluctant to hold the captain, or other 
officers, directly responsible for any violence against the subjects.91  Before long they 
had dropped the incident and seem to have declined to pursue it further. 
Later that month Maximilian entertained the idea that colonels should answer 
personally for how their captains and soldiers behaved toward local people.  He had Tilly 
summon the generals and colonels to a war council at Tilly’s headquarters to announce 
the new policy.92  Tilly told them colonels would now, in theory, be expected to enforce 
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the duke’s mandates on pain of losing their commands.93  Soldiers caught on forage 
without passes from their colonels would be arrested and subjected to exemplary 
punishment.  Maximilian sought in particular to weed out the many “lordless soldiers” 
(herrlose Knechte), roaming bandits who joined League parties to fight and participate in 
loot and booty, then left to prey upon the people.94  In politically sensitive cases 
Maximilian ordered Tilly to make sure the General Provost pursued culprits and had 
them hanged before their entire regiments as examples.95 
 Maximilian next tried to make sure hostile locals enjoyed less access to arms and 
fewer opportunities to give his men trouble.  During the previous year his Statthalter in 
Upper Austria, count Herberstorff, had collected weapons from the subjects in order to 
cut down on local violence against his soldiers.96  Maximilian decided he would try a 
similar program in the Upper Palatinate.  In November he instructed his Amberg 
government to disarm the region’s urban militia and castle garrisons.  In the towns local 
officials confiscated citizens’ weaponry, made out inventories and turned them over to 
the commissioners for safekeeping.97  Nobles, once they submitted to League parties, 
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surrendered their family armories, according to the commissioners’ reports, and had their 
men turn weapons over to the captains and company quartermasters.  Maximilian hoped 
his new policy would make subjects safer and give his own soldiers less occasion to 
retaliate against them. 
 City fathers, on the other hand, claimed Maximilian’s policy would leave their 
people defenseless against marauders.  Probably they meant not only lordless warriors 
and bandits, but the duke’s own occupation troops as well.  They pleaded with the 
Amberg government to let their militia remain armed.  In reply Maximilian’s 
commissioners explained that the duke had taken the Upper Palatinate under his 
protection.  He intended no insult or enmity through his measures, but merely wished to 
provide for peace and orderly rule.  Subjects had little to fear because League garrison 
troops had assumed responsibility for their defense. 
Magistrates, likely skeptical, nonetheless began to comply.  By mid-November 
the commissioners reported that they had taken most household and battle weapons from 
those men on the militia muster rolls and secured them in their central armory at 
Amberg.98  Maximilian next tried to force the nobles and other landholders to submit to 
his rule by having them do him homage before his commissioners.  He ordered the 
Amberg government to arrest those who refused to present themselves, then confiscate 
their estates.  In subduing the towns and nobles the duke hoped to reduce any resistance 
his occupation forces might face. 
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Maximilian tried, also, to supply his garrison troops entirely through the 
provisions service.99  He felt regular victuals would deny officers and soldiers their usual 
excuses to plunder from locals.  Last year’s campaign had so devastated local crops and 
trade that the Amberg commissioners could scrounge little and suggested, instead, that 
Maximilian send goods from his own lands instead.  First he would shift his grain 
reserves and some cattle northward to his magazines along the Danube.  His provisions 
service would then issue secret patents to grant supply contractors exclusive access to the 
magazines.  Suppliers would establish staples in the Upper Palatinate, then transport or 
prepare bread, meat and beer for the troops.  Sales they would charge to the duke on 
credit against soldiers’ future wages so the troops would have little need for hard coin. 
In the end, however, officials seem to have never carried the proposal forward.100 
During the winter, when Maximilian had his Amberg commissioners perform full 
musters for the garrison troops still present, he discovered that his commissariat remained 
nearly as underfunded and undermanned as it had been in February.101  Commissioners 
reported back that they lacked the coin and had too few commissioners present to 
perform the musters to good effect.  Commisioner Burhus had to conduct all the musters 
himself, for the time being, without any assistance. 
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Maximilian’s disarmament program, too, enjoyed limited success, and his 
colonels largely ignored the October orders.102  Soldiers in his occupation force continued 
their depredations unchecked.  Maximilian threatened, on some occasions, to carry out 
his October mandate and remove colonels from command unless they enforced better 
regiment, but he seems to have never followed through.  He decided he would need to 
secure cooperation from officers themselves if he hoped to improve their conduct toward 
local populations.   
 
Concessions and Compromise: Maintenance, Restraint and Enlarged Commands 
By year’s end Maximilian had begun to reach an informal compromise with several 
officers that made continued investment more palatable to them.  Officers tried, at first, to 
leverage Maximilian into granting their requests for reimbursement by refusing, almost 
outright, to enforce good regiment in their commands.  In reply Maximilian impugned 
their quality as warriors and threatened to disband their commands unless they better 
respected his orders.  Before long certain officers decided, during the winter months, to 
express their willingness to provide maintenance without reimbursement in exchange for 
enlarged commands so they could grow their followings.  By early 1622 Maximilian had 
agreed to the idea, under the condition that they make sure to enforce his disciplinary 
policies in the future. 
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Maximilian’s negotiations with colonel Johann Philipp Kratz von Scharfenstein, 
in particular, illustrate how the duke and his officers arrived at their tentative new 
arrangement.103  Kratz and his men had been fighting Mansfeld’s parties with Lindlo 
since early winter.  His captains, like others under Lindlo’s command, had been denied 
their reimbursement the entire time.  Kratz tried to intercede for his captains Metternich 
and Bertram, for example, but met only with Maximilian’s reassurances that they would 
see coin in the future.104  In the meantime they turned to the usual raids and plunder to 
satisfy their men and make up the duke’s shortfall.  Local authorities seem to have lodged 
more complaints against Kratz’s men than any other regiment throughout the campaign. 
In his many reprimands Maximilian urged the colonel to keep better regiment in 
his command.105  He appealed, first, to Kratz’s loyalty and devotion by expressing his 
disappointment in the colonel who, he said, he had so far held in special favor and 
affection.  Kratz should cease allowing his men free license, the duke said, bring them 
back into good devotion, and render exemplary punishment.  In addition the duke warned 
he might deduct damage claims against Kratz and his captains from their future 
recompense should they continue to prey upon local populations.  Maximilian’s threat 
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suggested he might force officers to choose between ordinary reimbursement, on the one 
hand, and the hunt for spoils on the other. 
Kratz nonetheless denied his involvement, like other officers, and made 
occasional overtures to show that he had been doing everything in his power to enforce 
Maximilian’s orders.106  He had made extensive inquiries, he insisted, but had found no 
culprits among his men, and felt they should not be held responsible for any infractions.  
In October, when Tilly announced the duke’s mandate that officers should be held 
personally responsible, Kratz reportedly expressed special enthusiasm for the idea.107  
Maximilian told Kratz he would have liked to believe him, but he knew better, and had 
reports that the colonel had done little to stop his men from mistreating the subjects.108  
Later that month Maximilian received further grievances against the colonel’s men.109  
Kratz insisted he would make inquiries, identify the culprits, force them to make 
restitution, then render exemplary punishment.110  In the end, however, he seems to have 
taken no action and the violence continued as usual. 
Before long Maximilian allowed the local authorities to become involved, as he 
had before.  Magistrates asked permission to participate in Kratz’s investigation and send 
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eyewitnesses to his headquarters who could identify the culprits on sight.111   Kratz 
refused, as most officers had done, unwilling to cede their command authority or lose 
control over how the proceedings would affect their followers.  In time, when Kratz’s 
investigation turned up no results, local authorities insisted that Maximilian hold the 
colonel’s entire regiment collectively responsible.  Kratz expressed outrage at the 
suggestion, not only because collective punishment constituted bad justice, but because 
those responsible could just as easily have been lordless soldiers, and not his own 
troops.112  He asked Maximilian to assign a commissioner to investigate, perhaps 
knowing the duke could spare none.  Kratz and his officers continued to resist 
involvement by outside authorities in their commands. 
Before long Kratz saw an opportunity to use Maximilian’s concern for good 
regiment as leverage to wrest concessions from him.  First, early the following month, 
Kratz reported he had brought his troops back into good regiment and would ensure they 
treated the subjects with restraint.113  He intended his report to prove his willingness and 
his ability to enforce the duke order’s to their fullest extent.  Second, in the same letter, 
he asked that Maximilian reward his good service by granting him permission to enlarge 
his regiment so he might find more posts for his followers.  His request carried an 
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implicit message that the duke might not find Kratz’s men so restrained in the future 
unless he rewarded the colonel’s efforts with due recompense. 
Maximilian, not to be so easily leveraged, responded to Kratz’s letter with his 
own counter-proposal.114  He assured Kratz that he held the colonel’s service in high 
regard, but he would not countenance enlarging his regiment unless he could keep his 
men from harming the subjects over a prolonged period.  In addition he reminded the 
colonel that he had not yet found the culprits he had begun to seek in October, and should 
continue his search.  In the future he might grant the colonel’s request should he prove 
his continued devotion.   
In reply Kratz followed through on his implied ultimatum and allowed his men to 
resume their search for spoils.  Maximilian’s Amberg government got complaints 
throughout November that Kratz’s cavalry had continued to rob, plunder, injure and kill 
local subjects unchecked.115  Commissioners summoned the colonel back to Amberg to 
answer for his regiment’s conduct in person. 
Kratz took the opportunity to make his demands for recompense more explicit.  
He professed he had made every effort to restrain his men, but they had grown so 
disgusted with Maximilian’s poor support that they had become ungovernable.116   Kratz 
hoped his men’s conduct would not tarnish his good name or the service he had rendered, 
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but they would continue in their behavior until they received the pay arrears the duke 
owed them.  Maximilian replied that Kratz would simply have to find ways to bring his 
men back into good order without further cash for the time being.117  He refused to allow 
Kratz to coerce reimbursement from him through mischief and illicit violence. 
 Kratz continued his mischief throughout the winter and repeatedly incurred 
Maximilian’s further reprimand.  In late November Truchseß, the bishop of Bamberg and 
Würzburg, lodged complaints against him.118  His riders had, the bishop claimed, brawled 
openly in both cities’ streets and engaged in wanton rape without any effort from their 
commanders to put a stop to their crimes.  Maximilian ordered Kratz to investigate, find 
the culprits and render exemplary punishment.119  He reminded him, again, that his 
charge as colonel required him to protect subjects in lands belonging to League members, 
not treat them as enemies. 
 Later that month, when Kratz showed no inclination to relent, Maximilian 
threatened to disband his regiment entirely.120  He instructed commissioner Haimhausen 
to open negotiations with the colonel as though he intended to proceed with the 
disbandment as soon as possible.121  Haimhausen should tell Kratz that Maximilian felt 
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his regiment could no longer be trusted to fight well or render good service in the future.  
Soldiers who disrespected their colonel’s authority and carried out crimes against 
subjects under the duke’s protection would bring nothing but disrepute to Maximilian’s 
name.  He considered them ill-disciplined youths, not warriors, and could expect no more 
from them but further damages, Haimhausen should say.  
 Maximilian impugned Kratz’s reputation in an effort to persuade him to enforce 
the duke’s orders and stop trying to leverage concessions.  He implied that commanders 
who failed to prevent their men from unsanctioned violence against subjects under the 
duke’s protection performed poor service.  He would judge their quality henceforth by 
how well they respected the duke’s instructions and enforced his policies.  Maximilian 
would allow Kratz to keep his regiment, Haimhausen should say, only if he promised to 
keep better regiment in the future.122 
 Kratz protested, in reply, that he and his men had fought in a reputable and 
honorable manner since the war’s beginning despite Maximilian’s poor recompense for 
their service.123  Local subjects had treated them with such hostility, however, and the 
duke had offered them such little support, that they had no choice but to forage and 
defend themselves from harm.  Commissioners, on the other hand, indicated that Kratz 
simply allowed his men to take lodgings and provisions as they pleased without regard 
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for legalities or instructions to the contrary.124  Kratz insisted, however, that his men, 
despite their ill-treatment at Maximilian’s hand, nonetheless desired nothing more than to 
continue in the duke’s service rather than be disbanded.125   
Soon after the new year Maximilian’s Amberg regime summoned the colonel 
once again and challenged him to explain his regiment’s behavior.126  Kratz told them his 
men had become outraged that the duke would reward their long service with nothing but 
abrupt dismissal.  He began to move them toward Donauwörth, ostensibly to prepare for 
disbandment, and declared that unless they received their full arrears they would mutiny 
and perhaps take their due directly from the Bavarian lands themselves.127 
 In the meantime Kratz had raised the prospect that he might leave Maximilian’s 
service for better opportunities elsewhere.128  He told the duke he had opened 
negotiations with Ferdinand about the possibility that he might enter imperial service 
with a larger command.  Ferdinand had, on Liechtenstein’s recommendation, offered to 
contract with Kratz for an enormous 2,000 man cavalry regiment.  Kratz assured 
Maximilian that he remained the duke’s loyal servant and would prefer to continue in 
League service.  Maximilian need only grant him some reimbursement and allow him to 
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126 KuBay ÄA 2302 fol. 268-276, January 10, 1622, Amberg Government to Maximilian. 
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enlarge his regiment so he could find posts for his clients.  In the event he did not, 
however, Kratz wanted to make sure he could bring his followers into new service in a 
reputable manner without bad talk attached to his name, he said. 
 By the time winter arrived Maximilian seems to have decided he had little choice 
but to grant Kratz the concessions he had demanded, at least in part.129  He needed the 
colonel’s resources, followers and leadership too much to risk losing him from League 
service.  Mansfeld’s strategy to delay Maximilian and wait for new allies had, in the long 
run, proven successful.  Two new champions, prince Christian of Brunswick and 
margrave George Frederick of Baden-Durlach, soon declared for Frederick and began to 
assemble their own armies to join Mansfeld in the west.130  Maximilian would need all 
his troops, Kratz’s included, for yet another year’s campaigns. 
In November emperor Ferdinand authorized Maximilian to pursue Mansfeld into 
the Lower Palatinate.  Tilly rounded up those troops not left behind for garrisons, 
marched west, and arrived in the Neckar valley within the week.131  He decided to secure 
the towns along the east bank, establish billets through the valley, and wait until spring to 
attack, rather than risk trying to dislodge Mansfeld from Alsace during the winter.   
Mansfeld, for his part, decided against trying to defend Frederick’s lands directly, 
as he had done over the past months.132  He would instead attack League members in the 
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130 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 325-331. 
131 Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte, 91-121. 
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regions around Alsace in order to draw their troops away, take presure off the Lower 
Palatinate and buy time for prince Christian and George Frederick to mobilize for the 
spring.  Christian’s troops could, on their way south, threaten Cologne’s lands in 
Westphalia as well.  Elector-archbishop Ferdinand of Cologne, Maximilian’s brother, 
decided to raise another League field army to protect his territories.  Maximilian awarded 
the new command to Anholt, bestowed upon him the title Field Marshal and ordered him 
to march for Cologne with several veteran regiments.133 
 In December Maximilian asked Tilly and his Amberg commissioners to assess the 
army’s overall condition for the coming year.  Tilly felt Maximilian should strengthen the 
army with even more recruits, cavalry in particular, who he could use to harass and 
disrupt Mansfeld’s recruitment efforts.134  He warned, however, that Maximilian’s 
inability to deliver enough money had seriously damaged his reputation among the 
officers and troops.135  In the future the duke should send more convoys to restore his 
good name and boost the men’s eagerness to fight for him.   
 Maximilian on the other hand knew he could not spare enough funds to meet the 
army’s demands.  In early 1622 Maximilian summoned Kratz to an audience at court to 
work out their new arrangement.136  He would allow Kratz to enlarge his regiment, as 
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136 KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 162, January 16, 1622, Maximilian to Kratz; KuBay ÄA 2311 fol. 15-16.  January 
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requested, and would send partial reimbursement to help the colonel with his present 
expenses.  In exchange Kratz would continue to support his men through open-table 
maintenance, on his own account, until funds could be found to recoup his costs in the 
future.  He would also keep better regiment in his command and improve his men’s 
relations with subjects under the duke’s protection. 
 Maximilian would prove more willing, in time, to abandon his insistence on good 
regiment in order to keep his officers and men satisfied in his service.  He would rely 
increasingly upon their continued investment and forbearance as the war dragged on, as 
his arrears grew, and as he rebuilt, maintained and enlarged the army from campaign to 
campaign.  
 
Conclusion 
Maximilian had begun 1621 in the hope that he could better pay, supply and reimburse 
his troops in the Upper Palatinate than he had in Austria and Bohemia.  He created the 
General War Commissariat to extend the War Council’s reach and lay claim to his 
prerogatives over the army’s material needs.  Regimental commissioners would exercise 
his control and supervise officers to make sure they adhered to his instructions and 
policies.  Regular cash and supply would, when paired with strict oversight, offer his 
warriors fewer occasions for mischief, unlawful violence and mistreatment toward local 
subjects, he hoped. 
 Officers nonetheless found Maximilian’s administration unreliable from the 
campaign’s outset and continued to support the troops largely on their own.  Once 
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Maximilian began to defer their reimbursement into the future they resumed the hunt for 
loot and booty, as before, to show they could provide for their men, and to replenish their 
own coffers with spoils.  Many asked Maximilian to send more commissioners who could 
record their expenses and dispense reimbursement, but the duke employed too few to 
keep all the books, let alone force officers in the field to restrain their men or deny them 
plunder.  On campaign and during muster his commanders used mischief, duels, raids and 
other violent displays to prove their quality and broaden their reputations, despite the 
duke’s policies to the contrary. 
 Maximilian sought new ways throughout the year to coerce officers into enforcing 
better regiment among their soldiers.  He tried to hold colonels accountable for their 
men’s conduct and, sometimes, threatened to deny them recompense or disband their 
regiments entirely, in punishment.  In response colonels and captains gave their soldiers 
broader latitude for mischief and plunder, or threatened mutiny, to force Maximilian into 
hearing their demands.  Most frequently they asked for more reimbursement, or tried to 
prevent the duke from reforming or disbanding their commands, in order to keep their 
followers together and satisfied.  Bonds between officers, their higher patrons and 
soldiers restricted Maximilian’s ability to replace or dismiss officers without alienating 
their men and supporters.  He depended too much on their investment, influence and 
leadership to drive them away. 
 In the end Maximilian had to moderate his concern for discipline in order to give 
his officers and soldiers room to maintain their customary relationships.  By the time 
Gaisberg’s muster took place in spring, 1621, soldiers like Georg Meisl may have felt the 
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same frustration he expressed toward the duke and his policies.  In Reuttlinger’s tavern 
he gave voice to the perception that Maximilian had failed to respect, and sometimes 
tried to abrogate or alter their time-honored warrior culture.  His poor recompense and his 
efforts to enforce strict discipline had, in time, begun to limit the means officers could 
employ to satisfy their men.   
 By November, however, League warriors had reasserted their prerogatives and, in 
part, regained their liberty to exercise lordship in their commands and the practices that 
established bonds with their men.  In 1622 Maximilian’s war effort would place even 
greater pressure on both Maximilian and his officers, strains that would bring his army 
into crisis. 
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CHAPTER 3: CRISIS AND INVESTMENT, 1622 
In November, 1621, with the Upper Palatinate secured and Tilly billeted on the Neckar, 
Maximilian returned to Munich to attend his court and state councils.  He would conduct 
the war from his desk for the next eleven years.1  Through the Privy Council he handled 
diplomatic and strategic decisions, through the War Council he managed the army’s 
finances and administration, and through the General Chancery he kept good 
correspondence with Tilly and other officers.  Only in 1632, when Gustav Adolf overran 
Bavaria, would he again take the field. 
Over the winter Tilly urged Maximilian to commit his available funds toward 
strengthening the army for the coming year’s advance into the Lower Palatinate.2  
English volunteers already held Frederick’s three principal fortresses at Heidelberg, 
Mannheim and Frankenthal.  With their support, Mansfeld had spread men all across the 
region to hinder any incursions.  He held his main force in Alsace, on the Rhine’s west 
bank, to await two fresh armies on their way to reinforce him, one under Durlach, the 
other under prince Christian of Brunswick, who gathered recruits as he plundered his way 
south through Hessen.3   
In order to delay Christian’s progress Tilly had Anholt take several regiments into 
the Odenwald to grapple with the rebels throughout the winter months.  He sent a few 
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2 KuBay ÄA 2297 fol. 518-521, December 16, 1621, Tilly to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2314 fol. 9-11, 
December 31, 1621, Tilly to Maximilian. 
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thousand more troops south to help archduke Leopold’s men guard Habsburg Alsace 
against Durlach.  Between garrisons and detachments Tilly felt he had barely enough men 
left in the main army to secure the Neckar valley, let alone advance, dislodge Mansfeld, 
defeat two new armies, and capture three first-rate fortresses in the Palatinate.4  He might 
hope for some help from general Córdoba, who occupied Frederick’s lands on the west 
bank for Spain, but Córdoba had been sent to keep the Spanish road open to the 
Netherlands, not to assist the League.5  Tilly sought veteran horsemen in particuar, who 
played an important role in partisan warfare and had come into high demand over the past 
few years.6    
Officials on the duke’s Privy and War councils agreed with Tilly’s assessment 
and backed his request for more soldiers.7  Maximilian gave his reluctant consent, 
authorized his commanders to replenish their ranks with fresh recruits, and commissioned 
several new regiments to participate in the coming campaigns.  Recent struggles over 
reimbursement had shown him, however, that he could scarcely hope to marshal enough 
funds to support the regiments already under arms, let alone new ones.  Maximilian 
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seems to have decided, with his councilors, that in the coming year he would propose 
similar bargains to those he had pioneered the previous fall.  He would try to persuade 
commanders to maintain their men through long-term investment, as a matter of policy, 
in exchange for guaranteed, enlarged, and long-standing commands. 
 Maximilian’s officers, on the other hand, bitterly resisted his investment policy 
throughout the 1622 campaigns.  Shortly after the new year, before the fighting got 
underway, they brought both Tilly’s and Anholt’s field armies to the brink of mutiny to 
press their demands for reimbursement.  Commanders flouted the duke’s disciplinary 
mandates, as they had done in previous years, and they used illegal pillage, plunder and 
extortion in both neutral and friendly lands to satisfy their soldiers, recoup their expenses, 
and put pressure on Maximilian to deliver more support.   
 In the process, however, officers used their potential cooperation as leverage to 
win back the second lordly prerogative that Maximilian had tried to abrogate since 1619, 
namely the hunt for loot and booty.  Maximilian had, in 1621, already conceded their first 
prerogative, open-table maintenance, because he needed them to fund their own men as 
they awaited reimbursement from his treasury.  In 1622 most commanders showed 
themselves willing, once again, to shoulder continued expenses on the duke’s behalf, so 
long as he relaxed his calls for “good regiment” toward local populations and allowed 
them to conduct partisan warfare as they saw fit. 
 Maximilian refused, at first, to compromise on discipline, and he condemned 
illegal violence during his earliest negotiations in the winter and spring.  He instead 
promoted investment as his new standard for quality, loyalty, and good service from his 
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officers, and he tried to discredit “mischief” and plunder by describing it as a blot on their 
reputations.  In order to avoid potential mutiny he sent special negotiators to Tilly’s and 
Anholt’s headquarters to treat with his commanders and reach new accommodations with 
them for long-term investment.  He promised investors favor, gifts and future rewards, 
particularly from the emperor, should they cooperate, and he appealed to their loyalty, 
affection and devotion to emperor and empire, on whose behalf Maximilian maintained 
the League army. 
 In the meantime Maximilian tried to compel reluctant officers to invest, first by 
forcing them to fund their own recruitment costs, then by deferring repayment 
indefinitely except in the most pressing strategic circumstances.  In addition he favored 
for new appointments those colonels and captains who agreed beforehand to cover their 
own recruitment and upkeep costs indefinitely without help from his treasury.  Many 
officers began to invest their wealth outright, that is, beyond the sums they might 
otherwise expect in reimbursement, in order to compete for fresh recruits and to re-arm 
and refit their commands.  Officers who commanded wealth, large followings and strong 
local power bases enjoyed considerable advantages in securing commissions. 
 Most officers continued to resist, however, and claimed the duke’s refusal to 
reimburse them threatened their reputations and credit among the troops.  During their 
recruitment efforts in Bohemia, in particular, commanders faced harassment from enemy 
parties, hostile locals, and Wallenstein’s rival imperial troops that delayed their musters 
and forced them to undertake extraordinary expenses to keep their men together.  Not 
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only officers, but also the duke’s own commissioners urged him to either send more 
support, or turn a blind eye to illegal spoils and violence so as not to endanger the muster.  
 Maximilian sometimes agreed to their requests and sent limited funds to 
reimburse them, but by the end of 1622 he consistently refused and forced them to make 
do without his help.  In return, however, he largely ceased his efforts to restrict their 
search for spoils through partisan warfare.  By year’s end Maximilian had, in effect, 
conceded his officers each of the two lordly prerogatives they had originally sought to 
defend, namely open-table maintenance and the hunt for loot and booty.  Officers, in turn, 
began to set aside their objections and committed themselves to ongoing investment in 
their commands. 
 League commanders, in agreeing to finance their own troops, enabled Maximilian 
to keep the army in being and thereby exercise lordship within the imperial state as 
commissioner.  Maximilian, for his part, enabled officers to practice lordship within their 
commands when he ceded them their lordly prerogatives.  His investment policy further 
strengthened their lordship because it conferred clearer advantages upon those who 
commanded wealth, large clienteles, and strong local influence.  In abandoning his efforts 
to enforce good regiment, however, Maximilian opened himself to repeated criticism 
from neutral parties whose lands his armies ravaged, precisely the situation he had hoped 
to avoid since 1619.   
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Reluctant Investors: Recruitment, Competition, and Service Terms in the Cavalry 
Maximilian worked out his earliest investment bargains that winter, first with Kratz, then 
among his other cavalry commanders, as he haggled with them over their recruitment 
costs and service terms.  In order to compete for recruits many officers found themselves 
forced to spend their own wealth beyond any reimbursement they could expect from the 
duke’s treasury.  Most proved reluctant, at first, and asked Maximilian to subsidize their 
expenses, but the duke refused, and thereby compelled them to invest outright in their 
commands.  In response to Tilly’s request for more cavalry Maximilian commissioned 
several new colonels, as well, on the understanding that they would support their own 
men indefinitely until funds became available to help them.  Officers both new and old 
decided to leverage their investment and, like Kratz before them, convinced Maximilian 
to grant them larger commands than he might otherwise have offered. 
Nicola de Fours, for instance, an imperial colonel, approached Herberstorff in 
January to discuss bringing his horsemen into League service over the winter.8  Ferdinand 
had recently made peace with Bethlen and, with the rebels quiet for the time being, 
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decided to release de Fours and several other regiments so he could catch up on his debts.  
In order to strengthen his bargaining position de Fours promoted his proven loyalty, his 
quality, his reputation among soldiers, and his willingness to maintain troops at his own 
expense throughout his tenure.   
De Fours stressed, first, his continued devotion to the House of Austria and his 
affinity toward the empire’s other great Catholic houses.  He and his men held special 
affection for the House of Bavaria, he claimed, and desired to enter Maximilian’s service 
above all Austria’s other allies, if they could reach a suitable arrangement.9  He had even 
sought Bavarian service once before, in 1603, when he obtained a recommendation from 
Hermann Russwurm, the imperial field marshal who Maximilian had entertained for his 
general-lieutenant post before he commissioned Tilly.10  
Over nearly thirty years’ service to the Habsburgs, de Fours continued, he had 
accrued fame, reputation, and a large following of seasoned warriors he could bring into 
the duke’s service.11  He had enough good leaders on hand that he could muster his 
regiment within three months, he claimed, and keep it continuously filled with soldiers 
from as far as Italy, in particular Savoy.  In addition he promised to support them on his 
own account until the duke could gather funds to reimburse him in the future.12   
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Maximilian agreed at once to negotiate with de Fours on terms for his possible 
commission.13  Herberstorff would, first, offer the colonel a demi-regiment with six 
companies to accommodate his men.14  De Fours hesitated to accept such a small 
command, however, and asked instead for an enlarged regiment with twelve companies 
rather than only six or ten.15  He explained that he already commanded a full ten-
company regiment in the Habsburg armies.  In addition he had recently gained new 
followers from other disbanded regiments who sought his patronage and expected him to 
find them posts.  He felt he could not satisfy them with only six companies, and he would 
lose his credit, as he called it, should he let them down.16 
Negotiations continued from January through early April as de Fours bargained 
with Maximilian for an enlarged regiment.  He still wished to serve Bavaria above all 
other Catholic warlords, he insisted, but he also sought advancement, as any true cavalier 
should.17  His reduced regiment would, to the contrary, suggest disfavor and, being 
smaller than his previous command, would disappoint his followers and tarnish his 
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reputation.  Herberstorff urged Maximilian to accept de Fours’ terms.18  He knew the 
colonel had received other offers and believed him unlikely to accept Maximilian’s. 
Maximilian meanwhile tried to persuade de Fours into taking the demi-regiment 
as offered.19  He assured the colonel he held him in special affection, not disfavor, and 
that he would incur no injury to his honor or reputation by accepting the smaller 
command in League service.  He would gladly have granted de Fours a full regiment, he 
continued, but for the future expense.  In the meantime other officers stepped forward as 
viable candidates who would gladly accept the regiment in his stead.20   
De Fours nonetheless remained adamant and Maximilian, in the end, conceded to 
his terms.21  He not only granted the colonel an enlarged regiment with twelve 
companies, he also authorized him to increase his own first company, and doubled his 
usual allotment for Intretenierte at his headquarters.22  He told de Fours he had agreed in 
order to bolster the colonel’s reputation and guarantee his advancement in League 
service.  In exchange, de Fours, like Kratz, would maintain his own men on the duke’s 
behalf. 
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22 Ibid. 
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Maximilian tried to convince long-serving officers, as well, to recruit fresh troops 
at their own expense rather than ask for reimbursement from his treasury.  He pursued 
this policy most aggressively, at first, in response to Tilly’s request for light cavalry who, 
alongside the heavy horsemen, could lend the army an edge in partisan efforts.  
Maximilian told several colonels, among them Herberstorff and Lorenzo del Maestro, to 
find the best Croat horsemen available along the Styrian borderlands.23   
Herberstorff decided he would send for experienced light cavalry captains he 
knew in Styria, Moravia and Silesia and ask them to gather horsemen for several new 
companies under his command.24  His captains soon found, however, that the Croats had 
raised their going enlistment bounties in response to the high demand for veteran cavalry.  
Rather than the region’s customary twenty-five guilder bounties the Croats now 
demanded thirty guilders per head. 
Herberstorff asked Maximilian to formally authorize his captains to offer higher 
bounties in response.25  Unless they obtained Maximilian’s approval they could not 
expect future reimbursement for the extra five guilders.  In earlier years Maximilian had 
sometimes agreed to authorize them, when necessary, to help them draw recruits.  Lindlo, 
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for example, had noticed bounties starting to ratchet higher the previous spring during his 
efforts to suppress Mansfeld’s recruiters in the Upper Palatinate.26  In Herberstorff’s case 
Maximilian once again agreed, albeit reluctantly, and permitted him to offer thirty guilder 
bounties to ensure he drew good light cavalrymen where he could find them.27 
Soon competition drove bounty rates even higher than Maximilian and 
Herberstorff had negotiated.  Del Maestro, for one, had his captains offer as high as forty 
guilders per head to try to out-recruit their rivals.28  Herberstorff believed del Maestro’s 
men had built such good names for themselves that recruits would ride to muster on their 
good word alone and expect to receive coin upon arrival.29  Rather than ask Maximilian 
for authorization, however, del Maestro’s captains spent the extra ten guilders entirely 
from their own private wealth.  Herberstorff and his own captains, on the other hand, 
proved far less prepared to invest outright and instead asked Maximilian to raise their 
authorized bounties to match del Maestro’s.30 
By this time, however, Maximilian had realized that del Maestro’s initiative 
afforded him an unprecedented opportunity to convince his other officers to invest their 
wealth outright.  Maximilian refused Herberstorff’s request and instead granted del 
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Maestro explicit permission to raise bounties at his own expense.31  His endorsement, and 
his refusal to reimburse Herberstorff, would set an example for other commanders and 
show them that he would henceforth expect investment, even when they had not formally 
agreed to the new arrangement. 
 Herberstorff and his captains nonetheless remained unwilling to match del 
Maestro’s bounties on their own.  Herberstorff instead began to treat with established 
light cavalry colonels who, like de Fours, might offer to bring their entire followings into 
service and save him the trouble and expense.  His top candidate, lieutenant-colonel 
Terschiten, had served the House of Austria since the Long War and counted many Croat 
horsemen among his followers.32  He had recently been declined advancement in the 
Habsburg armies despite his long, loyal service, Herberstorff said, and felt inclined to 
leave over the insult.  Should Maximilian commission him for the regiment he could 
summon at least 1,000 Croats in short order.  Herberstorff recommended that Maximilian 
take Terschiten into service.   
 Maximilian declined to engage Terschiten, however, perhaps because Terschiten, 
as Herberstorff reluctantly admitted, could not support his own men without 
reimbursement.33  In the end Herberstorff did acquiesce and managed to convince his 
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captains to match del Maestro’s bounties.34  Not to be outdone del Maestro raised his own 
in response until rates reached as high as sixty guilders in some instances, double the 
thirty-guilder rates Maximilian had authorized.35  Colonels and captains competed 
everywhere over who could offer the best rates to attract good candidates.  In the process 
Maximilian convinced them, unwittingly, to accede to his new investment policy. 
 Some officers who could not invest, or who refused to participate in the new 
arrangement, soon found themselves without commands.  Colonel Herberstain, for 
example, explained how the Bohemian rebels had burned his estates in retaliation for his 
continued loyalty and service to the Habsburgs.36  Funds he might have otherwise 
contributed to the war effort had gone instead to reconstruct his own lands.  In 
recompense for his lost incomes he asked that Maximilian authorize him for 
reimbursement so potential recruits would esteem him as highly as they did the other 
colonels.  Otherwise, he feared, he and his captains could not recruit 1,000 horsemen at 
more than forty guilders per head on their own.  Herberstain still tried to meet his 
contract terms, but his recruitment dragged late into the summer and he failed to draw 
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enough recruits.37  Maximilian refused his requests, as he had Herberstorff’s, and in the 
end told him to cease further efforts and disband his regiment.38 
 In other circumstances, however, Maximilian still considered engaging 
particularly renowned officers under ordinary reimbursement terms.  Often they offered 
so many veterans, or strong enough reputations, that they represented a good investment 
for the duke’s limited resoures.  In mid-February Martin Konrad von Eib, for example, a 
marshal in the Teutonic Order, showed up at Tilly’s headquarters with several captains 
and offered to bring his regiment into service.39  He held seven-hundred horsemen ready 
in the regions around Nuremberg, he explained, and could muster them within three 
weeks should the duke commission him.   
Tilly felt Eib’s men ranked among the best cavalry in the realm and urged 
Maximilian to take his offer.40  He should under no circumstances expect them to pay 
their own way, however.  Maximilian should instead present Eib’s captains with gifts, 
Tilly advised, in consideration for the esteem and honor they commanded and, if 
possible, some advance pay, so they might remain in League service to attract recruits in 
the future. 
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 Most new officers, less renowned than Eib, seem to have resigned themselves to 
paying their own recruitment costs so they could meet their contract terms.  Herberstorff 
believed the entire process would have fallen apart had officers not offered their own 
wealth and drawn upon each other’s informal lending networks.41  He praised de Fours in 
particular who, per his agreement with Maximilian, found his own means to raise and 
support his regiment.   
 Maximilian continued throughout the year to deny officers their reimbursement 
and hoped, in the process, to establish investment as his new standard for service in the 
League army.  Many commanders could ill-afford the heavy burdens, however, and 
continued to resist the duke’s coercion.  Even de Fours began to ask for reimbursement 
despite his earlier agreement, and pressed throughout his service for the duke to repay 
him for his contributions by adding further companies to his command.42  Before long, 
however, during the early months of 1622, Maximilian’s policy would provoke crisis 
throughout his armies.   
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Tentative Cooperation: Objection, Tension and Negotiation in Tilly’s Field Army 
Most commanders who served under Tilly and Anholt in the field armies remained 
unwilling to invest their wealth outright to rebuild their commands.  Many allowed free 
license for mischief and plunder, both to satisfy their men and to pressure the duke into 
sending more funds.  Maximilian realized his investment policy could not remain viable 
in the long term unless he convinced his officers to cooperate rather than resist.  In 
February he decided to appoint special delegates from his privy council, one to Tilly’s 
headquarters, the other to Anholt’s, to negotiate more formal arrangements with 
commanders in the field.  He appealed to their loyalty and service to the emperor, he 
offered them gifts and inducements, and he denounced illegal violence and mutiny as 
blots on their reputations that cast their quality into doubt.  In the end, however, he 
offered partial compromises on his investment policy, and sent small cash consignments 
to avoid potential mutiny. 
 Shortly after the new year Tilly’s officers began to lodge widespread objections to 
Maximilian’s new policies and demanded better support as they wintered along the 
Neckar.43  Officers claimed they could no longer maintain their men, they had begun to 
lose respect and credit in the ranks, and they would soon face ruin unless the duke helped 
replenish their coffers.  Many insisted they could no longer prevent their men from 
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despoiling villagers and townspeople until they received more coin.  Tilly pleaded with 
Maximilian to send some convoys to tide them over in time for his planned offensive 
come spring.   
 In response Maximilian sent colonel Hannibal von Herliberg to represent him in 
negotiations at Tilly’s headquarters.44  He instructed Tilly to summon a war council 
where Herliberg could treat with the colonels, captains and delegate soldiers.  Herliberg 
would try to address their concerns and, per instructions, convey to them Maximilian’s 
new expectations. 
 In his letter Maximilian told Herliberg to stress, first, that warriors could no 
longer expect short-term repayment as they had in the past.45  Neither he, nor any other 
warlord in the empire, had prepared to engage so many troops over such prolonged, 
extensive campaigns and occupations.  Maximilian had come to accept that his charge as 
imperial commissioner would entail heavy long-term expenses and standing arrears from 
year to year.  His commanders, too, should realize that their own service to Maximilian, 
to emperor and empire and, indeed, to God, would require them to undertake similar 
commitments.46   He did not mention, as he might have, that officers themselves claimed 
as as much when they cited their financial damages alongside their physical injuries as 
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evidence for their continued devotion to Maximilian and the Catholic cause more 
broadly. 
 Mutiny and illegal plunder, on the other hand, suggested a breach in faith that cast 
their quality, credit and loyalty into doubt.  Every warrior should seek, as his foremost 
concern, to support his own men and to advance his patron’s honor and reputation, 
Herliberg would insist.47  Maximilian himself had offered his own wealth in the 
emperor’s service without full recompense and had delivered far more money to his army 
than any other warlord in the empire.  He would, moreover, make good on his debts 
given time, as everyone knew.   
Officers who protested, on the other hand, or who commanded so little respect 
that their men refused to observe good regiment, could not be expected to make good on 
their obligations, Herliberg should say.48  Their poor service would injure Maximilian’s 
good name and bring disrepute upon the entire Catholic cause, something any honorable 
Christian warrior should rather perish than accept.  In effect Maximilian told his officers, 
through Herliberg, that he would henceforth judge their quality and loyalty chiefly by 
how well they kept good discipline and made do without his funds. 
 In the event Maximilian’s appeal failed to satisfy them, Herliberg would negotiate 
alternative deals with each colonel and his captains in private.49  He would offer, first, 
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cash reimbursement in small amounts to help officers with their debts.  Failing that, he 
would offer more generous gifts in interest-bearing notes redeemable in the future.  
Officers could then sell the notes for cash or use them as collateral to raise further loans 
from financiers.  Maximilian’s gifts, however small, would nonetheless show his officers 
favor through concrete tokens, and might help them save face, unlike empty deferment.  
In the same vein Herliberg would offer certain distinguished offers appointment to full 
colonelcy.50  Should officers still refuse then Herliberg would send to Munich for further 
instructions. 
 Soldiers meanwhile took subjects and even entire households hostage along the 
Neckar to ransom goods from towns and villages in the valley.51  Maximilian understood 
officers would continue to allow their brigandage until negotiations concluded and he 
delivered on their demands.52  They knew he would need their cooperation by the time 
the spring campaign began in earnest.  In late February parties from Mansfeld’s army 
began to probe for ways to cross the Rhine onto the east bank.  Should Mansfeld break 
across he would be able to hold the river and, with support from Mannheim, Heidelberg 
and Frankenthal, control the countryside against League troops.   
In the end Maximilian conceded and sent several convoys to the Neckar loaded up 
with 400,000 guilders and talers to satisfy Tilly’s men.53  He told Herliberg to admonish 
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them that they should hereafter find no further cause for complaint.  In granting them 
such large sums he had accorded them far greater esteem than they could expect from any 
other warlord, no matter their quality, Herliberg should say.54  By mid-March Tilly found 
his troops ready to resume their campaign against Mansfeld.  During the months and 
years after March, 1622, however, Maximilian would prove increasingly less willing to 
compromise on his investment policy.   
 
Protest and Agitation: Continued Unrest and Near-Mutiny in Anholt’s Field Army 
In his negotiations with Anholt’s army during the same months Maximilian used similar 
appeals and inducements to those he presented with Tilly’s commanders.  Beyond his 
special negotiator, Haimhausen, he also sent his trusted commander Timon von Lindlo to 
take the army’s pulse and advise him on how best to proceed.55  In addition he expected 
Lindlo to use his considerable standing in the army to prevent officers from using 
mischief or mutiny to force Maximilian into conceding their demands.  Before long 
Maximilian decided to take Lindlo’s advice, granted his officers partial concessions and 
sent coin to tide them over in March, as he had done for Tilly’s forces.  Neither Anholt 
nor Lindlo managed to enforce better regiment, however.  Anholt’s officers continued to 
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protest, agitate and plunder throughout 1622 and well into 1623 to gain better terms in the 
duke’s service.   
 Prior to negotiations, during the winter, Anholt continued to shadow and harry 
prince Christian’s army in Hessen, as he had done since the previous December.56  Tilly 
and Leopold meanwhile focused on trying to keep Mansfeld on the Rhine’s west bank, 
and Durlach on the east, so they could be defeated separately in the spring and summer.  
In an effort to help his officers maintain their men Anholt managed to scrounge coin and 
provisions from the elector-archbishops of Mainz and Trier, League members both. 
 Anholt’s men nonetheless struggled and began to protest, by January, that they 
could not maintain their troops much longer.57  Officers claimed, as they had in Tilly’s 
army, that their soldiers had ceased to observe good regiment, and would not resume 
unless they could provide better support.  Horsemen, in particular, felt unduly insulted, 
they said, and had ceased to accord their leaders any respect or credit.  In February, the 
same month Maximilian sent Herliberg to negotiate at Tilly’s headquarters, Anholt’s 
officers forced the field marshal to halt his campaign and refused to pursue Christian’s 
forces further until they had received their due coin from Maximilian.58  Anholt pleaded 
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with Maximilian to send some convoys as soon as possible so he could resume his attacks 
in earnest. 
 In response Maximilian sent Haimhausen to Anholt’s war council and ordered 
him to take the officers through the same negotiation process Herliberg had used for 
Tilly.59  Haimhausen would stress, first, that Maximilian frowned upon troublemakers 
who brought themselves and the army into disrepute through mischief.  Officers who 
chose to support troops at their own expense, on the other hand, would thereby show their 
quality and good service, and would meet with Maximilian’s favor, and perhaps gifts. 
Haimhausen continued negotiations through February and March without 
reaching any accord.  In the meantime Anholt had to make do with fewer active men.60  
Rather than use his parties to disrupt Christian’s recruitment and hinder his march 
southward, as he preferred, he kept his distance and waited for Haimhausen to make 
progress with the officers.  He asked Maximilian once again for more funds. 
Maximilian next consulted with Lindlo on how he might best convince Anholt’s 
officers to reach an agreeable settlement.61  Lindlo suggested that the duke should allow 
officers to continue their negotiations with Haimhausen.62  He did did not need to deliver 
more coin, necessarily, but he should at least show officers that he held them in good 
favor and understood their need to maintain credit with their men.  Haimhausen’s talks 
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would demonstrate, in addition, that Maximilian did intend to reward his officers and 
soldiers for the service and hard fighting they had rendered him over the past months, and 
would thereby strengthen their affection for his house.  Lindlo further suggested the duke 
should advance several worthy officers to higher command, as he had done in Tilly’s 
army.63  Maximilian’s commissioners seem to have concurred with Lindlo and warned 
him, further, that he should issue no further orders that seemed to bypass the negotiation 
process.64  Such instructions might incense the men and spark general mutiny.   
Maximilian trusted Lindlo’s judgment and let negotiations continue into the 
spring.  By March, however, Mansfeld had escalated his efforts to break across the Rhine, 
and Durlach, unable to force his way through Leopold’s men to join Mansfeld, marched 
north through the Black Forest to threaten Tilly from the south.65  Tilly needed Anholt’s 
troops active to keep prince Christian at bay while he dealt with Mansfeld and Durlach.  
Maximilian decided to give in to their demands, as he had with Tilly’s men, and sent cash 
convoys to tide them over.  In March and early April Anholt resumed his attacks on 
Christian.  
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 In the meantime, however, Mansfeld managed to put Tilly on the defensive.  In 
their effort to regain ground Tilly’s men seized several towns and, angered by the 
citizens’ bitter resistance during their assaults, slaughtered the inhabitants, a deep 
embarassment to Maximilian and a setback to his political legitimacy.66  Frederick 
traveled from the Hague in late April to join Mansfeld and give heart to his troops and 
subjects.  By month’s end Mansfeld had forced his way across the Rhine near Speyer and 
defeated Tilly’s efforts to drive him back across.  Maximilian pressed Anholt to move 
quickly, take pressure off Tilly and force Christian into battle before he could join 
Mansfeld.67 
 Anholt, for his part, could not respond to the request because his officers had, 
since late-April, become recalcitrant once again and pressed for reimbursement and 
support.  This time Maximilian had his brother Ferdinand, elector archbishop of Cologne, 
send another large cash convoy to tide them over.68  Commanders struggled to find a 
secure route where enemy parties could not interdict the wagons, however, and by early 
May the coin had not yet arrived.  Anholt feared his troops might soon rise in mutiny, he 
said.69  Maximilian ordered Lindlo to help Haimhausen negotiate with Anholt’s officers 
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in the hope that he might help them reach a lasting agreement.70  In order to keep up the 
pressure on Maximilian Anholt’s officers decided, once again, to intensify their mischief 
and plunder, and focused this time on League members themselves.71   
 Maximilian tried, this time, to crack down on mischief once and for all, and 
communicated to his officers that he would brook no further illegal violence as a 
negotiation tactic.72  He ordered Lindlo to break off negotiations, round up the 
ringleaders and hang them to discourage further insolence and exorbitancies.73  Lindlo 
clearly sympathized with officers’ plight, however, and his punishments, to the extent he 
may or may not have carried them out, seem to have wrought little effect. 
 By early May Tilly could no longer afford to wait for Anholt.74  Mansfeld and 
Durlach combined their armies and forced him westward against the Rhine.  He sought 
help from Córdoba, who crossed over with some Spanish troops to join him.  Several 
days later Mansfeld and Durlach briefly split their forces and Tilly, spotting an 
opportunity, attacked Durlach and scattered his army in battle.  Mansfeld, his ally lost, 
retreated swiftly back across the Rhine, and Córdoba returned to protect his original 
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positions in the west.  Leopold moved against Mansfeld to keep him occupied in the 
south while Tilly headed north to face prince Christian in Anholt’s stead.  He defeated 
Christian in battle near Frankfurt in June, then moved back south to reduce Frederick’s 
fortresses in the Palatinate.  Christian managed to escape with his cavalry and rushed 
south to join Mansfeld in Alsace.  Maximilian ordered Anholt to pursue Christian while 
Tilly besieged Heidelberg and blockaded Mannheim.  
Anholt’s men still refused to act, however, despite Lindlo’s efforts.75  Short on 
time Maximilian relented, again, and promised them more funds.  He had Herberstorff 
inform Anholt that substantial pay awaited his troops in Cologne, with more to follow 
over the next several months.76  Satisfied for the time being, Anholt’s men headed south 
after Christan, who had reached Mansfeld’s main army in Alsace.  Anholt pressed 
Mansfeld and, with help from Leopold’s imperials, forced him to evacuate the region, 
whereupon Frederick cancelled Mansfeld’s contract.  Mansfeld and Christian retreated 
west, looted their way through Lorraine, then headed north to try to bring their men into 
Dutch service against Spain.  In late August they ran up against Córdoba near Namur, but 
managed to punch their way through his army and escape north.77 
In early 1622 Maximilian’s reluctance to compromise on his investment policy 
had brought both Tilly’s and Anholt’s field armies into a growing state of crisis.  In 
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March he sent coin to both armies to help officers with their maintenance costs, but he 
could scarcely afford the expense.  Anholt’s men, unlike Tilly’s, continued to agitate all 
year for better support, often refused to campaign until the duke relented, and attacked 
League members’ own lands in an effort to force his hand.  In late August Maximilian 
wrote Leopold and asked him to pressure the League estates into contributing more to the 
war effort so as to afford his troops more ready cash.78  Maximilian would continue to 
face crisis throughout the year, however, not only in the field, but in his further 
recruitment efforts.   
 
Investors by Force: Hazard and Harassment during the Musters in Bohemia 
In addition to his efforts to recruit cavalry during the winter Maximilian decided to raise 
three further regiments in Bohemia to participate in Tilly’s upcoming campaigns.  He 
issued contracts for one cavalry and two infantry regiments, respectively, to colonels 
Gabriel Pechmann, Hans Ernst von Sprinzenstein and Johann von Aldringen, and set their 
muster date for March so they could march west in the spring.79  Maximilian tried to 
force investment upon them, too, as he had done with his other new colonels and 
captains.  In Bohemia, however, they faced not only the usual competition, but hazardous 
journeys in war-torn lands where they could find neither safe routes to muster nor secure 
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lodgings on arrival.  In consideration for the heavy costs they incurred to bring their men 
together they asked Maximilian to extend their musters and allow them to preserve their 
commands.   
Maximilian obtained permission from the emperor to hold musters in the Pilsener 
and Leitmaritz circles, close to Bohemia’s western borderlands, and sent commissioners 
Gumppenberg and Schierl to oversee the process.80  Schierl traveled to Prague and 
arranged for Pechmann to muster at Komotau, a largely German-speaking royal town 
nestled in the mountains north from Leitmaritz.81  Aldringen and Sprinzenstein would 
meanwhile direct their troops to gather southwest around Pilsen for their own musters.82  
Like other leaders Maximilian’s three new colonels had to offer higher bounties, more 
conduct money, and better equipment, all at their own expense, in order to draw good 
recruits.  
 Pechmann decided against trying to compete for recruits in southern Germany or 
the Austrias.83  Most Habsburg and Bavarian clients hailed from these regions, belonged 
to dense local networks there and had built up good names for themselves during the war.  
Instead he sent his recruiters north across the mountains into Lower Saxony, where his 
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own name carried weight, and into Silesia, where they could gather horsemen from 
disbanded Polish cavalry. 
 During their travels in Saxony and Silesia Pechmann’s men found themselves in 
constant confrontations with Mansfeld’s and Christian’s officers.84  Most frequently they 
encountered recruiters from the count of Löwenstein and one of the Weimar dukes, who 
scoured the countryside to seek horsemen for their cavalry regiments.  Rival parties 
ambushed each other’s recruits, launched raids against columns and fell upon lodgings 
and muster areas to kill, disperse, or counter-recruit their opponents’ prospective 
soldiers.85   
 Pechmann’s officers faced constant harassment as well from hostile locals who 
supported the rebels and awaited the exiled king’s return.86  His captains could barely 
cross Silesia, for example, because they fell under constant attack from militia and local 
farmers.  In towns they lost recruits by the dozens when citizens fell upon their lodgings 
and forced them to beat hasty retreats into the night.  Even when they found relatively 
peaceful areas the Bohemian lands, already ravaged by warfare, could provide few good 
billets, provisions or other supplies.   
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Conditions soon proved too hazardous for Pechmann to meet his planned muster 
date in March.  Pechmann asked the duke to extend his deadline to April and shift his 
assembly point from Komotau to a safer location in the south.87  In reply Maximilian 
explained that he needed the troops ready as soon as possible and could not grant the 
extension.88  He did, however, promise to ask Ferdinand for permission to expand the 
assembly area to include the entire surrounding region so Pechmann’s troops could better 
support and defend themselves. 
Pechmann and the others meanwhile continued to pour their own wealth into the 
recruitment process so they could complete their regiments on time.  None seemed able 
to bring enough men safely to muster, however, despite their heavy investment.  By mid-
February Sprinzenstein and Aldringen had gathered so few soldiers that Maximilian 
decided to cancel Aldringen’s command and merge his regiment into Sprinzenstein’s.89  
Maximilian urged Aldringen to accept a post as Sprinzenstein’s colonel-lieutenant until 
another full colonelcy became available for him in the future.90 
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Aldringen refused in the beginning to accept Maximilian’s offer for fear that he 
might lose his reputation and disappoint his followers should he give up his command.91  
He had promised his captains they would serve under him, and him alone, he said, and he 
swore to them that he would prevent their companies from being reformed.  Sprinzenstein 
took pains to assure Aldringen that he would make room in his regiment for the latter’s 
officers and troops.92  In time Aldringen agreed, on the condition that he retain exclusive 
command over his own captains.  Maximilian approved the arrangement and instructed 
both colonels to merge their regiments.93 
 In recognition for his ability to recruit and support troops Sprinzenstein next 
sought Maximilian’s permission to muster a second regiment, this time cavalry.  Several 
cavalry captains had presented themselves to him in Breslau, he said, including the 
Silesian Hans von Gelhorn, and the Austrian Matthias Grüber, renowned Catholic 
warriors both.94  Each held his own first company present and ready for service, and 
could invite enough fellow captains along with them to comprise a full regiment.  
Sprinzenstein believed he could muster close to 1,000 men should the duke commission 
him. 
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 Later that March Maximilian declined Sprinzenstein’s request, to the colonel’s 
disappointment, on grounds that he could no longer afford to recruit more cavalry.95  He 
instead asked Sprinzenstein to send Gellhorn and Grüber to Prague to stand by for further 
posts once they became available.  Maximilian had largely denied requests from 
Pechmann, Aldringen and Sprinzenstein throughout the winter, even when it cost them 
their commands, as it had Aldringen.  Perhaps he worried that any concessions might 
encourage Tilly’s and Anholt’s men to press him further during negotiations.  Soon 
additional, unforeseen challenges in Bohemia would force him to give more ground to 
help his new colonels complete their musters.  
 
Wallenstein’s Challenge: Rivalry over Maintenance and Reputation in Bohemia  
In Bohemia officers faced challenges to their commands not only from rebel adveraries, 
harsh conditions and Maximilian’s deadlines, but also from the emperor’s own 
commanders, in particular Albrecht von Wallenstein, who helped Liechtenstein govern 
Bohemia on Ferdinand’s behalf.96  Maximilian’s colonels and commissioners claimed 
Wallenstein had driven them from their billets, often by force, and always contrary to the 
emperor’s orders, the better to support his own men at their expense.  Many urged the 
duke’s commissioners to let them resist Wallenstein and retaliate against him so as to 
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preserve their reputations and credit among their troops.  Commissioners themselves 
tended to concur and supported the officers’ requests.  Maximilian, on the other hand, 
ordered them to comply with Wallenstein rather than invite further trouble, and thereby 
endangered the reputations they had spent so heavily to maintain. 
 Confrontations between the Leaguists and Wallenstein began when Pechmann’s 
recruits first arrived at Komotau, their designated muster area, only to find that 
Wallenstein had ordered the town to bar its gates to them.97  In their place Wallenstein 
reserved the settlement and its surrounding villages for his own imperial cavalry 
regiment.  Pechmann’s troops, already aggravated by the hardships they had endured to 
reach the muster area, began to take out their frustration on local subjects, the colonel 
said.98  He claimed, like other officers, that Wallenstein sought deliberately to damage 
their own and Maximilian’s reputations by making recruits lose respect for their 
leadership.   
Wallenstein seems to have acted on his own initiative without regard for the 
emperor’s instructions.  Ferdinand had informed him previously that he should reserve 
Komotau its environs for Maximilian’s colonels and their troops.99  Wallenstein should 
render League troops every possible assistance so they could muster quicky and leave 
Bohemia for the Rhine.  He did tell the Komotau authorities, as ordered, to expect 
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Pechmann’s troops, but he also told them to deny League troops entry pending further 
instructions from the emperor, instructions Wallenstein had, in fact, already received.100  
Until further notice Komotau should under no circumstances to admit Pechmann’s men. 
Pechmann soon turned to commissioner Gumppenberg for help against 
Wallenstein and his cavalry.  Gumppenberg left Amberg in haste and arrived at Komotau 
to secure local cooperation with League officers.101  He found, however, that Pechmann, 
not knowing how else to protect his men, had already moved them south to lodge near 
Prague where he could better provide for them.  Later that week Gumppenberg gathered 
Pechmann, Aldringen and Sprinzenstein together to confront Wallenstein in person and 
press upon him their need to billet troops at Komotau.102   
Wallenstein countered, falsely, that the emperor and Liechtenstein had insisted he 
keep the area clear for Spanish and Imperial troops soon to arrive.103  Behind their backs 
he pleaded with the emperor to deny them permission to billet there, on grounds that the 
area could not sustain them.104  He suggested that Ferdinand transfer League troops 
across Bohemia to Glattau and Tauß, large towns south from Pilsen.  He claimed, again 
falsely, that Gumppenberg had already agreed to the transfer. 
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Gumppenberg next turned to Maximilian to intercede with the emperor against 
Wallenstein.105  Maximilian replied that Ferdinand had already given explicit approval, 
and his colonels should simply ignore Wallenstein and establish billets as ordered. 
Wallenstein gave in, for the time being, and instructed the Komotau authorities to finally 
admit Pechmann’s men.106  He insisted however that League troops must pay for 
provisions on their own rather than demand requisitions from the town.  Imperial 
commissioner Christoph von Rechenberg would remain to act as Wallenstein’s 
representative and keep close watch over the Leaguists. 
By month’s end, however, Wallenstein resumed his efforts to monopolize the best 
billets and deny them to League troops.  Officers began to spend what commissioner 
Gumppenberg considered tremendous sums to support their men, far more than the duke 
would ever be able to reimburse in the near future.107  Colonels and captains had lost so 
much respect and credit, they claimed, that soldiers had begun to desert their companies 
almost as quickly as fresh recruits arrived to fill them up.  Soldiers felt insulted, they said, 
that their leaders could offer no better recompense for the loyalty and quality they had 
shown during their recent hardships.   
In order to placate their men officers allowed even more mischief and illegal 
violence in their commands.  Soldiers’ behavior in and around Komotau soon prompted 
                                                                                                              
105 Gumppenberg and Maximilian discuss, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 224-226, March 12, 1622, Maximilian to 
Gumppenberg; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 271-272, March 12, 1622, Gumppenberg to Maximilian. 
106 KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 279-280, March 11, 1622, Wallenstein’s Ordinance to Komotau. 
107 Gumppenberg describes their efforts, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 277-286, March 13, 1622, Gumppenberg to 
Maximilian. 
     181  
Rechenberg to lodge formal complaints against them with Gumppenberg.108  Rechenberg 
claimed the Leaguists told him they would simply continue to abuse the townspeople 
until they got better support and accommodations.  Colonels meanwhile assured 
Gumppenberg they were gathering recruits as quickly as possible so they could march 
away without causing much further damage.109  Ferdinand’s governors and the local 
authorities soon began to pressure League officers to leave at once. 
In late March the scheduled muster date arrived only to find the captains still short 
on recruits.  Colonels tended to blame Wallenstein and his efforts to sabotage their good 
names.110  They reported that Wallenstein’s cavalry had sprawled out over far more 
billets than necessary simply to luxuriate and deny those lodgings to Leaguists.  Rather 
than continue to deal with Wallenstein around Komotau Maximilian ordered 
Gumppenberg to have Pechmann and Sprinzenstein move their troops southward to 
muster in Leitmaritz instead.111 
Maximilian’s colonels, on the other hand, felt they should confront Wallenstein 
more directly at Komotau rather than retreat south.112  Over the past few months their 
men had lost confidence in their leadership, they said, because they had failed to respond 
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to Wallenstein’s provocations.  Rather than relent to his pressure they should fight back 
and force him to concede better conditions for their soldiers.  They pressed Gumppenberg 
to allow them broader latitude to resist Wallenstein and restore their credit among 
recruits. 
Maximilian insisted, in the end, on the planned move to Leitmaritz and his 
officers, however reluctant, collected their men for the march south.113  On their arrival at 
Leitmaritz, however, they found that the city fathers had, once again, barred their gates 
on Wallenstein’s orders.114  Wallenstein told Gumppenberg to forget his plans to muster 
in Leitmaritz and instead relocate halfway across Bohemia to Schlackenwerth, a German-
speaking town just north of Pilsen.115  Horsemen in Wallenstein’s regiment began to 
attack League recruits, drove them from their lodgings and cut them down on the roads.  
On their March to Schlackenwerth they would, presumably, remain vulnerable to further 
harassment. 
Gumppenberg decided to heed the officers, this time, and refused Wallenstein’s 
order outright.116  He told the colonels to hold position around Leitmaritz, then 
confronted Wallenstein in person.  Not to be deterred Wallenstein simply threatened 
Gumppenberg and the colonels and promised to have his cavalry kill any Leaguists who 
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sought quarters in Leitmaritz, Komotau, or any villages between.117  Once again 
Maximilian gave in to Wallenstein and told Gumppenberg to go ahead and transfer the 
muster to Schlackenwerth despite objections from the officers.118  Gumppenberg 
hesitated this time, however, and cautioned Maximilian that he believed further transfers 
might ruin the muster effort entirely.119  Colonels and captains insisted that most recruits 
no longer observed any discipline and would likely desert should they fail to respond 
Wallenstein’s provocations.120 
Despite Maximilian’s orders Gumppenberg decided, on his own authority, to heed 
the colonels instead.121  He ordered them to ignore Wallenstein and hold their muster at 
Leitmaritz as planned.  In late March and early April Wallenstein’s cavalry continued to 
try to dislodge League recruits from the villages around Leitmaritz.122  Officers continued 
to endure heavy costs without reimbursement, and they continued to use mischief and 
plunder to satisfy their men and uphold their reputations amidst constant harassment and 
shortages.  
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Reduced Commands: Coerced Musters and Injured Reputations in Bohemia 
Before long, Maximilian’s commissioners took it upon themselves to grant requests from 
officers for reimbursement, despite the duke’s orders to the contrary.  Commissioners 
recognized the importance officers placed upon their prerogatives and their need to 
uphold credit with the troops.  Maximilian consented to their judgment at first, as he had 
consented to send coin to Tilly’s and Anholt’s men, and he agreed to extend the muster 
so as to allow officers to build their companies to full strength.  In the end, however, he 
decided his investment policy was more important, and forced them to muster on his 
terms despite any injury to their reputations and followings. 
 During their recruitment, officers had begun to take out loans from financiers in 
Prague to make their limited resources go further.123  By mid-spring, however, they had 
stretched their resources to the limit, and pressed commissioners more insistently for 
reimbursement from the duke’s treasury.  Gumppenberg obliged them on his own 
authority and used the ducal funds available to him to help officers with their expenses.124 
 In time Maximilian backed the commissioner’s initiatives in order to avert further 
crisis.  He retroactively confirmed Gumppenberg’s decision to keep the muster near 
Leitmaritz, rather than move to Schlackenwerth at Wallenstein’s behest, and told him to 
reimburse officers to the extent possible.125  In addition he assigned commissioner Fatiga 
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to assist Gumppenberg with finance and supply.126  Fatiga rode from northern Bavaria 
and arrived by month’s end to report to Gumppenberg at a village between Komotau and 
Leitmaritz.127  By the time he arrived, however, he found that Gumppenberg had nearly 
emptied his ducal chest in his effort to support officers and desperately needed more 
funds. 
In order to raise more cash Gumppenberg sent Fatiga to Prague to take out 
advances in the duke’s name.128  Fatiga carried Bavarian double-guilders, high-value 
coins Maximilian preferred to issue because no one could challenge their quality.  On his 
arrival in Prague, however, Fatiga stepped into a shop to make some purchases only to 
find, to his surprise, that the shopkeeper refused to accept Maximilian’s coin.  He 
explained to Fatiga that the crown had forbidden Bohemian subjects by ordinance to use 
any currency save recently minted, low-purity talers.  He would outrage the other 
shopkeepers, he said, if they learned he had taken better Bavarian coin behind their 
backs. 
In February, two months earlier, Ferdinand had leased his royal minting rights to 
several Prague bankers and other magnates.129  He licensed them to buy up silver, gold 
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and proper coin, then melt them down and cut them with copper to issue new, debased 
mintages he could use to fund his war effort.  Fatiga soon learned Ferdinand had ordered 
officials throughout the Habsburg lands to prohibit transactions in any coin except those 
issued by the mint consortium.130  He could neither draw Bavarian coin nor spend it 
without incurring censure from Bohemian or imperial officials.  Consortium members, 
who included Wallenstein and Liechtenstein, made colossal profits and, in the process, 
wrecked the empire’s economy with runaway inflation for several years. 
Fatiga worried the emperor’s policies might ruin League officers as they tried to 
support their recruits during their muster.131  Colonels and captains who had already spent 
heavily would face even higher outlays to make up for inflation.  Soldiers would take 
insult at being asked to accept low-value talers over good double-guilders, while 
suppliers and camp vendors outside the Habsburg lands refused to do further business 
until currencies stabilized.  Officers felt their best course would be to stand up for their 
men and shield them from Wallenstein’s and the mint consortium’s machinations.132 
Fatiga agreed with the officers’ judgment and informed Maximilian he would re-
iterate Gumppenberg’s earlier orders.133  In addition Fatiga authorized officers for higher 
reimbursement amounts to match the inflation costs they incurred during their expenses.  
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Gumppenberg seconded the measure and told Maximilian he would ignore any further 
imperial mandates concerning coinage.134  He would also make sure League soldiers 
received good double-guilders in the future.  Colonels told him they felt optimistic that 
they could make their musters by month’s end, he reported.135 
Maximilian, on the other hand, hesitated to spend any further monies beyond what 
he had already allocated.136  He countermanded Fatiga’s decision, told his commissioners 
to cease any further reimbursements, then ordered them to rush the muster as quickly as 
possible.  Captains should leave Bohemia as soon as they reached two-hundred men, 
rather than wait for three-hundred, and march piecemeal for the Upper Palatinate.  Near 
Amberg the regiments would assemble all their companies, then head west to join Tilly.  
Captains who gathered too few recruits would have their men reformed to fill out other 
companies and become Intretenierte until new captaincies became available for them. 
Officers protested in outrage once they learned Maximilian would rather rush the 
muster and reform understrength companies than reimburse their ongoing expenses.  
Aldringen and his captains, for example, signed a joint petition to challenge the decision 
and request more time to gather men.137  They explained how they had spent months, 
                                                                                                              
134 KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 389-390, April 9, 1622, Gumppenberg to Maximilian. 
135 Gumppenberg discusses his interactions with the colonels, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 384-385, April 1, 1622, 
Gumppenberg to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 413-414, April 4, 1622, Gumppenberg to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 495-501, April 12, 1622, Gumppenberg to Maximilian. 
136 KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 363-364, April 8, 1622, Maximilian to Commissioners in Bohemia. 
137 Letters and petition, KuBay ÄA 2309 fol. 53-55, April 11, 1622, Aldringen’s Captains to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2309 fol. 65-67, April 11, 1622, Aldringen to Maximilian. 
     188  
bled and nearly ruined their finances to build their companies and keep them together 
during the spring.  Should the duke dissolve them he would injure their reputations and 
cost them the credit they had earned with their men.  They needed only one or two more 
weeks, they pleaded, to bring their companies up to strength. 
Gumppenberg and Fatiga urged Maximilian to listen to his warriors and grant 
their requests.138  Several captains had left service and took their recruits with them and 
the soldiers themselves, they reported, had intensified their violence.  Officers warned the 
plunder would get worse unless the duke sent them cash so they could replenish their 
coffers enough to issue back pay.139  Maximilian expressed displeasure at being coerced 
into greater expense through mischief.140   He nonetheless agreed to Gumppenberg’s 
recommendations and extended the muster until late April. 
By month’s end, however, the companies once again remained incomplete.  
Unwilling to consider further delays, Maximilian ordered Gumppenberg to muster them 
immediately in the same way he had previously instructed.141  Companies with over one-
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hundred-thirty men could wait until mid-May to reach the full two-hundred, but all other 
understrength companies should be reformed to create larger ones.   
Gumppenberg and Fatiga conferred with each regiment’s officers and cautioned 
Maximilian against implementing his decision.142  Soldiers in dissolved companies would 
rather desert altogether, they felt, than serve under any captain other than their own.  
Reformations would, moreover, both ruin officers’ good names and sabotage their future 
recruitment efforts.  They believed, in other words, that the cost to Maximilian’s war 
effort would, over time, far outweigh any short-term fiscal advantages he might gain 
from rushing the muster. 
Maximilian refused outright, this time, to consider another postponement.143  
Recruitment had already taken one month longer than anticipated.  His new regiments 
would not arrive to help Tilly until mid-May at the earliest.  He ordered Gumppenberg 
and Fatiga to muster the companies immediately and have them march for Amberg.  
Officers decried the decision, proclaimed that Maximilian’s harsh judgment would 
damage their reputations, and warned that only their strong affection for the duke himself 
and his house had kept them in service this long.144  They had signed on in the first place, 
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they claimed, in order to advance their own and Maximilian’s honor and reputation.  
Wallenstein, not the duke’s loyal colonels and captains, should take the blame for 
hindering their progress.  Sprinzenstein’s captains signed a join petition asking 
Maximilian to intercede with the emperor on their behalf against Wallenstein.145   
Maximilian told Gumppenberg to ignore their protestations and proceed with the 
musters as ordered.146  Colonels and captains refused to cooperate, however, and forced 
Maximilian into continued negotiations long through the summer months.147  Rather than 
press him on reimbursement, as they had before, they tried instead to convince him he 
should relax his disciplinary policies.  Recruitment had so depleted their finances, they 
claimed, that they could never have sustained their men without recourse to forage and 
requisitions from locals.  Many recruits had begun to deem service under Maximilian so 
inglorious that officers could placate them only by allowing them broad license to 
plunder as they wished.  Maximilian should reward those officers who had shown their 
loyalty, and did not abandon the duke’s service during the recruitment, by overlooking 
their infractions. 
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In the spring months Maximilian had agreed, albeit reluctantly, to reimburse his 
officers in order to avoid crisis and help speed their recruitment in Bohemia.  By summer, 
however, he hardened his position, and forced them to muster their regiments in early 
August with their claims largely unresolved.148  Captains who had failed to recruit 
enough men on their own accounts lost their commands despite the heavy investment 
they had undertaken.149 
Captains continued throughout the year to press for reimbursement and relaxed 
discipline, but they reached no explicit agreement with the duke.  Maximilian simply 
ignored their complaints and hoped they would cooperate with his investment policy in 
order to keep their commands intact.  He refused to let them use mischief to press their 
demands, and he refused to grant them free license for plunder in lieu of reimbursement, 
as they had urged.   
 
Assistance Councilors: Search for Accord and Compliance 
By late summer Maximilian came to realize that his commissioners had, in the end, 
proven more likely to support the colonels and captains than enforce his own mandates.  
Rather than rely solely on them to carry out his investment policy he decided to appoint 
permanent negotiators instead.  He summoned Herberstorff and Muggenthal to Munich in 
late July and discussed sending them into the field as “assistance councilors” (Assistenz 
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Räthe) attached to Tilly’s headquarters where they could treat with officers on an 
ongoing basis.150  He tasked them to find solutions that might placate his commanders 
without compromising his investment and discipline policies.  In the end, however, they 
could neither convince officers to reform their commands, nor could they fully persuade 
them to forego their claims to eventual reimbursement. 
 Herberstorff worried from the outset that he might not command enough stature in 
the army, with his colonel’s rank and governorship, to convince the generals and other 
colonels to follow the duke’s more unpopular directives.151  He asked that Maximilian 
bestow upon him the title Major-General of the Cavalry, a charge that had recently 
become vacant, both to strengthen his position and to reward his service.  Tilly himself 
had already warned Maximilian that he should send more highly placed representatives to 
impress his will and new policies upon the war council.152  Maximilian demurred to 
consider the many applicants, as always, but agreed two months later and granted 
Herberstorff the general’s rank.153   
Despite their new posts, however, Herberstorff and Muggenthal never managed to 
carry out Maximilian’s orders that certain companies be reformed or disbanded.  Officers 
refused to modify their commands in any way that might threaten their bonds or promises 
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to their followers.  In the fall, for instance, Maximilian decided to reform some 
companies assigned to his occupation forces in the Lower Palatinate.154  Shortly after his 
battlefield victories Tilly besieged Frederick’s seat at Heidelberg and captured the palace 
by storm in mid-September.155  Maximilian garrisoned the town with several cavalry 
companies that had suffered heavy casualties, then installed Heinrich von Metternich in 
Frederick’s old residence to run his new occupation government.  Metternich carried the 
title Statthalter, like Herberstorff in Upper Austria, and would oversee both Palatinate 
regions, with precedence over the regime at Amberg.156 
Once Metternich had made Heidelberg secure Maximilian decided to reform those 
cavalry companies he had assigned to the Statthalter’s garrison.157  He wanted to dissolve 
the old companies and form several new, stronger companies from among their number.  
In late September he ordered his two new assistance councilors, Herberstorff and 
Muggenthal, to form a special committee with commissioner Starzhausen to negotiate 
with the captains on how to proceed.158   
Captains objected at once, however, and refused to relinquish their commands 
without extensive negotiations.159  Should Maximilian reform their companies, they 
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explained, their horsemen would almost certainly leave service rather than serve under an 
unfamiliar captain.  Officers claimed their men had already grown impatient with poor 
support and outraged that the duke’s representatives sought to deny them their due rights 
to loot and booty.  Many had begun to consider the duke’s service “unmanful” for true 
warriors, they warned.160  Maximilian’s commission and the captains continued to 
negotiate throughout October but Herberstorff, for one, tended to agree with the captains’ 
assessment.  In the end Maximilian once again relented, dissolved the commission on 
Herberstorff’s advice, and declined to hold so much as a muster for the garrison 
cavalry.161 
Tilly in the meantime tightened his blockade around Mannheim and then, in 
November, launched an assault that carried the walls.162  Mannheim’s fall left only one 
remaining fortress, Frankenthal, in Frederick’s hands.  In the same month Anholt arrived 
in Westphalia to defend Cologne’s lands against Mansfeld and Christian, who had sought 
shelter in East Frisia to rebuild their respective armies.  Protestant towns, particularly 
around Münster, barred their gates to Anholt’s troops, and hostile villagers cooperated 
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with the enemy to deny his men provisions and shelter.163  League regiments settled in to 
blockade the towns and Anholt began his long efforts to subdue the locals. 
Anholt’s officers once again began to demand that Maximilian send them 
reimbursement.164  Their men, cold, hungry and battered, had begun to threaten general 
mutiny unless their leaders could provide better support, they claimed.  Lindlo reported 
that many cavalry companies refused to carry out any orders whatsoever until they 
received more coin and better provisions.165  He lamented that they had been reduced to a 
shameful beggar’s fate, a frequent trope that echoed Georg Meisl’s earlier insults in 
Geiselhöring, and urged Maximilian to grant their requests.   
Maximilian insisted, for his part, that Anholt’s officers should take more 
responsibility for their men’s well-being and use their proven quality and experience to 
find ways to maintain their companies without immediate help.166  He nonetheless did 
accede to Lindlo’s judgment in the end and promised to send funds as soon as possible.  
By early December Anholt managed to placate his men and once again averted mutiny 
among his troops. 
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Conclusion 
In previous years Maximilian had tried to guarantee his soldiers reliable support through 
his own administration.  Despite his reforms, however, he could never ensure steady 
funds, and by early 1622 he could no longer afford to reimburse his officers for open-
table maintenance.  He deferred their demands for cash and, in the process, brought both 
field armies into repeated crisis throughout the year.  Tilly’s and Anholt’s officers 
refused, on occasion, to participate in their respective campaigns until Maximilian sent 
convoys to defray their expenses.  In the meantime commanders paid to host their 
soldiers at open table, when necessary, but preferred, when possible, to shower them with 
loot and booty, both legal and otherwise.  Most allowed their men to engage in 
brigandage and declined to enforce better regiment until Maximilian defrayed their 
expenses. 
 Frederick, on the other hand, already an outlaw, allowed Mansfeld and Christian 
to support their armies by any means necessary.  Beyond the elector’s token subsidies his 
champions fueled their men through a piratical war economy based on pillage and illegal 
spoils from region to region.  Maximilian would need more help from his officers, he 
decided, if he hoped to match them in 1622.  Most had already begun to draw more on 
their own private wealth than they ever did in the past.  Maximilian now pressured them 
to invest in their companies and regiments outright, on their own account, without any 
guarantee they would see repayment in the near future.  
 In response to their pushback against his plans Maximilian tried, throughout 1622, 
to reward officers who agreed to bear their own recruitment and upkeep costs.  He 
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favored them for appointments to his new regiments and allowed them to negotiate for 
enlarged commands.  Conversely when officers demurred, unable or unwilling to support 
their own men, he threatened to reform their companies, disband their regiments, or 
otherwise punish them and diminish their reputations. 
 In addition Maximilian promised investors advancement, gifts and, most 
importantly, future boons from the emperor to acknowledge their contributions toward 
restoring the public peace.  In December Ferdinand summoned his allies and enemies to 
an imperial deputation at Regensburg to discuss how they might hasten the war’s 
conclusion.  During talks he agreed, at Maximilian’s behest, to distribute new titles to 
reward his supporters in both the Habsburg and the League armies.  He created roughly 
eleven princes, seventy counts, and over one-hundred barons to make good on his debts. 
 Officers who did invest tended to cite their contributions as evidence for their 
continued devotion and good service.  Maximilian decided to leverage those same 
conceits against officers who direspected his new mandates.  In his letters and 
instructions he implied that he would weigh their financial commitment more heavily in 
how he measured their loyalty and quality.  By the same token he would consider those 
who objected, or who failed to keep good regiment, both unfit and faithless to their 
charges.  Their standing and continued service in his army would depend, in other words, 
on how well they supported their own men without his reimbursement. 
In Bohemia the duke’s officers faced their worst crisis yet as they struggled to 
recruit several new regiments over the spring.  Hostile parties, poor conditions and 
rampant inflation delayed their progress and compounded their expenses over many 
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months.  Wallenstein’s cavalry fought them over billets in an effort, they felt, to ruin their 
reputations, unravel their commands and cause desertion from League arms.  They feared 
they might lose the followings they had invested so heavily to build.  Colonels collected 
joint petitions from their captains asking Maximilian to send them funds and extend their 
muster dates so they could complete their companies. 
Maximilian at first obliged them, as he had Tilly’s and Anholt’s men, in order to 
get their regiments into the field as quickly as possible.  Once their recruitment dragged 
into the summer months, however, he resolved to enforce his investment system more 
thoroughly.  He denied them further monies, ordered them to rush the muster and insisted 
they reform any companies that still remained understrength.  Leaders bitterly resisted 
Maximilian’s effort to dissolve their men until late summer, when he finally compelled 
them to muster on his terms.   
By the time they secured the Palatinate in the fall many officers had come to 
accept Maximilian’s new financial demands.  Despite heavy expenses they welcomed the 
opportunity to show how well they could provide for their men and contribute to 
Maximilian’s military potential.  On the other hand officers who became more financially 
committed also grew more adamant that Maximilian allow them to keep their commands 
intact.  Maximilian lost, in time, his freedom to reform or disband companies and 
regiments at his pleasure. 
Maximilian soon found, in addition, that he had to relax his control over good 
regiment so he might ensure ongoing cooperation from his officers.  Leaders short on 
coin used their negotiations with Maximilian as an opportunity to satisfy their men with 
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loot and booty and, in the process, replenish their own coffers.  Commissioners tended to 
overlook their infractions because they recognized the duke’s investment system would 
collapse without the added wealth his officers extracted from the countryside.  In time 
officers and commissioners developed new ways to avoid responsibility for brigandage 
and thereby spare Maximilian’s political reputation. 
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CHAPTER 4: PARTISANS AND PREROGATIVES, 1622 
Over the course of 1622 Maximilian largely gave up on trying to enforce “good 
regiment” in his armies.  Officers managed to avoid responsibility for crimes committed 
by their soldiers, as they had in the past, and Maximilian refrained from pressing the 
issue because he needed to secure their ongoing investment.  In most instances they 
claimed their men had never been involved in the first place, that the culprits had fled the 
army, could not be located or identified, or had acted mutinously in outrage due to poor 
support, contrary to the commander’s will.  Maximilian’s own commissioners often 
proved more likely to cover for officers under their supervision than carry out the duke’s 
disciplinary mandates.1 
 By year’s end Maximilian had, in response, shifted his focus away from trying to 
prevent infractions, and sought instead to avoid legal culpability for the damages his 
armies inflicted.  In order to avoid making restitution for the countless grievances lodged 
against his troops by local authorities he developed evasions similar to those his officers 
had used to dodge his own reprimands in years past.  Most often he claimed the culprits 
had not yet been found, or that no wrongdoing had occurred in the first place.  He 
frequently maintained the pretense that his commissioners would conduct ongoing 
investigations, but in practice he began to ignore complaints altogether and thereby, in 
effect, turned a blind eye to illegal violence and plunder. 
                                                                                                              
1  On  Maximilian’s  inability  to  hold  officers  responsible  see  also  Michael  Kaiser,  Politik  und  Kriegführung.  
Maximilian  von  Bayern,  Tilly  und  die  Katholische  Liga  im  Dreißigjährigen  Krieg  (Münster:  Aschendorff,  1999),  71-­‐‑
78,  103-­‐‑104.  
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 Commanders meanwhile relied upon Maximilian’s forbearance to conduct 
partisan warfare to their satisfaction.  Leaders used the hunt for spoils not only to advance 
their reputations, satisfy their men, and recoup their expenses, but also as a technique to 
overcome local resistance and secure regional control.  Their parties ignored local 
authorities and took plunder as they saw fit in order to demonstrate their supremacy, 
defend their men against civil justice, and wrest the means of rule away from magistrates 
and subjects.  Townspeople and villagers often proved more formidable in their 
opposition than historians usually allow, however.2  Magistrates and officials organized 
their people for local defense, claimed jurisdiction over soldiers who committed crimes in 
their districts, and tried to capture and execute the culprits. 
 Officers claimed sole jurisdiction over their men, however, and brooked no 
interference from authorities outside their own commands.  Commanders frequently took 
up the sword on their men’s behalf to guard their liberties and protect them from 
retribution, imprisonment and punishment.  Disputes between officers and magistrates 
followed careful escalation patterns and sometimes resembled minor feuds like those 
between League commanders and Wallenstein in Bohemia.  In using partisan warfare to 
establish control and override local jurisdictions commanders practiced the judicial 
dimensions of lordship through the powers of the imperial state, conferred upon them by 
charter.  
                                                                                                              
2  Some  historians  do  explore  their  role,  for  example  Michael  Kaiser,  “Inmitten  des  Kriegstheaters:  Die  
Bevölkerung  als  militärischer  Faktor  und  Kriegsteilnehmer  im  Dreißigjährigen  Krieg,”  in  Krieg  und  Frieden:  
Militär  und  Gesellschaft  in  der  Frühen  Neuzeit,  ed.  Bernhard  Kroener  and  Ralf  Pröve  (Paderborn:  Schöningh,  
1996),  281-­‐‑304.  
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Evasion and Collusion: Commissioners, Discipline and Incomplete Enforcement 
Early in 1622, during the winter and spring months, Maximilian seems to have made a 
few last, sporadic efforts to compel his officers to enforce better regiment in their 
commands.  Officers largely ignored him and denied wrongdoing, as expected, but soon 
his commissioners, too, began to neglect his orders on a regular basis, and even covered 
for the officers under their supervision.  In the end Maximilian’s representatives largely 
chose to refrain from interfering in another officer’s command and claimed that only 
soldiers’ own leaders could ensure their good behavior.  Some even suggested that 
Maximilian should abandon his discipline policies entirely and allow commanders to let 
their soldiers take illegal spoils in substitute for reimbursement. 
Shortly after the new year, for example, Maximilian detached several companies 
from Kratz’s command and sent them to Alsace to help archduke Leopold’s imperials.3  
Kratz had recently promised the duke he would keep better regiment in exchange for his 
enlarged command, but complaints against his men continued to arrive in flurries 
throughout the winter.4  In his effort to force Kratz’s compliance Maximilian decided to 
appoint colonel Egon von Fürstenberg, Leopold’s trusted client, as his newest 
commissioner, and charged him to keep Kratz’s troops in line.5  
                                                                                                              
3 Maximilian discusses, KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 232-234, January 8, 1622, Maximilian to E. Fürstenberg. 
4 Amberg commissioners discuss, KuBay ÄA 2302 fol. 244-249, January 3, 1622, Amberg Government to 
Maximilian. 
5 KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 232-234, January 8, 1622, Maximilian to E. Fürstenberg. 
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Maximilian decided to have his Amberg commissioners draw up new instructions 
for Fürstenberg that might serve as a model for how to enforce his disciplinary policies.6  
In addition to the usual measures his instructions outlined how Fürsenberg might use 
promissory notes in the duke’s name to help officers with their maintenance costs.  
Should officers run into trouble the colonel-commissioner could advance them notes, and 
they could use these notes to pay local service industries and contracted victualers rather 
than let their men ransack villages and towns.  Maximilian would attach to Fürstenberg a 
paymaster from one of the war chests who could issue notes on command to merchants, 
shopkeepers, lodgers, and others. 
His instructions notwithstanding Fürstenberg chose to cover for Kratz’s captains 
rather than force them to observe good regiment.  In mid-February, for example, he 
ignored reports from commissioner Burhus that Kratz’s riders had begun to terrorize local 
subjects.7  Burhus told him the soldiers refused all orders to desist and threatened, like 
Tilly’s and Anholt’s troops, to continue until Maximilian sent more cash.  Soldiers told 
Burhus they considered Maximilian’s notes and deferments a slight to the quality and 
loyalty they had shown during their many years in service, he said. 
 Fürstenberg took no steps to compel Kratz’s officers to enforce discipline.  He 
simply told Maximilian he had become preoccupied trying to oppose Mansfeld’s renewed 
                                                                                                              
6 Maximilian, Amberg commissioners and others discuss, KuBay ÄA 2302 fol. 244-249, January 3, 1622, 
Amberg Government to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 232-234, January 8, 1622, Maximilian to E. 
Fürstenberg; KuBay ÄA 2274 fol. 236, January 26, 1622, Maximilian to E. Fürstenberg; KuBay ÄA 2258 
fol. 31, February 12, 1622, Archduke Leopold to E. Fürstenberg. 
7 KuBay ÄA 2258 fol. 47, February 14, 1622, H.U. Burhus to E. Fürstenberg. 
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efforts to cross the Rhine.8  He would need to keep Kratz’s riders satisfied, his letter 
implied, if he expected them to continue fighting for him, and that meant he should not 
deny them their rights to loot and booty. 
 In addition Fürstenberg tried to claim that those troops under his supervision 
should not be held responsible for the reported infractions.9  He told Maximilian that only 
the imperial troops from Italy, not his own League troops, had taken liberties with the 
region’s subjects.  Locals knew no better, he claimed, and could not tell the difference 
between soldiers from different armies unless they wore their tokens.  Fürstenberg went 
on to suggest that Maximilian should allow his officers to let their troops take open 
plunder in lieu of reimbursement.10  Forage and spoils in League lands, in particular, 
would ensure that the other members contributed their fair share to the army’s upkeep, he 
said.  
 Burhus had earlier told Fürstenberg that he believed only Kratz himself, in person, 
could hold any sway over his captain and their men.11  Maximilian decided to recall Kratz 
from Prague in May and told him to ride for Alsace at once so he could bring his own 
troops into better regiment.12  Upon his arrival, however, Kratz seems to have joined 
Fürstenberg in ignoring Maximilian’s orders.  Further reports alleged that Kratz’s men 
                                                                                                              
8 KuBay ÄA 2258 fol. 30, February 14, 1622, E. Fürstenberg to Maximilian. 
9 KuBay ÄA 2258 fol. 61-62, March 23, 1622, E. Fürstenberg to Maximilian. 
10 KuBay ÄA 2258 fol. 70-72, E. Fürstenberg to Maximilian. 
11 KuBay ÄA 2258 fol. 47, February 14, 1622, H.U. Burhus to E. Fürstenberg. 
12 KuBay ÄA 2311 fol. 60-61, May 28, 1622, Maximilian to Kratz. 
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had begun to rob cattle and kidnap women and children to add to their baggage train as 
camp followers.  Kratz himself simply denied the allegations as Fürstenberg had.13  He 
claimed the local authorities had agreed to provide them with cattle and that the only 
women and children present in the baggage train belonged to soldiers’ families.  
 Complaints against Kratz’s cavalry continued through 1623 and 1624 even after 
they had marched north to join Anholt’s army in Westphalia.  Officials claimed his men 
abducted people and killed those villagers who stood in their way.  Kratz, for his part, 
professed outrage at their accusations.14  He requested that Maximilian have his 
commissioners conduct a formal investigation to exhonorate his men and restore his own 
honor and good name.  Plaintiffs denounced Kratz as a liar and claimed his reports false.  
Wilhelm Heinrich, the count of Bentheim, lodged repeated grievances against Kratz’s 
troops and insisted his own reports spoke the truth.15 
 In the years after 1622, however, Maximilian had largely ceased trying to address 
complaints against his troops in meaningful ways.  He urged Anholt to enforce better 
discipline, but Anholt demurred, saying he believed only those individuals responsible 
should be held accountable for infractions.16  He would make every effort to apprehend 
them and render exemplary punishment, he said, but so far they could not be identified or 
                                                                                                              
13 KuBay ÄA 2311 fol. 81-82, undated, Kratz to Maximilian. 
14 KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 475-476, July 29, 1624, Kratz to Anholt. 
15 KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 477-478, July 30, 1624, Bentheim to Anholt. 
16 KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 455, July 15, 1624, Anholt to Maximilian. 
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located.  In the meantime he refused to consider collective punishment against entire 
companies or Kratz’s regiment as a whole. 
 Other commissioners, too, for example Umbsecker, covered for officers who 
kidnapped locals to enlarge their camp communities.  Earlier that winter in 1622 
Maximilian got complaints that League troops around Bamberg had abducted women and 
children to add their baggage trains.17  In response he ordered commissioner Umbsecker 
to make sure each colonel reduced his regiment’s train to so the troops could not benefit 
from adding more people to their followers.  Umbsecker soon reported the reductions 
complete.  Local officials, on the other hand, claimed Umbsecker and the colonels had 
simply ignored Maximilian’s orders.  Officers still allowed their men to gather camp 
followers as before, they said, and abductions continued unabated.18 
 Maximilian reprimanded Umbsecker for his false report and his collusion with 
officers to disregard the duke’s mandates.19  In order to preserve his reputation 
Maximilian now felt obliged to render Bamberg some satisfaction, he said.  Umbsecker, 
as the duke’s representative, should have carried out his will and prevented his troops 
from inflicting harm on League members.  His neglect had affronted one of the League’s 
most important leaders and had injured Maximilian’s own good name.  League troops 
had been raised for the common good to help ensure the public peace, he said.  Mischief 
                                                                                                              
17 Maximilian discusses these reports in his later orders to commissioner Umbsecker, KuBay ÄA 2275 fol. 
202-205, January 28, 1622, Maximilian to Umbsecker. 
18 Maximilian describes these events in his later orders to Umbsecker, ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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and exorbitances, on the other hand, served only private interests and worked to the 
whole army’s disrepute.  Maximilian expressed his inclination to dismiss Umbsecker 
from service over the breach in trust.  Rather than cashier him, though, Maximilian 
simply re-issued him the same orders and enjoined him to carry them out this time. 
 Most officers and commissioners seem to have ignored orders they knew would 
interfere with commanders in their efforts to maintain and provide for their men.  Given 
the shortage in reimbursement from Maximilian’s treasury officers relied on illicit means 
to demonstrate their leadership and secure provisions, equipment, and rewards for their 
followers.  In the course of 1622 Maximilian would come to accept that his officers 
needed leeway not only to support their troops, but to combat the enemy and effectively 
conduct his war effort. 
  
Tactics for Control: Partisans, Conspicuous Violence and Supremacy in Erbach 
Officers used the hunt for loot and booty not only to provide for their men and show 
resourceful leadership, but as a technique to flush enemy troops from contested regions, 
suppress local resistance and secure effective control.  Commanders seized lodgings, took 
food and livestock in forage, kidnapped subjects to add to their baggage trains, held 
magistrates for ransom, obtained information through torture, and otherwise wrested the 
means of rule from local authorities.  Rulers lodged repeated grievances against 
Maximilian’s troops wherein they denounced the army’s conduct and called he 
constitutional legitimacy of his war effort into question. 
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 Ludwig, count of Erbach, for example, lodged repeated complaints against 
Anholt’s troops throughout their 1622 campaigns in Hessen.20  He compared them 
disfavorably to the rebels and submitted that Mansfeld’s marauders, or other public 
enemies, might not have terrorized his people so thoroughly as did the Leaguists under 
Anholt’s command.21  Ludwig’s reproach challenged Maximilian’s claim to have waged 
lawful war to restore the public peace and bring criminals to justice.  His letters to 
Maximilian offer some of the most illustrative descriptions of the many illegal tactics 
officers used to demonstrate leadership, earn credit with their men and establish local 
control.     
 Commanders seem to have sought, first, to challenge local magistrates and 
undermine their authority among the people.  Rather than make prior arrangements with 
the count or his officials, Ludwig said, horsemen descended upon his lands in the 
Odenwald suddenly and without warning, and seized lodgings for their men by force.22  
Officers rejected the Salva Guardia contract the count had negotiated with Tilly’s 
headquarters and instead had their men commit robbery, murder and arson throughout his 
jurisdictions.  Erbach’s bailiff approached the officers to draw up a new written accord 
                                                                                                              
20 Erbach’s complaints, KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 5, January 4, 1622, Erbach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2324 
fol. 7, May 15, 1622, Erbach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 9-10, October 30, 1622, Erbach to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 13-23, undated, Erbach to Maximilian. 
21 KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 5, January 4, 1622, Erbach to Maximilian. 
22 Erbach describes their actions in his grievances, KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 7, May 15, 1622, Erbach to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 13-23, undated, Erbach to Maximilian. 
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for their maintenance, but they refused to settle on specific written terms to limit their 
requisitions. 
 Once they had successfully overcome the authorities officers next secured their 
means for local defense and usurped their prerogative to extract goods and services from 
the populace.  Leaders sent their men into farmhouses and barns to round up horses, pigs, 
cows, and sheep, and to kidnap women and children for the baggage train.23  Soldiers 
confiscated everyone’s household weaponry for their own captains’ stockpiles and soon 
claimed the bailiff’s entire armory once they gained access.  Churches, town halls, inns, 
and other common houses shut their doors to bar the riders, but before long they broke in, 
looted valuables and hauled furniture away for their lodgings and camps. 
 Should commanders encounter further trouble they had their men use ransom, 
torture and demonstrative violence to suppress the opposition.  Ludwig described in his 
narrative how soldiers beat, cut down or shot anyone who got in their way or tried to 
resist, and they tortured local priests, and held them for ransom, to compel subjects to 
submit.24  He stressed sexual violence in particular when he denounced Maximilian’s 
troops and proclaimed that they showed themselves “more inclined to serve the devil than 
God.”25  House fathers gathered their families, fled into the nearby woods to escape the 
                                                                                                              
23 Erbach describes their actions in his grievances, KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 7, May 15, 1622, Erbach to 
Maximilian. 
24 Erbach describes their actions in his grievances, KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 7, May 15, 1622, Erbach to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 13-23, undated, Erbach to Maximilian. 
25 KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 13-23, undated, Erbach to Maximilian. 
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soldiers’ wrath, and remained there in the bitter winter cold until the soldiers torched 
their settlements and left. 
 In cases when local authorities organized further resistance commanders fought 
them openly in combat, both to re-establish their supremacy and to defend their martial 
reputations.  Once the Leaguists had worked their way through the count’s outlying 
villages and reached the walls at Erbach itself Ludwig rode out with his guards to 
confront them.26  On his approach, he claimed, the horsemen drew their weapons rather 
than treat with him.  One place his pistol against Ludwig’s chest and robbed the party’s 
weapons and valuables before allowing them to return to safety. 
 Erbach at once barred its gates against the marauders, let them overrun the 
suburbs for several days, and tried to rally the town’s defenses.  During that time one 
herald approached the gates, demanded entry and, when refused, fired several shots at the 
walls and citadel, one of which found its way through a window and into the count’s own 
chambers, so Ludwig’s story went.27   
 Before long Erbach’s leaders managed to organize several counterattacks that 
drove League troops from the town’s outskirts.  Ludwig expressed satisfaction that he 
had shamed the captains by defeating their men.28  In retaliation the Leaguists decided to 
ransack the count’s own palace, the Schönburg.  On their approach they noticed several 
                                                                                                              
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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people in the outer court who tried to hide from them and escape their notice.  Rather 
than announce themselves they simply broke down the door, killed one teenager who had 
taken up arms to defend the grounds, then took everyone else hostage.  Once inside the 
Schönburg they gathered up all the food they could carry, cut down the fruit trees in 
“devilish meanness,” and did as much damage as they could to the grounds in reprisal for 
their earlier humiliation at Erbach.29 
 League officers, their reputations repaired, chose the count’s other stronghold at 
Reichenberg for their next target.  In an effort to gain bloodless entry they forged false 
orders from Tilly that ordered Reichenberg’s defenders to open their gates in the name of 
the emperor.  Erbach’s bailiff saw through the ruse, however, waved the Salva Guardia 
contract at them, then sent them on their way.   
Rather than try to take the walls the horsemen simply confiscated all the wagons, 
horses, and hay they could find, along with cows, wine, bread and silver wares, then 
moved along to plunder and burn the nearby villages in order to satisfy what the count 
called their “bloodthirsty tyrannical hearts.”30  Shortly thereafter colonel Florinville met 
with the bailiff and agreed to post formal bans on further plunder on pain of death.  He 
made no effort to enforce the orders, however, and the bailiff’s leaflets hung forgotten for 
the campaign’s duration. 
                                                                                                              
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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 Later that year another entourage approached the Schönberg and claimed they 
wished to establish their headquarters in the palace.31  Erbach’s bailiff had taken up 
residence there, and once again he invoked the Salva Guardia to reject their demands.  
They pleaded with him in the emperor’s name and swore solemn oaths that they intended 
no harm toward the residence or its occupants.  In time they persuaded the reluctant 
bailiff to open his gates.  Soldiers at once locked the entire household in the wine cellar, 
ransacked the residence and, finally, took the bailiff himself hostage, thereby gaining full 
control in the region. 
Over the summer Ludwig sought audience with Tilly to plead redress for his 
grievances, to demand restitution for the breached Salva Guardia, and to exact solemn 
promises from Maximilian and his commanders that League troops would be kept away 
from his lands in the future.32  Tilly expressed to the count his anger that League officers 
had conducted their men so poorly, but explained that he could do little to remedy their 
behavior until the year’s campaign had concluded.  He directed the count’s complaint to 
Munich instead for Maximilian’s administration to address.33 
 By mid-summer Maximilian had largely begun to ignore complaints like Erbach’s 
altogether, as he would during the years after 1622.  He did acknowledge the count’s 
complaint, but he made no further effort to reprimand officers or admonish them to 
                                                                                                              
31 Ibid. 
32 KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 5, January 4, 1622, Erbach to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 9-10, October 30, 
1622, Erbach to Maximilian. 
33 Described in Erbach’s grievances, KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 13-23, undated, Erbach to Maximilian 
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follow his disciplinary policies.  He instead told Ludwig he would have his 
commissioners investigate the matter further so they could have officers render 
punishment and make restitution.34  Like other plaintiffs, however, Ludwig heard no 
further word on any investigations the duke’s commissioners may or may not have 
carried out.  
 
Lapsed Grievances: Misconduct, Damages and the Policy of Denial in Limburg 
Maximilian not only ignored complaints but began, by as early as mid-spring, to deny 
that any wrongdoing had taken place when his commanders seized local control.  He 
refused to either hold officers responsible or permit local authorities to invervene in their 
supposed disciplinary efforts.  Limburg’s counts, for example, in western Hessen, heard 
little from Maximilian in response to the grievances they lodged against Anholt’s troops 
during the spring and summer. 
 Limburg controlled an important bridge over the Lahn on the route between 
Hessen, Westphalia and the Palatinate.  Maximilian’s commissioners informed the counts 
in April that League troops would soon march through their lands headed south.35  Once 
the column had passed the commanders would leave a small detachment behind to hold 
the bridge indefinitely.  Their soldiers would need lodging arrangements from the counts 
to support them during their stay. 
                                                                                                              
34 KuBay ÄA 2324 fol. 1-2.  June 6, 1622.  Maximilian to Erbach. 
35 Earlier notices discussed in KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 398-399, May 4, 1622, Maximilian to the Counts of 
Limburg 
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 During recent campaigns Limburg had already experienced harsh treatment and 
both Mansfeld’s and Anholt’s hands.  Limburg’s counts pleaded with Maximilian to 
choose another route instead and spare their lands further troop movements.36  Earlier 
victual ordinances had demanded too much from their villagers, they said, and placed 
their people in desperate circumstances.  Maximilian acknowledged the burdens his 
troops placed upon Limburg’s people, but nonetheless insisted they must establish billets 
in town to ensure safe, unhindered passage over the bridge.37  He assured the counts his 
officers would take pains to keep good regiment and spare their subjects any unnecessary 
hardships.  Limburg’s rulers thanked the duke for his guarantee and hinted that they 
would hold him to his promise.38 
 Once Anholt’s troops moved in to secure the bridge as planned, however, their 
commander, colonel-lieutenant Gabriel Wachmann, showed no intention to abide by 
Maximilian’s earlier agreement.39  Wachmann arrived in July, in far greater numbers than 
the counts had been led to expect, and spread his men out to occupy nearly all the 
county’s villages.  Limburg’s victual ordinance had called for Wachmann to establish a 
field camp well away from settlements, maintain good order, and make sure his men paid 
for what they took in good coin.  Instead he billeted them far and wide and ordered them 
to secure as many provisions as they could pack away.  
                                                                                                              
36 KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 400-401, April 13, 1622, Wilhelm of Limburg to Maximilian. 
37 KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 398-399, May 4, 1622, Maximilian to the Counts of Limburg. 
38 KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 405-406, June 29, 1622, Wilhelm of Limburg to Maximilian. 
39 KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 414-415, August 17, 1622, Wilhelm of Limburg to Maximilian. 
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 In their grievances the counts asked that Maximilian hold Wachmann personally 
responsible for the damages his men had caused in their lands.40  Soldiers had acted under 
Wachmann’s direct orders, they said, not in defiance to him.  He kept his men in good 
order throughout their rampage, never lost control over their behavior, and could have 
stopped them at any time.  In the process Wachmann’s troops had left their people 
destitute, they said.  Farmers dreaded in particular the loss of their draft animals and 
livestock, hitched to soldiers’ treasure-laden wagons or sent to the butchers in the 
baggage train.  Subjects could no longer sow their crops, nor scratch out basic 
subsistence, nor pay the rents, dues and fees the counts needed for reconstruction funds.  
They asked that Maximilian force Wachmann to render them due compensation and shift 
his army’s march route to another region that could better sustain the troops. 
Maximilian replied, as before, that he could under no circumstances abandon the 
bridge.41  He had instructed his commanders to avoid inflicting harm where possible, he 
continued, and he would re-issue those orders, but any further action must await 
investigation by the commissioners.  No further word arrived, however, and Limburg’s 
counts, like Erbach’s, had to eventually give up on their grievances. 
Before long the counts demanded to negotiate their own Salva Guardia to spare 
their lands further exactions.42  League troops had remained at Limburg throughout the 
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fall and into winter, 1623, despite further requests that they be moved elsewhere, and 
continued to make exactions upon local subjects.  Maximilian again refused the counts’ 
request.43  He insisted that he still expected Limburg’s people to abide by the victual 
ordinance and provide the necessary lodgings and supplies against orderly payment from 
his troops.  
Maximilian’s latter response betrayed no further recognition that his troops had 
engaged in any misconduct around Limburg.  He neither allowed that officers had 
disobeyed his instructions, nor that their conduct differed in any way from the 
disciplinary policies he had set out to deal with infractions.  By summer’s end 
Maximilian consistently either ignored complaints altogether, as with Limburg, or 
maintained the pretense that his commissioners would investigate, as with Erbach and, by 
year’s end, Leiningen. 
 
Privileges and Rewards: Command Integrity and Interference in Leiningen  
By late fall Maximilian had begun to dodge complaints from local authorities using the 
same evasions his own officers had previously used with him.  He maintained the 
pretense that his commissioners would investigate, but invariably he claimed the culprits 
could not be found, or had left the army, and no meaningful action could be taken to 
make restitution for damages or punish the offenders.  In the process officers made clear 
that they would neither interfere in another’s command prerogatives nor tolerate outside 
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encroachment upon their own.  Given the need to maintain their men without 
reimbursement they also made clear that under no circumstances would they deny their 
men the privilege to loot and booty for support and rewards.   
Maximilian’s response to an incident that occurred late that fall in the county of 
Leiningen illustrates how officers defended their prerogative to plunder and how the 
duke, through his new policy, sought to accommodate them.  Frederick, the young count 
of Leiningen, and his mother, Maria Elizabeth, had recently negotiated a Salva Guardia 
with Tilly’s headquarters to shelter their people from ubiquitous marauders who had 
plagued them in recent months.44  Under the contract’s terms colonel Pappenheim would 
detail soldiers to guard Frederick’s lands and the count, in return, would provide horses 
for his regiment. 
On November 11, 1622, Pappenheim’s representative, captain Damian Moran, 
arrived at the Emichsburg, the count’s castle and seat, to work out details on how to 
procure the horses and make arrangements for the county’s defense.45  Late the following 
night, November 12, Moran and the count got word that unidentified horsemen had 
descended without warning upon two of Leiningen’s villages, Klein- and 
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Großbockenheim, and ransacked both communities.  Frederick now called upon Moran to 
hold up Pappenheim’s end of the bargain and drive out the marauders.46   
Moran described, when later questioned, how he rode forth at once from the castle 
to confront the horsemen.47  He intended to enforce the Salva Guardia in Pappenheim’s 
and Maximilian’s names, he said, or, failing that, scout the situation further.  On his 
arrival at the scene, however, he discovered that the horsemen in fact belonged to 
Pappenheim’s cavalry, his own regiment.  In dismay, he claimed, he ordered the soldiers 
to desist at once.  Pappenheim and Maximilian had given their word to defend 
Leiningen’s lands and people, he reminded them.  Soldiers should seek to uphold those 
promises and advance their officers’ honor and reputations.  Instead the marauders had 
chosen to ignore their obligations and, in the process, undermined their colonel’s and 
warlord’s good names. 
 In response the riders told Moran that their own captains had granted them full 
authorization for the raid, he said.48  Moran, merely another captain in the regiment, 
could not command their loyalty and held no standing to prevent them from carrying out 
their plunder.  Should he persist in his attempts to interfere they would return in the 
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morning, break into the Emichsburg, and defenestrate him from its highest window.  By 
placing in their mouths a reference to the Prague defenestration, Moran implied that his 
intervention had, in fact, constituted an illegitimate attempt by outside authorities to deny 
them their liberties and privileges. 
Moran quickly made his retreat and sought help from colonel Courtenbach, he 
claimed, who had established his headquarters nearby.49  Courtenbach declined to 
intervene, however, on the same grounds the marauders had given, namely that he 
himself held no more standing to stop them than did Moran.  He suggested that Moran 
find their own captains or, failing that, colonel Pappenheim, the only officers who could 
compel them to respect the Salva Guardia.   
Courtenbach did allow that Moran could challenge them with his own men, if he 
insisted, and force them to desist by attacking them.50   Courtenbach himself refused to 
supply any captains from his own regiment to help with such hostile action, however.  
Wallenstein had incurred widespread disrepute among League officers that summer for 
trying the very same methods against Pechmann’s, Aldringen’s and Sprinzenstein’s 
recruits in Bohemia.  Courtenbach refused to let Moran involve him or his captains in 
similar action against Pappenheim’s men. 
Moran deferred to Courtenbach’s judgment and decided he should seek 
Pappenheim’s own help to stop the horsemen.  He returned to the Emichsburg by early 
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morning and prepared to depart in haste.  In the meantime, however, it seems the riders 
decided to make good on their earlier threats.  Before Moran could leave he found the 
castle surrounded by somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 troops intent on plunder.51  He 
gathered Frederick and Maria Elizabeth into his custody, stationed his own men and a 
few servants to hold the entries, then ushered his charges through a secret postern and 
made their escape.  Soldiers quickly overcame the guards, forced their way into the 
Emichsburg and took away all they could carry. 
Several months passed before count Frederick could lodge his formal complaint 
with Maximilian.52  He and his jurisdictions had remained loyal, he explained, had 
rendered no assistance to the rebels, and had moreover concluded their own Salva 
Guardia contract with Maximilian.  By rights the imperial and League armies should 
have accorded them protection from peace-breakers, not despoiled them.  Frederick asked 
Maximilian to have his war council conduct formal inquiries so he and his ruined 
villagers could receive appropriate compensation for their damages. 
Maximilian referred grievances like Leiningen’s to his new occupation 
government at Heidelberg.53  Officials on its board would, like the Amberg regime before 
them, follow up on complaints in order to placate the Palatine estates and ensure good 
policy under the duke’s rule.  In Leiningen’s case Herliberg and several commissioners 
                                                                                                              
51 Ibid. 
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     221  
arranged to conduct a formal investigation.  Herliberg summoned captain Moran to 
Heidelberg and questioned him about his role in the affair.  Clerks took down Herliberg’s 
queries and Moran’s answers in transcripts for the war council, then sent copies to count 
Frederick for his review.54 
In their interview Herliberg helped Moran construct his harrowing tale, recounted 
above, for Maximilian’s and Leiningen’s eyes.  Moran insisted he had tried every means 
at his disposal to stop the marauders short of attacking them.  Most importantly he 
appealed to their obligation to uphold the good word their colonel and warlord had given 
to spare Leiningen’s lands.  He tried to show in his narrative that he could not, in the end, 
interfere in another captain’s effort to provide for his company.  Moran’s or any other 
outsider’s attempt to intrude in another officer’s command would require violent 
confrontations between his men and theirs and would likely diminish both their 
reputations.   His narrative suggested by implication that Maximilian, too, should refrain 
from further attempts to interfere if he expected captains to keep their companies 
together. 
In order to placate the count, meanwhile, the duke’s commissioners continued 
their investigation.55  Starzhausen sent several agents to Kleinbockenheim to assess the 
damages Pappenheim’s riders had inflicted.  His men worked with the parish priest to 
reconstruct an inventory for what they had taken from the Leiningen jurisdictions.  Their 
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reports suggest that Pappenheim’s captains followed the same behaviors other officers 
had used in Erbach and Limburg to secure local supremacy. 
Pappenheim’s men seem to have gone, first, for ordinary forage goods like grain, 
fruit, wine casks, hay for the horses, and sundry provisions.56   Left unchallenged they 
soon plundered the villages for valuables, household items, clothes, loose coin, and any 
other goods they could lay hands on.  Several horsemen broke into the parish church, 
brutalized the priest, then looted the sanctuary for candles, gold and silver wares, other 
ornaments, and even carried away the baptismal font.  Officers then secured the church 
bells, designated in regulations as war matériel that could be melted down into cannon, as 
well as any horses they could find for the regiment.  Soldiers who broke into the 
Emichsburg took furniture, jewelry, and other valuables estimated to be worth around 
140,000 guilders.   
In total Starzhausen assessed Leiningen’s collective damages at nearly 340,000 
guilders between the villages and the count’s residence.57   Once the soldiers completed 
their raid they extorted a further 50,000 guilders in protection money from the locals, a 
practice normally reserved, like plunder, for enemy lands.  Maximilian assured Leiningen 
the culprits would be found, exemplary punishment rendered, and restitution made to 
cover the damages.   
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Herliberg and the other commissioners seem to have taken no further action 
beyond their initial inquiries, however.  Six years later the count had still received no 
further word from them on his claims.  League troops meanwhile continued to billet on 
Leiningen’s lands throughout the 1620s.58  In October, 1628, Frederick reiterated his 
grievances to the Heidelberg administration.  Maximilian reassured the count he had so 
far done everything in his power to redress his damages.59  His commissioners had tried 
to identify the culprits so that his officers could force them to make restitution, then 
render exemplary punishment.   
Unfortunately, Maximilian continued, too many years had passed since the  
incident to reliably identify the culprits.60  Soldiers other than Pappenheim’s may have 
participated, and in any event some might have left the army altogether in subsequent 
campaigns.  Maximilian would nonetheless have his administration continue the search 
and inform Frederick when they had progress to report.  
Two years later Frederick once again petitioned Maximilian for restitution.61  He 
obtained, this time, an intercession from count Wolfgang Wilhelm of the Palatinate-
Neuburg, a prominent Catholic prince allied to Bavaria through his marriage to 
Maximilian’s daughter Magdalena.  Wolfgang Wilhelm insisted that the League’s 
                                                                                                              
58 Described in Maximilian’s letter to the count, KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 267-268, November 3, 1628, 
Maximilian to the Count of Leiningen. 
59 Ibid.   
60 Ibid.   
61 KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 272-273, June 6, 1630, count of Leiningen and Count Palatine Wolfgang Wilhelm 
to Maximilian. 
     224  
billeted troops had ruined Frederick’s subjects beyond their means for basic subsistence.  
He asked Maximilian to grant the count some restitution from the ducal treasury in 
consolation for his losses.   
Maximilian acknowledged the intercession but repeated, again, that his 
commissioners continued to look for the culprits.62  Once found they would be punished 
and forced to make restitution as individuals.  Maximilian, his officers and 
commissioners could easily ignore crimes commited by elusive, anonymous culprits who 
could neither be caught nor forced to make restitution.  Their strategy worked so long as 
they continued to insist that soldiers be held accountable as individuals rather than by 
company or regiment.  Maximilian’s tentative new policy allowed him to refrain from 
proceeding against officers or interfering in their ability to maintain the men under their 
command.    
 
Custody and Jurisdiction: Disputes and Escalation between Officers and Authorities  
In situations when local magistrates tried to fight back or take soldiers into custody 
officers took up the sword to defend their men and their command prerogatives.  Often 
their disputes followed careful escalation patterns that resembled minor feuds over 
jurisdiction.  In Erbach, for example, count Ludwig described how he and his officials 
became embroiled in an escalating conflict with Anholt’s troops.  Several violent disputes 
between Pappenheim’s captain Dietrich von Puttberg, on the one hand, and local 
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authorities who tried to apprehend his soldiers, on the other, further illustrate this 
dynamic.63 
 During his first dispute, at Mindelheim in western Bavaria, Puttberg explained to 
Maximilian why he resisted efforts by the duke’s own officials to claim jurisdiction over 
his men.  Over the summer Maximilian’s local Pfleger at Mindelheim charged that 
Puttberg had allowed his cavalry stationed there to engage in highway robbery against the 
duke’s subjects.  Puttberg had taken no action to stop them or curb their behavior, he 
claimed, so he demanded instead that the captain allow him to participate in the 
investigation.  He insisted that Puttberg allow him to bring several plaintiffs to his 
headquarters, let them identify the culprits by sight themselves, then summarily hang 
them on the spot under the Pfleger’s supervision.   
Puttberg refused him outright, however, and declined to entertain the Pfleger’s 
further claims against his troops.  Maximilian, unwilling to ignore infractions against his 
own subjects, ordered the captain to explain his actions.64  Puttberg replied, first, that he 
had done everything in his power to enforce Maximilian’s discipline policies.65  He kept 
his men in good regiment, for the most part, he said, and had forbidden them from taking 
liberties with Maximilian’s subjects.  On those occasions when he received complaints he 
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made every effort to identify the culprits, force them to make restitution, and render 
exemplary punishment as required.   
Mindelheim’s Pfleger, on he other hand, had made outrageous demands that 
impinged on the captain’s command authority, he said.  Puttberg would not relinquish his 
prerogative over discipline in his own company, nor would he tolerate the Pfleger’s 
effrontery and insult.  No officer, he declared, should allow such a challenge to go 
unanswered. 
Later that same month, in Alsace, Puttberg defended his soldiers against the 
Obervogt for Reinach, who tried to capture and execute them for crimes committed in his 
jurisdictions.66  Freiburg’s victual ordinance called for Reinach, just across the Rhine to 
the south, to provide Puttberg’s company with fodder for their horses.  Puttberg and his 
men refused to content themselves with the ordinance’s provisions, however, according 
to the Obervogt.67  He claimed their quartermaster insisted the town authorities turn over 
more fodder and daily wine rations than regulations allowed.  Soldiers also demanded 
that the city fathers turn over large casks filled with their best wine so they could gift 
them to their captain, in his esteem (verehrung). 
Outright the Obervogt refused their demands and tried to send them on their way.  
Puttberg’s men, not to be deterred, threatened to return with a large party, burn Reinach 
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to the ground, and slaughter its entire citizenry unless he met their terms.68  He believed 
their threats exaggerated, at first, but soon the horsemen began to warn him through 
sudden attacks against local people.  One rider in particular, Hans Friedrich von 
Engelschal, reportedly beat, stabbed and otherwise injured four people by himself.   
Once eyewitnesses began to report more incidents to the town magistrates the 
Obervogt, finally fed up, decided to make an example of Engelschal.69  He gathered his 
own men and rode out to confront the marauders and clap Engelschal in irons.  In the 
skirmish that ensued the Reinach men managed to drive the riders away and captured 
Engelschal.  Puttberg’s men claimed the Obervogt threw his captive into a makeshift pit 
for several days without food or water. 
Puttberg refused, as before, to allow an outsider to usurp his prerogatives, and 
hastened to secure Engelschal’s freedom from Reinach’s custody.70  He sent one of his 
corporals to represent him, convey his request and retrieve Engelschal from the Obervogt.  
In his letter to Maximilian the captain said he simply wished to take the soldier into his 
own custody, weigh the plaintiffs’ grievances against him, then render punishment as 
appropriate.   
Reinach’s Obervogt, on the other hand, refused to consider the corporal’s 
demands, claiming that crimes committed by soldiers in his district fell exclusively under 
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his own jurisdiction.71  In reply Puttberg sent his company’s lieutenant to press the matter 
more forcefully, again to no avail.  Soon the Obervogt began to construct a gallows 
where he intended to hang Engelschal and any other soldiers he caught engaged in 
unlawful acts. 
In yet another escalation Puttburg rode all the way to Reinach in person to treat 
with the Obervogt and demand his man’s release.72  He met only with further resistance 
from Reinach’s officials.  League soldiers, the Obervogt explained, had terrorized local 
subjects to the point that they lived in constant alarm.  In order to ensure their safety and 
keep the roads free from banditry he had instructed them to carry their weapons at all 
times for protection.  Watchmen would toll the bells when soldiers or brigands appeared 
and, upon alarm, armed subjects would assemble to repel them.  He would treat soldiers 
no differently from common highwaymen, the Obervogt said, to be strung up along the 
roads to deter further crime. 
Puttburg denounced the Obervogt as a vicious and arrogant rogue and, in outrage, 
sent his quartermaster to demand Engelschal’s immediate release one last time.  He 
invoked the duke’s standing policy that soldiers should be investigated and punished by 
officers and commissioners alone.  Rather than simply communicate the captain’s wishes, 
however, the quartermaster threatened to kill the the Obervogt, so the official claimed, 
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and to set the entire company loose on the town should he refuse.73  Local officials 
remained defiant despite the threat and tried to send the quartermaster on his way. 
Rather than leave quietly the quartermaster rode through town with his sword 
drawn, found the Obervogt’s wife and children, and threatened to cut them down on the 
spot unless the magistrates released Engelschal at once.74  Town watchmen rushed to the 
family’s aid and managed to free them from danger.  Once they reached safety the 
Obervogt denounced Puttberg’s entire company as a band of rogues and thieves, then had 
his watchmen drive the quartermaster and his entourage from town. 
Puttberg explained to Maximilian in his letter that he now felt obliged to defend 
his and his company’s honor against the Obervogt’s insults and challenges.75  He 
gathered a large party and rode into Reinach to demand Engelschal’s release once and for 
all.  On their approach the Obervogt sounded the alarm and assembled armed subjects to 
oppose them.  Puttberg declared, undeterred, that in light of the Obervogt’s insolence he 
saw little choice but to leave a permanent garrison at Reinach to wrest victuals from the 
populace by force.  In response the Obervogt ordered his people to block all the routes in 
and out of town so the captain and his troops could not leave without having to fight their 
way through. 
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Puttberg and the Obervogt had, through a patterned escalation process, 
transformed their custody dispute over Engelschal into a minor feud over jurisdiction.  
How they resolved their final confrontation remains unclear.  In their subsequent letters 
to Maximilian both requested the duke’s permission to claim custody over the prisoner.76  
In addition the Obervogt, for his part, had asked that he be allowed to detain the captain, 
his officers and men until they had rendered due restitution to Reinach and its people.  
Maximilian made no reply, however, and given similar events elsewhere it seems 
unlikely that the Obervogt got his way. 
 
Conclusion 
Maximilian’s war councilors remained committed to his disciplinary policies despite the 
duke’s own reluctance to attempt further enforcement.  Shortly after the new year, in 
1623, they offered their views on how he might compel officers to enforce better 
regiment.77  His best hope, they felt, lay in regular reimbursement to help officers with 
their expenses.  Captains otherwise had little choice but to support their men through free 
booty.  Being finance ministers the war councilors relied largely on reports from officers, 
rather than their own experience, to arrive at their opinions.   
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Failing reimbursement, they advised, Maximilian should simply crack down on 
the troops through sterner enforcement measures.  He should order officers to keep their 
billets in enclosed, well-supervised areas where commissioners could conduct regular 
visitations.  Commissioners should also post leaflets pronouncing the duke’s ban against 
further spoliation on pain of corporal punishment.  Second, he should send each regiment 
at least one Capuchin monk to reach the soldiers’ “hearts,” persuade them to change their 
ways, and administer punishment should they persist in sinful conduct.   
Third, Maximilian should inform officers he would hold them personally 
responsible for infractions.  He would compel officers, not their men, to make restitution 
for their soldiers’ damages from their own purses.  In addition he should sanction any 
direct reprisal subjects decided to exact against those soldiers who abused them.  Lastly 
he should start to heed the grievances local authorities lodged against his army and force 
those officers responsible to make restitution. 
Maximilian largely ignored the war council’s recommendations, however.  
During his negotiations over reimbursement, investment and discipline throughout the 
spring and summer Maximilian had, by the autumn of 1622, largely given up on trying to 
enforce his earlier disciplinary policies.  He had come to realize that officers used the 
search for spoils as an opportunity not just to provide for their men, but to demonstrate 
their leadership and bolster their reputations.  They refused to tolerate any interference in 
their commands from outsiders, even other captains and colonels, and they took up the 
sword on their men’s behalf to shield them from local justice.  
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By year’s end Maximilian and his commissioners had adopted officers’ own 
tactics to avoid responsibility when faced with grievances and petitions against their 
soldiers’ conduct.  Most often they either claimed the investigation remained underway, 
the culprits could not be found, that no wrongdoing had taken place, or they ignored 
complaints altogether.  In the years after 1622 Maximilian would cede officers even 
broader prerogatives to take spoils as they desired and, eventually, grant them permission 
to use plunder in formal substitute for reimbursement. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONTRIBUTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, 1623-1626 
By the new year in 1623 Maximilian had become fully committed to his new investment 
policy.  Most officers had decided to cooperate, but many others continued to resist and, 
between 1623 and 1624, forced Maximilian to grant them nearly unchecked control over 
their commands and the army’s operations in the field.   
Maximilian guaranteed, first, that their commands would remain standing for the 
war’s duration to protect their investment.  Second, the duke promised that his 
commissioners would hold no further musters or formal recruitment drives, but instead 
entrust each unit’s welfare, management and maintenance to the colonels and captains.  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Maximilian granted his commanders explicit 
permission to take illegal spoils in substitute for his reimbursement.  He would allow 
them to plunder at will, often under the guise of contributions, without restriction or 
oversight from his administration.  In exchange Maximilian’s contractors assumed from 
him nearly all responsibility for the army’s financial upkeep for the time being.  
Maximilian and his officials would accept no resignations until the commander in 
question had found a successor to assume responsibility for his company or regiment. 
 In 1625 and 1626, however, even the most willing officers had begun to find 
outright investment far too ruinous to remain sustainable much longer.  Captains 
expressed concern that their companies had begun to fall apart.  Many resorted to lavish 
pillage to keep their men together and went to extraordinary lengths to prevent desertion.  
Late in 1624 Tilly decided to levy emergency contributions in occupied Hessen to help 
ease the burdens on League contractors.  League officers continued to struggle, however, 
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until they began to collect imperial contribution revenues, at first sporadically in late 
1625 when Wallenstein first introduced them, then more systematically after 1626.  
Contributions enabled officers to fulfill obligations to their men as they saw fit without 
having to worry about the delicate balance between legitimate maintenance and illegal 
plunder.  Imperial contributions remained the principal basis for war finance until the 
war’s conclusion in 1648 and demobilization in the early 1650s. 
 
Rejections and Warning: Pressure, Resistance and Mutiny in Anholt’s Army 
Over the winter and throughout the new spring, 1623, Anholt’s commanders continued 
their efforts to establish the League’s supremacy in Westphalia.1  Maximilian soon found, 
however, that the small cash consignments he allowed to trickle their way could no 
longer placate them.  Many rejected the payments outright as an insult and redoubled 
their demands for reimbursement.  In their hunt for spoils some officers treated their men 
to lavish pillage and took conscious example from Mansfeld, famous among soldiers for 
his piratical war economy, to shore up their reputations and resources.  Maximilian made 
sporadic attempts to discourage mischief and illegal plunder, as he always had, but he 
could offer them no relief from their burdens until Tilly occupied Hessen later that year. 
Maximilian recognized he would need more sustainable solutions beyond simply 
asking his officers to pour their private wealth endlessly into his forces.  In an effort to 
                                                                                                              
1 On the 1623 campaigns see Michael Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung. Maximilian von Bayern, Tilly und 
die Katholische Liga im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Münster: Aschendorff, 1999), 241-243; C.V. Wedgwood, 
The Thirty Years War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), 180-185; and Peter H. Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy: A 
History of the Thirty Years War, (London: Penguin, 2009), 339-344. 
     235  
secure more funds Maximilian convened the League diet at Regensburg in February, 
1623, in parallel session to the deputation Ferdinand had initiated the previous year in 
December.2  His representatives tried to make the case that League members should 
undertake more earnest efforts to contribute their fair share to the army’s upkeep. 
Shortly after the new year Maximilian faced the further prospect that he might 
need to enlarge the army yet again, as he had done each spring since the war’s outset, to 
consolidate his occupations and strengthen his field armies for new offensives.  Mansfeld 
and prince Christian had each refused Ferdinand’s clemency offers and dashed any hope 
for a negotiated peace.3  Both commanders resolved to fight on another year in 
Frederick’s cause and continued to rebuild their armies in Westphalia and Lower Saxony.  
Tilly meanwhile remained tied down in the Palatinate, encamped at bitter siege around 
Frankenthal, Frederick’s last stronghold in the region.  He could send no one north to 
help Anholt until he had taken the fortress and reduced further resistance to Maximilian’s 
occupation. 
In the meantime Lindlo tried to convince Maximilian to moderate his investment 
policy by appealing to the duke’s reputation.  He reported that Anholt’s men had begun to 
press their claims to reimbursement more forcefully than before.4  League members 
became routine targets as officers began to exact regular provisions from them, 
                                                                                                              
2 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 340. 
3 On the 1623 campaigns see Michael Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 241-243; Wedgwood, Thirty Years 
War, 180-185; and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 339-344. 
4 KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 158-159, January 18, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
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particularly Cologne’s lands in Westphalia.  In addition they dared physical threats 
against the duke’s representatives.  Lindlo described how some soldiers had tried to cut 
down commissioner Burhus in the open, and that Burhus himself had begun to suffer 
declining health during his duties.5  In January, when Maximilian sent more coin to help 
satisfy Anholt’s cavalry commanders, Lindlo told him the horsemen threw the pieces 
back in disgust, insulted at the paltry sums, and threatened to desert the army altogether.6  
Lindlo worried that the duke’s apparent parsimony constituted a slight to his officers’ 
quality and service and would undermine their future efforts to recruit more men.  
Many officers tried to bolster their reputations through lavish requisitions on their 
men’s behalf.7  De Fours, for example, became notorious among Cologne’s officials for 
his regiment’s demands upon local subjects.8  He took his headquarters in residences and 
palaces without permission, they said, confiscated their goods to support his own 
household, and let his horsemen claim billets anywhere that suited them.  His methods 
resembled those used by Wallenstein, Pechmann, Aldringen and Sprinzenstein in 
Bohemia the year before to show good support to their men. 
                                                                                                              
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Maximilian discusses with Anholt the reports he has received, KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 178, January 19, 
1623, Maximilian to Anholt. 
8 Maximilian discusses, KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 161-162, January 1, 1623, Maximilian to Anholt; KuBay ÄA 
2281 fol. 178, January 19, 1623, Maximilian to Anholt. 
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Lindlo urged Maximilian to meet his officers’ demands before they caused the 
villagers to stage a full-scale uprising against his soldiers.9  Not only did League troops 
harm the duke’s reputation when they alienated the local authorities, he said, they 
inadvertently aided Mansfeld’s and prince Christian’s clandestine recruitment efforts in 
the region.  Townspeople and villagers either fled Westphalia altogether or joined the 
rebel armies to oppose their tormentors.10  Soldiers would need better recompense if 
Maximilian expected them to stop.  Lindlo felt the duke could restore their affection for 
the House of Bavaria, lift their courage to face the enemy, and stop their plunder, if only 
he sent them what he owed before the new year’s campaign got underway. 
In deference to Lindlo’s judgment Maximilian sent another small cash convoy, 
but his token gesture only enraged his officers further, Lindlo said.11  He reported that 
they declared they would never again accept such an insult, not if the duke sent another 
hundred orders.  Some replied with more brazen abuse toward Maximilian’s 
representatives.  Horsemen burst into Burhus’ lodgings, assaulted the commissioner’s 
person and threatened to run him through unless they saw better support from their 
warlord, Lindlo said. 
                                                                                                              
9 KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 142, January 19, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
10 Lindlo’s claim, ibid. 
11 Maximilian and Lindlo discuss, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 140-141, January 30, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; 
KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 140-141, January 30, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo. 
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Lindlo warned Maximilian he had seen soldiers use similar tactics before during 
his service in Hungary in prelude to mutiny.12  By physical violence against their 
warlord’s representatives they showed that they would not tolerate their conditions much 
longer.  Lindlo further insisted that the duke’s poor support had truly cost his officers 
their reputations and credit among their men.  Commanders dare not impose better 
regiment lest they lose control entirely.  One captain had already been attacked by his 
own men and might have been killed if not for his bodyguards, Lindlo reported.13 
In addition Lindlo had heard soldiers grumble that they should take example from 
Mansfeld’s men and simply sack the Westphalian towns as needed.14  By now they posed 
such a menace that authorities throughout the region barred their gates, even against the 
colonels.  Should they decide upon general mutiny Lindlo feared they would take their 
own officers hostage, march on Bavaria itself and pillage their recompense directly from 
the duke’s own lands.  Their dereliction would bring about defeats and open the way for 
Mansfeld and prince Christian to overrun Westphalia and Cologne. 
Should Maximilian persist with his investment policy, Lindlo concluded, he 
would eventually ruin the reputation of every officer in his service.15  Lindlo himself 
claimed to have depleted his own credit merely by trying to convince the duke’s 
                                                                                                              
12 KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 136-139, January 13, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 161-163, 
January 30, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
13 Lindlo describes, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 161-163, January 30, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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commanders to cooperate.  Lindlo had staked his reputation on Maximilian’s promises, 
he said, in his efforts over the past two years to keep Anholt’s men in good devotion to 
the House of Bavaria.  Each time Maximilian failed to deliver on his obligations Lindlo’s 
standing declined, and now his good word no longer held as much weight as it once had.  
Several days prior to his report, he claimed, one of his own men had burst into his 
headquarters to confront him about recompense.  Neither he nor Anholt himself could 
keep mutiny at bay much longer, he pleaded, unless Maximilian could deliver full arrears 
to the officers under Anholt’s command, and thereby suspend his investment policy for 
the time being. 
 Maximilian might help officers recover their reputations, Lindlo suggested, by 
offering them advancement to reward their investment and service.16  Lindlo himself 
might regain his own lost esteem if the duke would only agree to award him a higher 
charge as the army’s Major General of the Infantry.  Maximilian’s favor would enhance 
Lindlo’s standing and lend his assurances more authority until he could send the army its 
full arrears. 
Should Maximilian decline his request, on the other hand, Lindlo would prefer to 
retire to his estates rather than remain with the army, he said.17  He served foremost to 
show his quality and advance his own and Maximilian’s honor and reputation, he said.  
                                                                                                              
16 Lindlo and Maximilian discuss throughout the winter, spring and into the summer, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 
136-139, January 13, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 165, February 14, 1623, Lindlo to 
Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 184-186, March 9, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 
215, June 29, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 233, August 8, 1623, Lindlo to 
Maximilian. 
17 KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 165, February 14, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
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Lately, however, the army’s deteriorated condition left little glory to be found in League 
service, and little credit to Maximilian’s name.  Lindlo would rather leave altogether than 
incur further discredit in his efforts to persuade other warriors to remain.  Other officers 
felt the same way, he claimed, and would rather resign like him than risk losing any more 
reputation than they had already done.18 
 In reply Maximilian tried to negotiate with Lindlo and Anholt’s men using the 
same strategies and inducements he had developed over the previous year.19  He told 
Lindlo to remind the colonels and captains that he expected them to show their loyalty 
and quality by supporting their own troops until he could find the funds to repay them.20  
Under no circumstances should they engage in mischief or refuse to fight the enemy 
merely to coerce him into granting their demands.  His convoys had already indulged 
them with far more money than they needed, he said, despite the challenges they faced 
getting through to far-flung garrisons and field troops.  Further efforts on their part to 
press him for reimbursement would meet with his stern displeasure. 
                                                                                                              
18 Lindlo discusses, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 165, February 14, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 
fol. 175, February 19, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
19 Negotiations proceeded throughout February, 1623, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 145-146, February 7, 1623, 
Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 148-149, February 10, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 
2260 fol. 155-157, February 11, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 165, February 14, 1623, 
Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 171-172, February 17, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 
2260 fol. 175, February 19, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 168-170, February 26, 1623, 
Maximilian to Lindlo.       
20 KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 145-146, February 7, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 155-157, 
February 11, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 168-170, February 26, 1623, Maximilian to 
Lindlo. 
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 Maximilian further hinted, for the first time, that officers might gain his tacit 
permission to support their investment through illegal spoils.  He knew they already 
allowed their men free booty outside the law, he said, and ignored their duty to punish 
infractions as he had ordered.21  Captains therefore held in their power sufficient means 
to satisfy their troops as they pleased without demanding further funds from his treasury. 
 Commanders nonetheless ignored Maximilian’s admonitions, continued to press 
for reimbursement, and broadened their plunder to include Cologne’s Westphalian 
lands.22  Maximilian conceded, once again, that he knew officers needed to let their men 
take spoils to sustain their investment, but he refused to tolerate their depredations in his 
brother the archbishop’s lands.23  Cologne’s people had provided the army with aid and 
supplies in good faith, he said, and did not deserve to have their goods, in particular their 
horses, stolen from them.  He ordered Anholt to stop the soldiers at once and hang 
anyone caught engaged in robbery. 
 In reply Anholt worried that he, too, like Lindlo, had begun to lose respect and 
credit among his officers and soldiers.24  He felt his promises would no longer carry any 
weight unless the duke delivered on his obligations.  His cavalry in particular had become 
                                                                                                              
21 Maximilian discusses, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 145-146, February 7, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay 
ÄA 2260 fol. 155-157, February 11, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 168-170, February 
26, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo. 
22 Maximilian and Lindlo discuss, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 168-170, February 26, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; 
KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 262-263, March 21, 1623, Maximilian to Anholt.. 
23 Maximilian’s orders to Anholt, KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 254-255, March 4, 1623, Maximilian to Anholt; 
KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 262-263, March 21, 1623, Maximilian to Anholt. 
24 Anholt discusses, KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 282-284, April 3, 1623, Anholt to Maximilian. 
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too outraged to resume good discipline until satisfied.  He would nonetheless summon the 
colonels and captains and remind them to keep better discipline in their regiments.   
 Many officers in Anholt’s army continued to lodge complaints throughout 1623, 
but by mid-spring most realized they would need to continue their investment if they 
hoped to participate in the summer campaign.25  In March the English garrison at 
Frankenthal surrendered the fortress, evacuated their positions, and ceded League forces 
unchallenged control in the Palatinate.  Soon therafter, in April, Tilly advanced his army 
north into Hessen and occupied the Wetterau region.26  Since the previous year Moritz of 
Hessen-Kassel, a Calvinist, had used the war’s pretext to annex lands around Marburg 
from his Catholic neighbor and rival, Hessen-Darmstadt.  On Maximilian’s orders Tilly 
guarded Marburg against further incursions by Moritz and then, in May, forced Moritz to 
begin restoring Darmstadt’s lands.   
Once Hessen had been secured both armies began to prepare their troops for the 
coming fight against Mansfeld and prince Christian in Lower Saxony.27  By late spring 
most officers had dropped their objections to Maximilian’s investment policy and began 
                                                                                                              
25 Maximilian, and Lindlo discuss, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 184-186, March 9, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 180-182, March 19, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 191, March 
21, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 204-205, May 20, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 208, May 22, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
26 On Tilly’s occupation in Hessen-Kassel see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 341. 
27 On the 1623 campaigns see Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, 241-243; Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, 
180-185; and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 339-344. 
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to work out suitable new arrangements with the duke through Lindlo.28  In March and 
April they invested what Lindlo considered tremendous sums to refit and rebuild their 
commands.  Most agreed to provide weapons, equipment, supplies, and recruitment costs 
entirely on their own account.  In the end they would rather face debt and ruin than miss 
the opportunity to fight with distinction, show their quality and further advance their 
reputations.  
 
Management and Autonomy: Maintenance, Recruitment and Succession 
Despite his successful negotiations that spring many officers continued to resist 
Maximilian’s policies long into the summer months.29  Most would gladly continue to 
support their men, they claimed, but they could no longer shoulder the costs, and they had 
begun to lose credit in the ranks.  In their own support they cited the loyalty, quality and 
good service they had continuously shown through heavy investment in their commands 
over the years.  On advice from Lindlo and his war council Maximilian plied them with 
enlarged commands, as he had done the previous year, and tried to guarantee them that 
they could keep their commands so long as they continued to invest.  Rather than conduct 
musters, inspections or recruitment drives he would, over time, simply entrust each 
                                                                                                              
28 Lindlo worked out the new arrangements with Maximilian from March through July, 1623, KuBay ÄA 
2260 fol. 184-186, March 9, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 191, March 21, 1623, 
Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 204-205, May 20, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 
2260 fol. 229-230, July 21, 1623, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
29 Lindlo communicates his interactions with other officers to Anholt, and Maximilian mentions them later 
in the year, KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 336-337, June 16, 1623, Lindlo to Anholt; KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 342-343, 
June 17, 1623, Lindlo to Anholt; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 240-242, December 15, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo. 
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company’s welfare and maintenance to the responsible captains and colonels, and thereby 
allow them greater autonomy in how they managed their men. 
 Maximilian and his councilors first began to consider granting commanders 
greater explicit autonomy as they debated how to enlarge the army over the winter 
without sparking renewed crisis.30  Councilors felt Maximilian should refrain from 
raising new regiments or engaging additional colonels.  He should instead allow long-
serving colonels to add new companies to their regiments and let captains recruit men for 
their companies at their own discretion.  Under no circumstances should he try again to 
reform or disband anyone’s command, as he had done in Bohemia, because doing so 
would only alienate his officers and discourage their investment. 
 In order to reduce their expenses Maximilian should take steps to spare his 
officers the competition and hostilities that had plagued their recruitment efforts in years 
past, councilors felt.31  He should make arrangements for captains recruit in Bavaria, the 
Palatinate, Upper Austria, and other regions under Maximilian’s secure control, where 
enemy parties could not so easily harass them.  Officers could also, for the same reasons, 
conduct recruitment in lands that belonged to prominent League members.  Councilors 
suggested in particular the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg in Franconia as well as 
the electorate-archbishoprics of Mainz and Trier in the Rhineland. 
                                                                                                              
30 KuBay ÄA 2251 f 158-165, January 3, 1623, Herliberg and Eisenreich to Maximilian; KuBay ÄA 2251 f 
181-183, April 3, 1623, Kriegsrat to Maximilian. 
31 Ibid. 
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Under no circumstances, however, should Maximilian continue to ignore wanton 
plunder simply to encourage further investment, his councilors felt.32  They urged him to 
crack down on the increasing tendency toward rampage and misconduct his armies had 
demonstrated over the past year.  Colonels and captains should adhere more closely to the 
articles of war, they said, to show their devotion to Maximilian and to spare his 
reputation throughout the empire.  Should the duke allow them to plunder with impunity 
his mandates would lose their force and his commanders would feel free to disrespect his 
orders at will.33  Maximilian largely ignored the latter recommendation, however, 
because he recognized that officers would continue to exact pillage as the price for their 
support. 
 Maximilian decided, in addition, to reorganize his war council one last time to 
reflect the greater role war finance now played in his administration and statecraft.34  He 
removed the council from the Kofkammer’s chambers and elevated its board into a new 
state department parallel to the Hofrat and Kofkammer.  Maximilian left the War 
Council’s duties unchanged, but he granted its members their own chambers, plus a new 
War Chancery (Kriegskanzlei) to complement the General Chancery in the field, and 
                                                                                                              
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 On reforms see Cordula Kapser, Die bayerische Kriegsorganisation in der zweiten Hälfte des 
Dreißigjährigen Krieges, 1635-1648/49 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1997), 101-108; Kaiser, Politik und 
Kriegführung, 15-61; Reinhard Heydenreuter, Der landesherrliche Hofrat unter Herzog und Kurfürst 
Maximilian I. von Bayern (1598-1651)(Munich: Beck, 1981), 178; August Damboer, Die Krise des 
Söldner-Kapitalismus in Bayern unter Kurfürst Maximilian I. insbesondere in der Zeit des dreißigjährigen 
Krieges.  Eine soziologiesche Studie (Munich, 1921), and Dieter Albrecht, Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573-
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their own bookkeeper’s vault (Hauptbuchhalterei) to register and store important 
documents and records.  Councilors from the Hofkammer remained on the board, but its 
presidency now fell to a delegate from the Hofrat, rather than the Hofkammer president. 
 Officers who continued to resist often asked Lindlo and Anholt to intercede with 
Maximilian on their behalf.  Most tended to claim that the duke’s policies had insulted 
them and failed, despite his concessions, to reward the good service they had rendered.  
De Fours, for example, told Anholt his men were at his throat for better support and 
demanded to know why Maximilian had treated their colonel with such disfavor.35  One 
captain, Fontinelli, told Lindlo his men would refuse to fight until Maximilian sent him 
some cash.36  
 In the end, however, de Fours and Fontinelli both dropped their objections as 
further evidence, they claimed, for their loyalty and devotion to Maximilian.37  Both took 
pains to emphasize the great effort they had undertaken to persuade their men to 
cooperate and make do with their present maintenance.  Fontinelli described how he had 
read the duke’s orders aloud to his men several times until, despite repeated outcries in 
protest, his men finally agreed to subside.38 
                                                                                                              
35 KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 333-334, June 15, 1623, De Fours to Anholt. 
36 KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 338, June 15, 1623, Fontinelli to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 339, June 16, 1623, 
Fontinelli to Lindlo. 
37 KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 333-334, June 15, 1623, De Fours to Anholt; KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 338, June 15, 
1623, Fontinelli to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 339, June 16, 1623, Fontinelli to Lindlo. 
38 KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 339, June 16, 1623, Fontinelli to Lindlo. 
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 Maximilian refused, in addition, to consider holding further musters or 
recruitment drives for those officers who sought to refit their commands.39  Many of 
these officers sought to avoid further investment and urged the duke to let them muster 
their regiments so they could claim reimbursement and undergo formal accounting by 
commissioners.  Maximilian, on the other hand, understood that his investing 
commanders would prefer full discretion in decisions on how to manage and maintain 
their own men.  He had commissioner Burhus explain to Anholt’s men that the duke 
would hold no musters or recruitment drives until further notice.40  Lindlo, on witnessing 
their reaction, feared his own men might assault him again, he said.  
 Several officers reacted as Lindlo had predicted and tried to resign from League 
service altogether.  In Lindlo’s own regiment two captains, Jonas Walon and Caspar de 
Rogier, asked his permission for severance.41  He granted their requests on his own 
authority, made out their passports and then, without Maximilian’s authorization, issued 
them bills to be discharged at the pay office for their arrears.  He later justified his 
decision on grounds that he considered both men well-known, capable warriors with 
good reputations in the army. 
                                                                                                              
39 Lindlo discusses the duke’s policy with Anholt, KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 336-337, June 16, 1623, Lindlo to 
Anholt; KuBay ÄA 2281 fol. 342-343, June 17, 1623, Lindlo to Anholt. 
40 Lindlo discusses Burhus’ interactions with Anholt’s men, ibid. 
41 Maximilian discusses with Lindlo and receives petitions from Walon and Rogier, KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 
240-242, December 15, 1623, Maximilian to Lindlo; KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 246-247, 1623, Supplication 
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 Maximilian’s paymasters rejected their applications, however, and disregarded the 
bills Lindlo had issued.42  Their instructions stated that no officers should be permitted to 
resign or receive arrears without Maximilian’s direct approval.  In effect they would 
remain stuck in service at the duke’s pleasure indefinitely unless they gave up their 
claims on the treasury.  In outrage Walon and Rogier threatened that they would return to 
Lindlo’s headquarters and wring their cash from him by force unless they received their 
due, the paymasters said.43  Their words suggest that Lindlo and Anholt had not 
exaggerated when the claimed their own reputations had suffered when Maximilian failed 
to deliver reimbursement.  
 Maximilian informed Lindlo about their threats and instructed him to take both 
captains into custody should they confront him.44  He expressed concern that reputable 
officers like Walon and Rogier might undermine his policies if they encouraged others to 
follow their examples.  In the future, Maximilian warned, Lindlo should never grant 
anyone permission to formally resign without his direct approval.  Officers would remain 
in service unless they found successors who could assume command and, with it, 
financial responsibility for their companies and regiments. 
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 In the meantime Walon and Rogier submitted two joint petitions to make their 
case for why they deserved recompense for their service.45  Both had proven themselves 
loyal throughout the war, they said, and remained affectionate toward the House of 
Bavaria despite the poor recompense they had so far received.  League service had 
afforded them plentiful opportunities to show their quality in the many victories 
Maximilian’s armies had won.  Walon and Rogier had each earned praise from their 
commanders and fame across the army for their conduct.  Each would gladly serve until 
the war’s conclusion to further advance their reputations. 
 In the past few months, however, they found themselves unable to support their 
men because their expenses had nearly ruined them, they said.46  Unless they received 
some reimbursement they could no longer afford to offer reputable service and would 
rather retire to their new estates in Bohemia than incur disrepute.  Once they had put their 
finances in order they would gladly return to take up arms in League service again.  
Should the duke refuse them, on the other hand, they would spread word throughout the 
army that Maximilian seldom offered his warriors due recompense except at his own 
convenience.   
Walon and Rogier’s petitions received no reply, however, and in time they seem 
to have dropped their complaints without result.  In the meantime Maximilian, like his 
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officers, leveraged his own service as imperial commissioner to exact his due rewards 
from emperor Ferdinand.  Ferdinand agreed to transfer the entire Palatinate, both Upper 
and Lower, from Frederick to Maximilian for the duke’s entire lifetime.47  Maximilian 
now sought only one final boon, hereditary rights to the Palatine lands and electoral title, 
to complete his dynastic aims. 
Revenues from his new lands would help Maximilian fuel the army with more 
coin, but not enough to relax his investment policy.  He obtained further help in July, 
1623, when the League diet adjourned and agreed to grant him additional funds to 
maintain his troops.48 Maximilian could use their money to provide his colonels and 
captains some welcome relief, if it ever materialized, but the estates had only granted him 
enough for 15,000 men, about half the ideal strength for one field army.  With two field 
armies and countless garrisons from Austria to Westphalia Maximilian and his officers 
would continue to fund the army on their own.      
 
Contributions in Hessen: Toward lasting Solutions 
Early that summer, in June, Tilly moved his troops into northern Hessen and prepared to 
confront prince Christian and Mansfeld in Lower Saxony.49  Both Tilly and Maximilian’s 
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councilors pressed the duke to enlarge his army yet again, twice in one year, to support 
the planned invasion.  Maximilian had not yet concluded negotiations over how to 
support the troops already under arms, however, and could not countenance another 
increase.  In the meantime many officers had begun to threaten mutiny all over again, not 
only in the field armies, but also in the occupation garrisons.  Rather than request 
reimbursement this time, however, they asked for further command autonomy and, in 
particular, Maximilian’s permission to take unrestricted plunder during their campaigns.  
Tilly spared Maximilian from having to make that concession, at least for the time being, 
when he decided to levy emergency contributions in occupied Hessen to help officers 
maintain their men. 
 In the war’s earlier years the Lower Saxon estates, like most others in the empire, 
had tried to avoid direct involvement in the conflict, both to spare their lands its ravages 
and to avoid political consequences.50  Rather than take steps to halt prince Christian’s 
underground recruitment efforts, their governments allowed him to amass his new army 
in Halberstadt and Wolfenbüttel unhindered.  In the emperor’s view, however, their 
inaction bordered on open support for Frederick’s cause.  His representatives pressured 
them to crack down on Christian’s recruitment and thereby show their commitment to 
uphold the public peace. 
 Rather than take sides, however, the Lower Saxons opted for armed neutrality 
instead.  Their circle diet invoked the right to engage its own army and guard member 
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lands against all incursions by any belligerent forces, whether Maximilian’s or 
Frederick’s.  By vote they decided to commission prince Christian himself as their 
commander and took his army on as their own.  Their move gave Christian’s recruitment 
a legal pretext and thereby absolved the Lower Saxons from any insinuation that they had 
rendered aid to Frederick, at least in theory.   
Ferdinand, on the other hand, took their vote for open defiance.  In June, 1623, he 
issued them an ultimatum.51  Unless they turned Christian over to accept the emperor’s 
clemency Tilly would invade the Lower Saxon circle and take him into custody by force.  
Once Ferdinand issued his ultimatum both Tilly and Christian advanced their troops into 
the borderlands between Hessen and Lower Saxony and commenced to grapple 
throughout the summer.   
Shortly before his campaign Tilly impressed upon Maximilian how few troops he 
could marshal to fight in the field.52  Between garrisons and detachments he could scrape 
together only 18,000 men before he risked weakening the League’s occupation forces.  
He might be able to hold Christian on the border, but if he wanted to carry out the 
planned invasion into Lower Saxony he would need more fighters.  Officers would gladly 
take on more men, he added, but they could scarcely afford the added expense.  He 
requested, as he had done in 1622, that Maximilian send more coin to help his officers 
with their recruitment and maintenance. 
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 Maximilian denied Tilly’s request, however, on grounds that he could not afford 
to send anything more from the war chests, and left him to make do with the troops 
available for the time being.53  By August Tilly had nonetheless managed to gain the 
upper hand, defeated Christian in battle, and forced Mansfeld to retreat back into East 
Frisia, where he fortified the frontier against repeated League assaults.  In late August 
Tilly encamped his troops to blockade the region and tried to break through Mansfeld’s 
lines throughout the fall and winter.54 
 In the meantime League soldiers once again began to threaten mutiny, not just in 
the field armies, as before, but in the garrisons as well.  Tilly got reports from Heidelberg, 
for example, that troops there had begun to compare Maximilian unfavorably with 
Mansfeld.55  Officials told him the Statthalter’s men had gone about in the streets and 
shouted “Long live Mansfeld!” to all who would hear.  Their cries sent a message similar 
to the one Lindlo had reported among Anholt’s men, namely that soldiers could find 
better maintenance under Mansfeld, who allowed them to live freely from the land.   
Tilly denounced their conduct as insolent, injurious toward the duke, against all 
“reputation, justice, honor, propriety and military discipline,” (wider alle Reputation, 
Recht, Ehrbare, Billichkeit, und alle Kriegsdisciplin) and a threat to the entire army’s 
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honor and renown.56  He ordered the commissioners and officers to render exemplary 
punishment to any soldiers caught praising Mansfeld. 
 Maximilian and Tilly both realized, however, that League officers, having fought 
another campaign without reimbursement, now stood in desperate need for relief.  Over 
the summer Ferdinand had revoked the mint consortium’s license and restored the 
Reichstaler’s silver content to pre-1622 purities.57  Most officers had nonetheless counted 
on the planned invasion into Lower Saxony to provide them with opportunities to 
replenish their coffers through spoils.  Now that they had defeated prince Christian their 
next chance might not come anytime soon. 
Moritz of Hessen-Kassel, on the other hand, had already forfeited his neutrality 
when he tried to take Marburg from Darmstadt.58  League troops could, in theory, 
establish control over his principality and allow Moritz to govern under duress while they 
used his lands to support their further campaigns.  Hessen would provide an ideal 
regional base with steady billets, supplies and secure access into both Westphalia and 
Lower Saxony. In October Maximilian ordered Tilly to move detachments into Hessen-
Kassel, force Moritz to disarm, and make arrangements for officials and troops to extract 
resources from his people.  
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Once Tilly placed Hessen under his control he decided to implement emergency 
contribution levies, for the first time, to help officers support their troops.59  In principle 
Maximilian and the League army had never deviated from those laws laid out in the 1570 
Speyer articles that governed the use of military power to uphold the empire’s 
constitution.  Regulations entitled billeted troops to a small Servis from their lodgers, 
usually candles, salt, butter, and other necessaries, but the rest they should pay for in coin 
according to prices fixed under the prearranged victual ordinance.60  Commanders could 
also, when desperate for supplies, levy legal contributions as an extraordinary tax.  
Headquarters would issue requisition notices to local magistrates who would then collect 
the specified goods for the army.  In each instance the affected circle’s estates would 
appoint a commissioner to supervise the process on the diet’s behalf. 
In Hessen, Tilly’s contribution mandates would call, in theory, for Moritz’s own 
officials to collect cash and supplies for League troops on demand.  In practice, however, 
League troops in billets and garrisons forced towns and local subjects to provide 
contributions directly rather than rely on Kassel’s administration.61  In most cases 
contributions simply gave officers a legal pretext for extortion and pillage, and did little 
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to alter the army’s usual methods.  Contributions transformed plunder into an 
extraordinary tax and thereby gave Maximilian a constitutional umbrella to allow his 
army to live from the land without further embarassment or loss to his reputation.  Tilly’s 
measures in Hessen helped lay the groundwork for the financial system Wallenstein 
would develop two years later at Halberstadt. 
 
Final Negotiations: Bargains of 1624 
In 1624 Maximilian concluded the last major rounds of negotiation he would undertake 
with his commanders during the 1620s.  In talks at Kronau over the winter and spring, 
where the duke tried, one final time, to disband or reform several regiments, he 
formalized the new autonomy in command he had granted his officers, incrementally, 
during the 1622 and 1623 campaigns.62  In exchange for their unfaltering investment he 
guaranteed that he would allow them to keep their commands as long as they wished, to 
oversee and direct as they saw fit, without interference from his administration.  Should 
an officer wish to retire from service he must pass financial responsibility on to his 
successor so his company or regiment could remain standing.  Last, and most 
importantly, he finally conceded them explicit permission to recoup their costs through 
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illegal spoils in substitute for his own direct reimbursement.  Dissenting officers launched 
their last major attempt to coerce reimbursement during the fall, but thereafter 
Maximilian seems to have ignored any further petitions or complaint from them.   
 Maximilian initiated his final talks during the winter when he decided to reform 
several weakened cavalry regiments and consolidate them into stronger commands. He 
appointed Herberstorff, Herliberg and del Maestro to form his disbandment commission 
and, this time, restricted talks to only five colonels, Lindlo, de Fours, del Maestro, Grana 
and Pappenheim.63  Each stood among the duke’s earliest investors and had, since at least 
1622, convinced their officers to support their companies on their own accounts.  Given 
their past cooperation he likely hoped they might hear his proposals out rather than drag 
his commissioners through extended grievances or mutinies.  He invited the affected 
colonels, captains and soldiers’ delegates to the table for secret talks to be held with his 
commission at Kronau. 
 Maximilian tried, first, to establish some agreement among the officers on how 
well he had rewarded their service thus far.64  He suggested in his first proposal that they 
had more than made up for his arrears in the illegal plunder and requisitions they had 
taken from neutral and even League estates.  Maximilian had tolerated their depredations 
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to ensure they could support their soldiers, he said, and in so doing had discharged his 
obligations toward them.  He proposed, in effect, that officers should take their license to 
plunder in more or less direct substitute for his own reimbursement.  Should they compel 
him to deliver any further back pay he would issue not coin, but rather promissory notes 
redeemable at Frankfurt within three years, to ease the pressure on his treasury. 
 In their counter-reply Maximilian’s officers insisted that spoils had nowhere near 
covered their expenses or satisfied their men.65  Requisitions had simply kept them from 
ruin and prevented desertion among the troops.  Should they attempt to reform their 
companies on Maximilian’s terms their troops would threaten mutiny all over again and 
likely carry it out.  Herberstorff and Herliberg indicated to Maximilian that officers 
feared, as before, that reformations would damage their credit and cause their men to lose 
faith in their leadership.  They could not comply without alienating their officers and 
soldiers.  
 Herberstorff reiterated to them that Maximilian had allowed them to despoil entire 
cities and regions far in excess to what he owed them in reimbursement and back pay.66 
They had already earned great favor, praise and fame, he said, for the support they had 
provided for their troops so far.  He suggested they could advance their reputations yet 
further if they covered Maximilian’s arrears and agreed to the reformation he had 
proposed.  Should they allow further objections or indulge mutiny, on the other hand, 
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they could only bring discredit upon themselves, not to mention the duke and indeed the 
entire army.   
 Colonels and captains remained unpersuaded, however.  Negotiations continued 
through into spring, 1624, without accord or resolution.67  Maximilian’s armies 
meanwhile spent the year trying to consolidate their gains in Hessen, Westphalia, both 
Palatinates and Upper Austria.  In the months since their victories many of the League’s 
allies and leaders had unfolded cautious pro-Catholic policies and nascent counter-
reformations whose full extent became apparent only by mid-1624.68  Soon the duke’s 
occupation troops began to face increasingly bitter insurrection movements.  In the 
meantime Frederick managed to bring the kings of England and Denmark into talks at the 
Hague to form a new alliance to continue his war effort.69 
 In light of possible intervention from abroad and ongoing threats from 
insurrections Maximilian’s councilors cautioned him against his efforts to negotiate 
reformations at Kronau.  Lindlo, for his part, urged Maximilian to enlarge the army yet 
again, perhaps in an effort to spare his own regiment from being reformed.70  He offered 
reasons similar to those Tilly had given the previous summer, namely that Maximilian 
lacked enough free men to form strong field armies.   
                                                                                                              
67 Maximilian, Herberstorff and Herliberg discuss, ibid. 
68 On such policies see Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, 163-180; and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 349-361. 
69 On diplomacy see Albrecht, Maximilian I, 641-662; Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, 180-185; and Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy, 339-344. 
70 KuBay ÄA 2260 fol. 297-299, 1624, Lindlo to Maximilian. 
     260  
 In addition, however, Lindlo argued that Maximilian had kept too small an army 
to manage his occupations and had, in consequence, placed his reputation at risk.71  He 
observed, first, that the duke’s present garrisons had too few men to cover important 
roads, bridges, passes, villages, towns, and other places.  Soldiers had become exhausted, 
stretched thin, and and their apparent weakness had emboldened the duke’s enemies to 
rise against them.  Partisans cost Maximilian good soldiers when they ambushed 
convoys, recruiters, patrols, pickets, and billets, and they cost him resources when they 
captured wagons, draft animals, weapons, munitions, and cannon, not to mention chests 
filled with coin intended for their captains.  Rebel successes opened Maximilian and his 
warriors to ridicule, Lindlo said, because they could not keep the peace, and thereby 
undermined the duke’s rule. 
 Lindlo proposed that Maximilian strengthen his garrisons by allowing officers to 
fill out and expand their companies and regiments.72  Maximilian should maintain 
standing commands not only to reward investment, but to keep veteran soldiers in 
service, who could pass on their experience and training to new recruits.  His efforts to 
reform and consolidate regiments, as he was trying to do with Lindlo and the other 
colonels at Kronau would, in Lindlo’s view, prove counterproductive. 
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 In the end Maximilian decided to conclude his negotiations at Kronau by keeping 
all five regiments in service.73  Colonels and captains kept their commands, as they had 
wanted, and the duke held no further reformations or disbandments until the war’s 
conclusion, except upon the colonel’s request.  Maximilian in turn refused to accept 
resignations unless the interested officers had already made their own financial 
agreements for the succession.   
In early 1624, for example, colonel Sprinzenstein decided he wished to resign 
from League service and pass his regiment on to his colonel-lieutenant, captain Gottfried 
Hübner.  In the spring and summer Maximilian entered negotiations with Hübner to take 
over responsibility for his patron’s command.74  In Hübner’s final contract Maximilian 
included specific terms, for perhaps the first time, that held Hübner responsible for 
covering the regiment’s upkeep costs.  Once he accepted Maximilian’s commission 
Hübner could no longer complain that the duke had reneged on his obligation to 
reimburse him. 
Maximilian’s new arrangement remained precarious, however, because it did little 
to ease the pressure on his officers, who continued to face the same struggles as before.  
In Westphalia, for example, Anholt’s men claimed they could not wrest enough wealth or 
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goods from the exhausted local economy to cover their needs.75  In the fall they began the 
army’s last major round of negotiations over reimbursement with Maximilian.  Once 
again they stepped up their exactions in Cologne’s lands to press their demands. 
Maximilian rebuked Anholt and ordered him to undertake more earnest efforts to 
stop his men in Cologne.76  He remained determined, as before, to prevent plunder in 
lands under the League’s protection.  In reply Anholt protested that Maximilian’s rebuke 
deeply wounded his honor.77  He had spared no effort, he said, to prevent soldiers under 
his command from inflicting harm on Cologne’s lands, at great cost to his own good 
name and reputation among his men.  His diligence had caused his own men to hate him, 
he claimed, and placed him in danger to life and limb, all on the duke’s behalf.  One last 
time he urged Maximilian to send more cash.  Given the resistance they faced among the 
locals in Westphalia only direct support could help them, he said. 
Anholt’s colonels and captains, too, gathered at headquarters and drew up their 
own petition to add to his reply.78  They had abided by the duke’s investment policy long 
enough, they said, and could no longer support the troops on their own.  Many had served 
longer than four years without any reimbursement whatsoever and, in their present 
condition, could not prepare their troops to withstand the coming winter.  In order to 
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make their case they selected captain Johann Wilhelm zu Hunolstein from among their 
number to seek an audience with Maximilian and present the document in person.   
Maximilian made no reply, however, and seems to have ignored any further 
petitions or objections officers raised against his policies after that fall.  By mid-1624 
Maximilian and his officers had established clear routines to cope with the army’s 
support costs that would last throughout the war.  In exchange for their investment 
Maximilian would allow commanders to keep their men in service, manage them as they 
saw fit, and recoup their costs through spoils, sometimes in the guise of contributions.  
Regiments and companies would remain standing as officers passed them on to their 
successors upon retirement.  Officers still struggled to meet the financial burdens, 
however, a problem they could not fully solve until Wallenstein introduced imperial 
contributions. 
 
Imperial Contributions: Legality, Legitimacy and Pretext for Plunder  
During the 1625 campaign League officers continued to weather heavy expenses with 
only spoils, extortion and financial connections to fall back on for relief.  Campaigns 
against Denmark’s forces in Lower Saxony did provide them better opportunities to 
extract resources from the populace, but their actions remained illegal until Wallenstein 
introduced imperial contributions late that fall.  By winter, 1626, after the imperials had 
used contributions for one full year, League commanders began to claim them as well to 
lend their plunder a legitimate, constitutional pretext.  Contributions enabled officers to 
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fulfill obligations to their men as they saw fit without having to worry about the delicate 
balance between legitimate maintenance and illicit plunder.   
Late that spring League officers received their long-awaited chance to invade 
Lower Saxony.79  In May the Lower Saxon estates voted king Christian of Denmark to 
replace the defeated prince Christian as their circle’s commissioner.  King Christian, in 
his capacity as duke of Holstein, enjoyed a prominent seat on the circle diet and, through 
his intervention, hoped to preserve and strengthen his dynasty’s influence in the empire’s 
northern reaches.   
Ferdinand, on the other hand, denounced king Christian’s election as illegitimate.  
Christian, openly allied to Frederick at the Hague, clearly intended to advance the 
Palatine cause and prolong the war, not defend Lower Saxony against incursions.80  In 
Ferdinand’s view the circle diet’s decision belied their pretense of neutrality and 
demonstrated that they harbored no intention to help him restore the public peace.  He 
told Maximilian to ready Tilly’s army, cross into Lower Saxony at once, and prevent 
Christian from establishing strong positions in the region.  In June Christian’s army 
marched from Holstein and, with support from Mansfeld’s volunteers from across the 
channel, grappled with Tilly in Lower Saxony throughout the summer and fall.81 
                                                                                                              
79 On the 1625 campaigns see Barudio, Teutsche Krieg, 1618-1648, 267-290; Wedgwood, Thirty Years 
War, 119-213; and Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, vol.1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 583-593. 
80 See Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 387-391. 
81 On the 1625 campaigns see Barudio, Teutsche Krieg, 1618-1648, 267-290; Wedgwood, Thirty Years 
War, 119-213; and Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, vol.1, 583-593. 
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Denmark’s involvement in Lower Saxony heightened constitutional debates over 
how, precisely, the emperor should expect the imperial estates to contribute to his 
military efforts.82  Ferdinand took the position that they should render him active 
assistance to defend the realm and suppress peace-breakers.  Rulers could help either 
through direct action, like Maximilian, or through taxes to support Ferdinand’s own 
army.  Ferdinand had until now funded imperial troops solely from his own domains, 
more as a Habsburg force than as an imperial one, and could not pursue his war effort 
without deference to interested parties like the League.  Neutrals like the Lower Saxons, 
on the other hand, pointed out that Ferdinand had undertaken his wars unilaterally 
without the imperial diet’s counsel or consent.  He could not expect them to vote 
contribution taxes unless he met them halfway and offered concessions on his more 
disputed policies. 
In the meantime Ferdinand continued to seek other, more autonomous means to 
expand his army, ones that required no vote in the diet.  Since the previous spring his 
governor in Bohemia, Wallenstein, had forwarded offers to raise an entire field army for 
imperial service on his own account.83  He would pay every regiment’s recruitment and 
muster expenses from his own purse at no cost to the emperor.  Further outlays on 
campaign he would record as loans to the emperor against future reimbursement.  
                                                                                                              
82 On constitutional questions see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 407-409, 454-458. 
83 See Golo Mann, Wallenstein, His Life Narrated (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 172-181, 
253-277. 
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Wallenstein, already an imperial duke, could, in principle, perform the same military role 
Maximilian had done, but without the same political leverage. 
In June Ferdinand accepted Wallenstein’s offer and authorized him to raise 
25,000 troops.84 Once he began to gather recruits, however, Wallenstein found, like 
Maximilian’s officers, that the costs far outstripped his own private means.  By 
September when he marched up the Elbe and drove Danish garrisons from Magdeburg 
and Halberstadt he had gathered only 16,000 men.  In November he established his 
headquarters at Halberstadt and tried at once to recruit the other 9,000 men.  Ferdinand 
had failed to deliver the expected funds, however, so Wallenstein, low on resources, 
would need to devise new methods to raise funds. 
In an effort to cover his costs Wallenstein began to issue contribution ordinances 
similar to those Tilly had introduced in Hessen two years before.85  His first, the 
Halberstadt Ordinance, took effect later that November, with more to follow over the 
years.  Rather than ask for goods in kind, however, Wallenstein required local officials to 
deliver cash directly to his colonels to cover their debts and expenses.  Should the 
authorities fail to deliver on their quotas, the Halberstadt Ordinance authorized colonels 
to collect them directly from their lodging communities by force.  In effect the ordinance 
superseded the 1570 billet regulations and reclassified plunder as contributions in explicit 
                                                                                                              
84 See Geoff Mortimer, Wallenstein: The Enigma of the Thirty Years War (New York: Palgrave, 2010), 75-
81; and Mann, Wallenstein, 253-277. 
85 On Wallenstein’s contribution ordinances see Moriz Ritter, “Das Kontributionsystem Wallensteins.” 
Historische Zeitschrift 90 (1903): 193-249; and Redlich, “Contributions.” 
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terms.  Officers in Ferdinand’s army could now extort and confiscate treasure from local 
people under full color of law. 
In subsequent months Wallenstein broadened his army’s cash contributions into 
an impost tax levied directly on the imperial estates, one that required no consent from 
the diet.86  Rather than ask Ferdinand to obtain their votes in assembly he would instead 
negotiate Salva Guardia contracts with them separately, one by one.  Local rulers agreed 
to support specific regiments or companies with cash installments and commanders, in 
exchange, would protect them from further impositions.  Should the authorities default, 
as usually happened, commanders would use their troops to collect their taxes directly on 
the emperor’s behalf. 
In principle Ferdinand still bore sole responsibility to fund the army’s expenses 
through his treasury.  Contributions simply allowed officers to function, in essence, as tax 
farmers, licensed to collect those revenues earmarked to service their commands.87  
Colonels sent small detachments to enforce Salva Guardia terms in those regions 
assigned to support their regiments.  Soldiers would billet with their hosts, keep the 
peace, and supervise local officials to make sure the required cash quotas reached their 
regiments in the field.   
                                                                                                              
86 See Mann, Wallenstein, 278-330; Mortimer, “War by Contract,”; Ronald G. Asch The Thirty Years War: 
The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 88-90; and Wilson, 
Europe’s Tragedy, 391-406. 
87 See Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European 
Economic and Social History, vol.1 (Wiesbaden: F.Steiner, 1964), 239-270; and Wilson, Europe’s 
Tragedy, 391-406;  
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 Contribution revenues, being in theory predictable, allowed Wallenstein to 
develop an intricate credit network that could guarantee his officers ready cash at all 
times.88  Once he negotiated contract terms with potential colonels he would, first, lend 
them startup funds from his own purse to cover their recruitment costs prior to muster.  
Officers would begin to collect the regiment’s quota from their lodgers at muster, per the 
Halberstadt Ordinance, then deliver them to Wallenstein to repay his loans.   
Wallenstein in turn borrowed from private financiers against future contribution 
revenues to ensure he had enough cash on hand to offer advances to the colonels.  Should 
the troops come up short on their collections, bankers offered Wallenstein bridging loans 
secured against earmarked proceeds from specific regions.  In principle Wallenstein’s 
advances to the colonels functioned as loans to the emperor, reimbursed as they were 
from future tax revenues.  Colonels, for their part, could fund commands on their own 
account without having to spend one penny from their own private wealth, provided they 
could squeeze enough contributions from the subjects. 
In three months Wallenstein’s “contribution system,” as historians term the 
method, allowed him to enlarge the army from 16,000 men in November, 1625, to 45,000 
in March, 1626.89  His need for garrisoned collectors prompted his oft-quoted comment 
that he could support an army of 100,000, but not 30,000.  By December, 1626, he had 
nearly doubled the army again to 70,000 troops. 
                                                                                                              
88 See Mortimer, “War by Contract,”; and Mann, Wallenstein, 278-330. 
89 See Asch, Thirty Years War, 88-90; Mann, Wallenstein, 278-330; and Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 391-
406. 
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Wallenstein’s system provoked outrage among the imperial estates.  They felt 
taxes levied by the army abrogated their right to consent by vote in the diet.90  
Ferdinand’s unilateral actions and his new army stoked fears that the Habsburgs would 
use the war to consolidate monarchical power and trample their privileges.  Neutrals in 
particular insisted that only those rulers who had risen in open defiance to the emperor 
should bear the war’s costs, not the emperor’s loyal supporters.  Maximilian, too, added 
his own voice in protest, worried he might lose his military leverage before he could 
sway Ferdinand to make his new electoral title and lands hereditary. 
In winter 1626-1627, however, Maximilian’s own commanders began to claim 
contributions alongside imperial troops in an effort to relieve their arrears.91  Leaguists 
held no legal standing to collect the impost, but in principle Ferdinand’s unpaid debt to 
Maximilian translated into an unpaid debt to them, Maximilian’s warriors, who had 
fought in the emperor’s cause without recompense for many years.  Maximilian’s service 
as imperial commissioner placed League contractors in a position to claim that they, too, 
served the emperor under constitutional authority and were entitled to contributions just 
like imperial troops. 
Wallenstein’s system enabled both League and imperial soldiers to harvest 
resources from across the empire in regions disengaged from the wider war, untouched as 
yet by the fighting.  In the campaigns from 1626 through 1630 both armies fought 
                                                                                                              
90 On political ramifications see Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 407-409, 454-458. 
91 See Redlich, German Military Enterpriser, 359-364; and his “Contributions.” 
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combined, and although they remained distinct, both benefited from the same 
contribution apparatus.  Imperial contributions remained the principal basis for war 
finance until the war’s conclusion in 1648 and demobilization in the early 1650s. 
 
Material Bonds: Reputation, Desertion and the Preservation of Followings 
In winter 1626 League commanders embraced imperial contributions as the best solution 
to an investment policy they claimed had become too ruinous to remain sustainable.  
Earlier that year several captains expressed concern that they could no longer keep their 
men together and outlined why they felt their companies had begun to fall apart.92  Their 
letters illustrate the extreme lengths they employed to show they would not tolerate 
desertion, and they cast light on some of the means officers used, beyond maintenance 
and plunder, to build credit among their soldiers. 
 In winter 1626, shortly after the new year, captain Tobias Übele wrote 
Maximilian to despair his company’s deteriorated condition and his own reduced 
reputation.93  In earlier years, he said, he had to spend several days at every inn on his 
recruitment tours, because so many good candidates lined up for a place at his table.  He 
and his men could scarcely decide who to take with them to the muster tryouts and who 
to leave behind.  In recent times, however, his company remained at less than half 
strength.  No candidates showed up to sign on with him anymore, and many men had 
                                                                                                              
92 Captains discussed in this section, KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 140-141, Jan 11, 1626, Übele to Maximilian; 
KuBay ÄA 2261 fol. 108-110, 1626, Sparl to Blarer. 
93 KuBay ÄA 2229 fol. 140-141, Jan 11, 1626, Übele to Maximilian.  
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begun to desert while on watch or out on patrol.  He feared his command might soon 
waste away entirely. 
 Übele’s lament reflected concerns widely shared among captains that they could 
not hold their companies together through investment forever.  His men had served the 
duke with body, estate, and blood, Übele said, but over the last few years they had begun 
to lose hope he would ever reward them.94  Übele himself harbored no doubt that 
Maximilian would unfailingly help his men in their hour of need, he professed, but the 
duke would need to heed their requests for reimbursement, else risk the men’s disfavor 
(Ungnad).  In the meantime the troops had lost all respect and might desert at any time, 
let alone observe good regiment. 
 Captains never took desertion lightly, even by 1626, because it breached their 
bonds with their followers and placed their reputations in jeopardy.  Übele’s warning that 
open desertion had become endemic suggested how far those bonds had eroded in the 
years since Maximilian had begun his investment policy.  One dispute between lieutenant 
Hans Sparl and his recruit, Caspar Liezl, illustrates the lengths officers still took to 
prevent breaches with their men, and to exact restitution from those who did. 
 In spring 1626 Sparl left his captain’s headquarters at Fulda in Hessen to recruit 
for his company.95  Sparl would tour from town to town to collect volunteers and then, 
once his band had grown large enough, return to Fulda for the captain to approve and 
                                                                                                              
94 Ibid.  
95 Sparl discusses the incident with his colonel, Caspar Blarer von Wartensee, KuBay ÄA 2261 fol. 108-
110, 1626, Sparl to Blarer. 
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enroll his candidates.  In Reisbach, a Bavarian town in the Pfaffenhofen district, one local 
subject, Liezl, approached Sparl to express an interest in joining his men.  Sparl offered 
the young man an enlistment bounty and a seat at his table should he decide to enroll.  
Liezl hesitated, at first, but soon took the lieutenant’s coin, and the men welcomed him to 
his seat amongst them.   
Not long afterward Liezl got cold feet, however, and indicated he would rather 
return home than remain at the table.96  Sparl and his men spent some time trying to 
convince Liezl to stay on and, in the end, they persuaded him.  In exchange for the young 
man’s oath Sparl bestowed upon him his weapons and equipment, a ritual that made him 
a soldier in his company. 
Sparl gave Liezl a few days to set his affairs in order and agreed to meet him in 
Eichstätt when his tour reached the city later that April.97  On his way Sparl stopped in 
Schrobenhausen to set up his table at a local inn.  Late in the evening none other than 
Liezl came through the door, much to Sparl’s surprise, and returned his armaments.  He 
declared that he no longer intended to join the company.  Sparl refused to let the young 
man renege on his earlier word, but Liezl pleaded with him and promised he would find a 
suitable replacement for his seat at the table.  Sparl agreed, albeit with reluctance, and 
waited for Liezl to return with another candidate. 
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 Liezl never returned, however, and left Sparl little choice but to continue on with 
his tour and return to Fulda to introduce his men to the captain.  Before long he left on 
another recruitment round that took him through Passau.  One day he stopped in on the 
annual fair at Aicha vorm Wald and spotted, among the fairgoers, none other than Caspar 
Liezl, his former recruit. 98  In anger, Sparl produced his pistol.  He berated the young 
man for frivolity and fickleness and denounced him as a faithless liar.  Liezl, frightened, 
tried to make his escape, but he stumbled, got sick and vomited on the lieutenant.  Sparl 
released him on the promise that Liezl would make satisfaction for his betrayal, then 
continued on his tour. 
 Some time later Sparl’s travels took him once again past Schrobenhausen and 
Reisbach.99  On his way through the area Sparl took several men and rode into the village 
to locate Liezl and collect his satisfaction from him.  His search unsuccessful, the 
lieutenant got some locals to direct him to Liezl’s home where, in the young man’s 
absence, he took one draft horse from his family to settle the dispute.  He then continued 
on way having upheld his good name. 
 In the meantime Liezl lodged a formal complaint against Sparl with Maximilian’s 
local Pfleger at Pfaffenhofen.  Before long the Pfleger apprehended Sparl and his men, 
imprisoned them for several weeks, and ordered the lieutenant to render Liezl’s family 
one-hundred-seventy guilders in restitution for the stolen horse.  Sparl pleaded for his 
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colonel and cousin, Caspar Blarer von Wartensee, to intercede with Maximilian on his 
behalf.100 
 Sparl defended his actions on grounds that many witnesses would attest to the 
oath Liezl had sworn to him in Reisbach.  Liezl had, moreover, no reason to flee from 
him at the fair, because Sparl had neither threatened his life nor injured him in any way, 
he claimed.101  He asked that Blarer instead bring Liezl before the regimental court so the 
matter could be properly adjudicated by fellow soldiers under customary law.  In all his 
thirty-two years as a soldier, Sparl added, he had never met with such discreditable 
behavior as he had witnessed from Liezl.  Blarer, whom Sparl knew to be a renowned and 
honorable soldier, he said, would certainly understand. 
 In the years since 1622 officers had spared no effort, as Sparl’s and Übele’s 
stories demonstrate, to preserve their followings and reputations despite their financial 
struggles.  Several notable possessions captain Übele kept with him on campaign open 
one small window onto the methods they used to maintain their men’s confidence.  Some 
time after he wrote his letter, Übele perished on campaign from natural causes.  Upon his 
death the General Auditor inventoried his effects and sent them to the Dominican 
monastery near Worms for safekeeping.102  Übele’s belongings and his many debts fell to 
his widow, Anna Maria, who inquired after them at the monastery shortly after his death. 
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 Übele kept, first, gold and silver coin hoards collected on campaign, useful for 
collateral on loans and as slush funds for recruitment and other expenses.103  In one large 
chest bound with a worn red leather band he stored his signet and jewelry, his company’s 
battle standard folded in with his partisan, a reliquary cross, several mathematical and 
scientific instruments, including a surveyor’s compass, and some silver wares.  In a 
smaller white chest he stored his writing instruments and a small library that included 
several mathematical treatises, his muster rolls and a book of fiefs. 
 Each item in Übele’s chests could, when on display, communicate his standing, 
his leadership and courage in battle, his piety, his prowess on the hunt for spoils, and his 
ability to provide for the men under his command.  Books, register lists, instruments, 
treasure and wares suggested his technical knowledge, his largesse at open table, and the 
followers and dependents he had accumulated during his service.   
In addition Übele kept three further chests, two long ones stacked with pistols and 
muskets, respectively, and a third, shorter one piled with swords, likely the cheaper 
variety used by common soldiers.104  He may have intended these as gifts to bestow upon 
his new men, as Sparl had done with Liezl during his recruitment drive.  Übele’s sense 
that his company had declined, however, might explain why so many lay in their chests, 
unused, near the hour of his death. 
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Conclusion 
By summer, 1627, Ferdinand felt compelled to revise the contribution system in response 
to objections voiced by his supporters.  He ordered Wallenstein to use contribution levies 
solely as punitive measures against those who rendered aid to the rebels.  Contributions 
would, in effect, replace loot and booty as the preferred means to live from enemy lands.  
By the same principle Ferdinand began trying to settle his war debts with lands 
sequestrated from defiant rulers.105 
In 1630, once Denmark had exited the war, Ferdinand convened the electoral 
congress at Regensburg to devise a more sustainable military constitution for the 
empire.106  Electors agreed, first, that the imperial circles would administer regular 
contribution taxes to support a standing imperial army under Ferdinand’s sole authority, 
to last until the war’s conclusion.  Ferdinand would dismiss Wallenstein, reduce his 
forces to a 40,000 man field army, and leave local authorities to collect taxes on their 
own without coercion from garrison detachments.  Circle officials would allocate one-
third of their contribution revenues to support the League army, 20,000 strong, under 
Maximilian’s sole command as an independent, autonomous force.  Commanders would 
reserve outright collections for only those territories who defaulted on their taxes or 
refused to pay them altogether.  
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106 On the electoral congress see Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, 260-266; and Peter H. Wilson, Europe’s 
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In practice nearly everyone found the imposts too heavy to bear, however, so 
contributions occupied an ambiguous role between orderly taxation and coercive 
extraction.107  Poor villagers and townspeople resisted attackers just as fiercely as before 
because they knew their own governments would squeeze them harder to meet the 
conqueror’s demands.  Contributions enabled officers to fulfill obligations to their men as 
they saw fit without having to worry about the delicate balance between legitimate 
maintenance and illegal plunder.  
In the years after 1623 outright investment by League officers drained their 
finances too quickly to remain sustainable, even with loot and booty.  Most continued to 
refit their troops so they could fight in ongoing campaigns, but many expressed concern 
that their companies had begun to fall apart.  They went to great lengths to keep their men 
together and uphold their reputations, often through lavish pillage.  Maximilian praised 
their contributions as proof for their valor and devotion and, in exchange, eventually 
ceased all attempts to reform or disband them.  Once his troops began to openly praise 
Mansfeld he granted officers explicit permission to take illicit spoils in substitute for 
reimbursement from his treasury.  Tilly decided, in addition, to levy emergency 
contributions in Hessen to help ease the financial burdens. 
By mid-1624 Maximilian and his officers had worked out an unofficial new 
arrangement that helped make continued investment tolerable.  First, he guaranteed 
officers their commands would remain standing for the war’s duration, and that he would 
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reward them with further opportunities to grow their clienteles.  Second, he would hold 
no further musters, inspections, or recruitment drives, but simply entrust each unit’s 
welfare and upkeep to the captains and colonels.  Third, he would accept no resignations 
until the commander in question had found a successor to assume financial responsibility 
for his company or regiment.  Fourth and finally, he would allow reimbursement through 
spoils, often under the guise of contributions.   
Burdens on officers nonetheless remained great until Wallenstein, in 1625, 
created his new contribution system that had, by 1627, helped League officers relieve the 
pressure on their own finances.  Contributions remained the principal basis for war 
finance until the war’s conclusion in 1648 and demobilization in the early 1650s. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has provided a narrative account of negotiations undertaken between 
Maximilian I and his contractors over command prerogatives within the Catholic League 
army.  It has argued that the duke and his officers each used the army’s operations as a 
vehicle to exercise their lordship under the legal authority granted them by the imperial 
state.  It further suggests that they sought, in the process, to make their noble power as 
lords of war indispensible to the strength of the imperial monarchy and the governance of 
the Holy Roman Empire. 
 Maximilian tried, when he first mobilized the army in 1619, to usurp from his 
contractors the traditional lordly liberty to maintain their own men, to conduct partisan 
warfare and the hunt for spoils it entailed, and to exercise sole jurisdiction over the troops 
under their authority.  By asserting his own lordship in this way Maximilian hoped to 
retain strict control over the army’s conduct so as not to transgress the imperial 
commission that granted him constitutional authority to wage war on the emperor’s 
behalf.  His contractors, on the other hand, also wielded state power by virtue of the 
charters he had granted them as stipendiary commanders.  Between 1619 and 1622 they 
took up conservative positions to defend their privileges and, with them, their legal power 
to exercise lordship.  In the years after 1622, as Maximilian became more dependent 
upon their investment to keep the army in being, officers compelled him to cede them 
quasi-proprietary autonomy in their companies and regiments. 
 Once the League and Imperial armies began to operate together in the years after 
1626 their use of imperial contributions integrated Maximilian and the League more fully 
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into the emperor’s nascent military apparatus.  Contributions offered legal pretexts for 
plunder that resolved the original tensions between Maximilian and his contractors and 
obviated the need for further intensive negotiations.  In 1630 the electoral congress 
formally authorized the League to levy contributions as auxiliaries to the emperor’s army 
and thereby solidified Maximilian’s and his contractors’ position within the evolving 
imperial state.  Swedish victories in the 1630s destroyed the new constitutional 
arrangement, however, and contractors, rather than continue to invest in the monarchy, 
pinned their hopes instead on the houses of Austria and Bavaria as territorial, rather than 
imperial, lords. 
 In conceptual terms my dissertation uses the idea of “lordship” to understand how 
military contractors operated within the broader context of early modern state-formation.  
It speaks to new lines of scholarship that try to rehabilitate military contracting as a 
means of power-sharing whereby rulers deepened their ties to local elites for mutual 
benefit.  In placing partisan warfare at the center of the state’s exercise of juridical power 
at the local level, through contractors, it complicates narratives that associate the rise of 
territorial authority with corresponding declines in violence and the feud, and with the 
emergent civil-military divide. 
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